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Abstract
The main purpose of my thesis is to present a desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of 
justice. In this thesis, egalitarianism comes in two principal forms: teleological 
(telic) egalitarianism and deontological (deontic) egalitarianism. Telic 
egalitarianism says that we should aim for simple equality, because it makes the 
outcome better. Deontic egalitarianism says that we should aim for simple equality 
not because it makes the outcome better, but for some other morally relevant 
reason. While the two forms of egalitarianism are often regarded as incompatible 
positions in egalitarian justice, this thesis combines the two in such a way that telic 
egalitarianism is a baseline position but which allows deviations from it for reasons 
that deontic egalitarianism specifies.
In taking this approach, I show three things. The first is that telic 
egalitarianism as a base point can be fleshed out as the Principle of Baseline 
Equality. This principle holds that all people should be equally well off as a point 
of departure. This would very likely obtain in conditions of moderate scarcity 
(which is often called ‘the circumstances of justice’). The second is that deontic 
egalitarianism is better interpreted in the responsibility-sensitive form: substantive 
inequalities are morally permissible only if they precisely reflect people’s exercise 
of responsibility. This is what I formulate as the Responsibility-Based Principle of 
Inequality. This principle can apply in both negative—an agent’s responsibility for 
being worse off—and positive—an agent’s responsibility for being better
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off—directions. The important point is that implausibilities in the
responsibility-sensitive deontic egalitarian standard can be avoided by this 
principle, because it articulates a carefully narrowed understanding of what people 
are responsible for. The third is that the conception of desert can embrace these 
principles as combined desert bases in a way that grounds a system of moral duties 
owed to deserving parties. They can be tracked by our reactive attitudes only if 
they are dispositionally construed such that they are informed and impartially 
formed.
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C h a p te r  1
Introduction
This thesis presents a desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice. Like many other 
theories of justice, my argument can be regarded as an attempt to spell out a 
plausible conception of justice. The conception of justice specified in this thesis 
comprises a characteristic set of principles which aim to provide a fundamental 
basis of what we owe to each other. We can then say that the justice of a social 
scheme depends on how a fair system of moral duties is enforced under the 
principles of justice. In other words, the scheme that ascribes moral duties to 
people in such a way as to settle on the fair distribution of advantages from social 
cooperation is the subject-matter of justice, which is what John Rawls calls ‘the 
basic structure of society’ . 1 What is distinctive about Rawls’s proposal is that it 
uncovers the significance of the distributive aspect of justice that determines a fair 
allocation of advantages and burdens to people in the institutional scheme 
regulated under the relevant principles. Rawls’s egalitarian aspiration to work out a 
theory of distributive justice inspires my attempt to elucidate the principles of 
egalitarian justice, even though, in the final analysis, I take a stand against his 
theory, especially his arguments concerning the role of desert in the practice of
1 Rawls (1971: 7).
1
2 Desert-Sensitive Egalitarianism
distributive justice.2 3
In contrast to Rawls’s ambition to set out a theory of justice as an alternative 
to utilitarian theories, this thesis will be concerned mainly with egalitarian debates, 
not with arguments against utilitarian views of justice. This signifies a marked 
difference between the main focus of my argument and that of Rawls’s argument. 
It is not because Rawls’s theory successfully defeats utilitarianism in its 
contemporary forms that my argument need not take utilitarian arguments 
seriously. Rather, it is because the many great achievements of egalitarian 
discussions after the publication of Rawls’s A Theory o f Justice inevitably lead me 
to shift the target to egalitarian justice in pursuit of the conception of distributive 
justice.4
Giving responsibility a central role in distributive justice is the most 
noteworthy aspect of egalitarian debates. The responsibility-based version of 
egalitarianism is actively addressed by Ronald Dworkin, Richard Ameson, G. A. 
Cohen, Philippe Van Parijs, and John Roemer.5 This is often called ‘(brute) luck 
egalitarianism’ in that it aims to rule out, as far as is possible, the influence of sheer
2 See Chapter 5, Section 2.
3 As a matter of fact, there have been many attempts to offer rebuttals to Rawls’s criticisms of 
utilitarianism (e.g., Arrow 1973, Hare 1975, and Harsanyi 1976: Ch.4). Even on his famous 
characterisation of utilitarianism that it can hardly respect the separateness of persons, the adequacy 
of this criticism seems dubious if we think carefully about the distinction between teleology and 
deontology that is also relevant to utilitarian arguments (Kymlicka 1988; cf. Freeman 1994).
4 O f course, this does not show that other kinds of arguments (including utilitarian ones) outside 
the domain of egalitarian justice are not viable any more. Nor does it mean that some arguments 
which contend against egalitarianism are of little relevance to egalitarian debates. As I will argue in 
Chapter 4, the Principle of Self-Ownership that libertarians endorse has strongly to do with a 
condition under which an agent can be held responsible for being better off.
5 Ameson (1989; 1990), Cohen (1989), Roemer (1994; 1996; 1998), Van Parijs (1995), and 
Dworkin (2000) which collects two seminal articles on equality published in 1981.
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fortune for which an agent cannot be responsible.6 7Roemer nicely summarises this 
luck-egalitarian ethic: “society should indemnify people against poor outcomes 
that are the consequences of causes that are beyond their control, but not against 
outcomes that are the consequences of causes that are within their control, and 
therefore for which they are personally responsible.” The plausibility of this ethic 
is revealed by an appeal to the fair discrimination of egalitarian indemnification for 
the badly off consequences of a choice: these consequences will be compensated 
only to the extent to which people can in no way bear responsibility. By way of 
example, Dworkin maintains that a falling meteorite hitting a person is 
representative of cases in which compensation is legitimate, whereas deliberate and 
calculated gambles that could have been reasonably declined cannot justify the 
compensation for any loss flowing from gambling. 8 To put it very roughly, 
substantive inequalities resulting from responsible action are deserved, whereas 
unequal outcomes which have nothing to do with the exercise of responsibility are 
undeserved. It seems that this rescuing of personal responsibility and its 
desert-sensitivity from the arsenal of the right renders egalitarian justice a much 
more plausible concept of justice than might have been thought.
6 See, e.g., Anderson (1999), Ameson (2000a), Vallentyne (2002; 2003), and Scheffler (2003b). 
To be honest, 1 am reluctant to use the term ‘(brute) luck egalitarianism’ because, as will become 
evident, not all kinds o f sheer luck should be targeted in my argument (see Chapters 3 and 4). But 
following these works, I adopt this conventional term.
7 Roemer (1994: 179-180).
8 Dworkin (2000: 73). Notoriously, whether and how we can draw the line between responsible 
outcomes and non-responsible ones is one o f the most contentious issues in egalitarian debates. This 
is because we have to confront complications and difficulties with the identification o f factors that 
are not within individuals’ control, as far as egalitarian justice goes (e.g., Price 1999; Fleurbaey 
2001; Lippert-Rasmussen 2001; Vallentyne 2002; Sandbu 2004). In Chapters 3 and 4,1 will suggest 
a promising way o f determining the range o f outcomes for which people are responsible, by 
formulating the responsibility-based principle o f deontological egalitarianism.
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Recently, however, the luck-egalitarian ethic has been under fire for three 
reasons. First, this ethic seems non-egalitarian, since responsibility as such can by 
no means assure an equal pattern of distribution. More generally, the consideration 
of people’s responsibility is of no relevance to any specification of favourable 
patterns in terms of equality, for there is no guarantee that the redistribution of 
advantages for which people are not responsible would amount to equalisation.9 As 
Susan Hurley says, this is fallacious, because “the fact that people are not 
responsible for difference does not entail that they are responsible for 
nondifference.” 10 There is no inherent connection between equality and 
responsibility. Second, the luck-egalitarian ethic seems anti-egalitarian, in such a 
way as to allow for unequal results that may involve harsh treatment of the 
responsibly badly off. This means that those who are in great need through their 
own fault may be left unaided, on the basis of the merciless attribution of 
responsibility to them. Under the scheme based on the luck-egalitarian ethic, for 
instance, an uninsured driver who is heavily injured because of reckless driving 
may be left to die. This seems to run contrary to our considered judgments about 
claims of the urgently needy. * 11 Third, as can be inferred from these two concerns, 
the conception of egalitarian justice that reflects the luck-egalitarian ethic seems 
inappropriate for providing a bedrock for the basic structure of society. The system 
of moral duties grounded by some desert-sensitive principle that echoes the
9 The redistribution o f manna from heaven as such varies depending on how to redistribute it. 
There seem two main ways o f redistribution: the first is to allocate it equally among people; the 
second is to distribute it such that the effects o f sheer luck are neutralised (Vallentyne 2003: 
175-178). Note that, as Hurley explicitly recognises, either way o f redistribution would not assure 
equalisation (Hurley 2003: 151-155).
10 Hurley (2003: 152; emphasis original).
11 See, e.g., Fleurbaey (1995: 39-43), Anderson (1999: 295-298), and Fried (2003: 135-146), for 
this anti-egalitarian charge.
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luck-egalitarian ethic may give rise to a repugnant moral guidance. The 
above-mentioned case in which there is no duty to rescue the uninsured driver 
amply illustrates this.
It should be evident that to fulfil the task of explicating the conception of 
egalitarian justice, there is a need to demonstrate that the conception in question 
can deal with these three concerns. The easiest—and actually most popular—way 
of coping with them is to recant the luck-egalitarian ethic: individual responsibility 
should not matter to the determination of how to distribute whatever we want to 
distribute among people. Some supporters of this move tend to favour an allocation 
of advantages in accord with demands of equal respect and concern for human 
beings, to the extent that everyone can enjoy a decent life. 12 Others would propose 
a distribution of advantages in such a way as to give priority to the worse off,
n
regardless of their responsibility. The former may roughly be called 
‘sufficientarians’, whereas the latter are dubbed ‘prioritarians’. Setting aside the 
details, their view is regarded as having more egalitarian consequences, because 
they are not concerned with how substantive inequalities come about: what these 
positions enjoin is help the worse off or people whose life is below the threshold of 
decency. Their implicit attitude is that we should forgo the consideration of 
personal responsibility built in the luck-egalitarian ethic. 14
However, I do not employ this approach. My argument is committed to 
neither sufficientarianism nor prioritarianism. This is because if we acquire a
12 See, e.g., Frankfurt (1987), Wolff (1998), Anderson (1999), and Crisp (2003). In Section 3 of 
Chapter 6 , 1 will examine— then refute— arguments o f this kind, especially the one which is fully set 
out in Anderson (1999), as the compassion argument for basic needs trumping desert.
13 On this view, see, e.g., Temkin (1993: Ch.9; 2000), McKerlie (1996), and Parfit (2000).
14 Richard Ameson’s prioritarian proposal is an exception. His prioritarianism is weighed by an 
individual’s responsibility for being badly off, which is named ‘responsibility-catering 
prioritarianism’ (Ameson 1999a: 237-238; 2000a: 340).
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plausible conception of egalitarian justice then the luck-egalitarian ethic can be 
viably preserved such that the three aforementioned worries do not come into play. 
My goal in this thesis thus is to elaborate the conception in question that puts 
responsibility in full play.
There are three proposals corresponding to those three worries about the 
desert-sensitive conception of egalitarian justice:
1) A pluralist synthesis of egalitarian justice: Egalitarian justice, in my view, 
should not be taken as constitutive of only one relevant principle that specifies the 
range of substantive inequalities for which people are responsible. Egalitarian 
justice can be a pluralist concept. We can appeal to another kind of principle that 
stems directly from the value of equality in itself. This teleological form of 
egalitarian principle holds that all people should be equally well off as a point of 
departure (In Chapter 2 ,1 will flesh out this as ‘the Principle of Baseline Equality’). 
Since this principle provides a basis for equality (even in cases in which the 
consideration of responsibility may on balance outweigh the moral value of 
equalisation), the non-egalitarian worry can be diffused.13 The further point of the 
pluralist conception of egalitarian justice is that the principles in question can be 
combined, in that the teleological principle at stake guarantees the baseline of 
equality while deviations from the base point are justified for deontological 
reasons: all people should be equally well off unless there is some morally relevant 
reason not to do so. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will demonstrate that the relevant 
consideration of responsibility provides such a reason.
15 Chapter 2 argues that the principle in question is endorsed by virtue of a non-arbitrary reason, 
not placed as a mere default. As will become clear there, my proposal thus is not susceptible to 
Hurley’s charge against the equality-default view, according to which equality does not have any 
moral ground because of its mere default assumption (Hurley 2003: 153-155).
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As will be argued in Chapter 2, there are three points that should be noted in 
relation to this pluralist synthesis of egalitarian principles. First, the two principles 
combined in this way should not violate the uncontroversial presumption about the 
equal worth of human beings. No violation of this fundamental idea of human 
equality must be allowed in the name of justice, since any moral hierarchical view 
of human life is nothing less than perverse. Second, this pluralist synthesis of the 
two principles is conditional on the circumstances in which we are standing. As I 
see it, conditions of moderate scarcity (which are often called ‘the circumstances of 
justice’) are a striking feature of contemporary society. Third, moral principles as 
such are not of an exceptionless kind: in some cases, the value of simple equality 
may outweigh the deontological consideration of an agent’s responsibility. This 
outweighing need not be considered as ad hoc or inconsistent because our 
engagement with overall deliberation over the moral status of simple equalisation 
can be properly regulated under the fundamental idea of human equality.
2) A carefully narrowed understanding of responsibility: The deontological 
principle that permits substantive inequalities to obtain on account of people’s 
exercise of responsibility, on my argument, should be formulated such that the 
range of their responsibility is strictly—thus narrowly— specified. This way of 
understanding an agent’s responsibility contributes tremendously to the avoidance 
of implausible implications, due to which the responsibility-sensitive construal of 
egalitarianism has been charged as anti-egalitarian. There are two points worth 
mentioning about this proposal. First, responsibility-ascription should not be 
considered as an all-or-nothing matter. We can say that people are comparatively 
more (or less) responsible for unequal advantages. The implausibility of holding 
people either completely responsible or not at all responsible (but nothing in
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between) can be evaded. Second, the precise specification of people’s 
responsibility would lead us to heed the residual part of any consequence of choice 
for which they are not ultimately responsible. This is because, in my view, no one 
can be fully responsible on grounds that no one is fully rational and perfectly 
informed in actual circumstances. This helps to ward off the dreadful implication 
of the responsibility-based conception of egalitarian justice, namely that some of 
the needy may be left unaided. As will be shown in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
responsibility-sensitive version of the deontological egalitarian principle—which is 
what I want to call ‘the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality’— is applied 
in both negative (an agent’s responsibility for being worse off) and positive (an 
agent’s responsibility for being better off) directions.
3) A desert-sensitive scheme that can ground moral duties: The pluralist
principles of egalitarian justice can be embraced as the conception of desert that 
provides a full account of how we owe moral duties in society. As I mentioned 
above, grounding moral duties is the primary subject of justice, so how the 
proposed egalitarian principles can generate such duties is fundamental to our 
inquiry into egalitarian justice. For this reason, one of my main concerns is how 
desert can function as the mechanism through which we discern our moral duties. 
As will be argued in Chapter 5, there are two reasons that desert can play the 
distinct role in question. First, the combined principles of egalitarian justice that I 
will spell out in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 can provide two combined bases of desert, 
which can deal with widespread scepticism against desert in the issues of 
egalitarian justice, especially when it comes to the desert-responsibility connection. 
Second, desert claims can be closely linked to our reactive attitudes, in that the 
reactive attitudes can fully track what the combined desert bases prescribe. In other
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words, we acknowledge our prima facie moral duties to deserving parties, whether 
direct or indirect, through the relevant observations of our reactive emotions just in 
case these reactive attitudes are well-informed and formed impartially in the 
circumstances of justice. As Chapter 6 shows, this scheme would not only avoid 
the appalling policy of leaving the seriously needy unaided but also provide a more 
morally acceptable treatment of the worst off: the normative space of basic needs 
can be reasonably appreciated in my desert-sensitive egalitarianism.
Before elaborating upon these three proposals, I must make one preliminary 
remark: throughout this thesis, I put aside domain questions such as equality o f  
what or equality of opportunity for what. I assume that equality is related to the 
promotion of advantages for a person’s well-being, namely that the conception of 
equality discussed here is more than ‘basal equality’—that is, equality of 
something.16 The conception of equality should not merely entail the endorsement 
of basal equality so understood, since it should have more to do with an equal 
distribution of advantages that matters for an individual’s well-being. It might 
seem controversial to just assume that redistributing advantages of some kind 
consists in more than basal equality, unless we specify the domain. Although I do 
not deny that the specification of a metric is crucial, there seems to be a reasonable 
consensus about what kinds of positive benefits are seen as relevant advantages 
calculated in a way that reflects a diversity of people’s functioning. As Norman 
Daniels points out, for instance, there is a similarity of targets of equalisation in 
Rawls’s and Sen’s arguments, notwithstanding Sen’s criticism of Rawls’s
16 As Amartya Sen argues, basal equality says that in any theory equality is sought in some space. 
So basal equality includes equality o f libertarian rights that Robert Nozick puts forward (Sen 1992: 
12-13).
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fetishising primary goods.17 For our purposes, this alignment of otherwise different 
arguments on the metric of equality allows us to assume that equalisation is such 
that advantages (of some relevant kind) are distributed to the extent that people are 
equally well off.
17 Daniels (1990: 276-285).
C hapter 2
T he Principle o f B aseline E quality
1. Introduction
My first task in this thesis is to identify and justify a teleological form of egalitarian 
principle that derives directly from the value of equality itself. It goes without 
saying that equality is a dominant value in most theories of distributive justice. 
This is due to the fact that extant inequalities of various sorts—political, legal, 
social, and economic—pose central problems for any kind of society, from local 
communities to the global society. Many philosophers have tried to articulate 
conceptions of equality to deal with those problems.
I now focus on a most intuitive conception of equality among these: simple 
equality. Simple equality is defined such that all people are at the same level of 
advantages. For a plausible comparison between simple equality and our current 
world that has more or less inequalities, it seems reasonable to confine simple 
equality to that which would be achieved in the closest possible world to our own, 
where there is least demand for advantages to be transferred from the better off to 
the worse off. The world in question should be the closest possible world because, 
otherwise, it might be utterly utopian—far different from our actual world. Implicit 
in this commonplace conception of equality is that substantive inequalities are
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deviations from simple equality. 1
We are now in a position to consider how we should evaluate the value of 
simple equality. There are two main ways. First, simple equality is read 
teleologically such that we should strive for simple equality because we thereby 
make the outcome better. This view may be equated with the non-instrumental 
egalitarian view that simple equality is valuable in itself.2 This is often contrasted 
to a deontological view of simple equality in which we should aim for simple 
equality, not because it makes the outcome better, but for some other morally 
relevant reason. In other words, the deontological reading of simple equality is 
concerned with how substantive inequalities are produced. The consideration of an 
individual's responsibility, for instance, may provide a morally relevant reason for 
(or against) substantive inequalities. Since this distinction is made on the basis of 
the fact that while teleology refers to end-states, deontology refers to actions or 
treatments, let me thus call these views ‘telic egalitarianism’ and ‘deontic 
egalitarianism’ respectively.3
With these points in mind, I can now state a main aim of this chapter: to 
argue for one age-old principle of equality which has been championed by classical 
thinkers including Aristotle, John Locke, and Marquis de Condorcet, and also by 
contemporary philosophers, of whom Isaiah Berlin is representative.4 Let me
1 The concept of simple equality seems dominant in egalitarian debates. As Larry Temkin argues, 
however, our actual judgments about equality usually involve a complex process of reasoning: there 
are different ideas and lines of thought with respect to inequality (Temkin 1993: Ch.2). This is 
undoubtedly true. But 1 regard simple equality as the conception of equality that captures our basic 
intuition behind the complexities of our judgments about inequality. On this point, see McKerlie 
(1995: 627-628).
2 See, e.g., Temkin (1993; 2000) and Mason (2001).
3 Derek Parfit, I think, is the first to name them telic and deontic egalitarianism in his Lindley 
Lecture at the University of Kansas, 21 November 1991. See Parfit (2000: 84ff).
4 Berlin (1978). See also Benn and Peters (1959: 110-111) and Barry (1965: 119-120).
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formulate this principle as follows:
The Principle o f  Baseline Equality: All people should be equally well off as
a point of departure.
Notice that, on my argument, this principle is formulated in its telic form. Most of 
the supporters I mentioned above, by contrast, have upheld its deontological form, 
which says that everyone should be treated as equals unless there is sufficient 
reason to do otherwise. Why I want to take the Principle of Baseline Equality in its 
telic form is that it is not only defensible, but, as I will show, it can be combined 
with a deontic egalitarian principle that I want to support.
In arguing for the Principle of Baseline Equality in the telic egalitarian form,
I should wrestle with a famous criticism of it: the Principle of Baseline Equality is 
logically untenable because there is no clear reason to start with simple equality 
(rather than some substantively unequal state). In other words, we cannot exclude 
selecting some kind of inequality as a baseline, since this principle, it is argued, 
does not answer why simple equality has enough moral weight to be qualified as 
the base point.5
This chapter purports to defend the Principle of Baseline Equality against this 
charge. I thereby demonstrate that this principle is plausible, if it is located properly 
in the desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice. To do so, I clarify three points 
in defence of the Principle of Baseline Equality in its telic form.
First, telic egalitarianism can be endorsed under the uncontroversial idea of 
human equality: all humans are of equal worth. In egalitarian debates, there is a 
tendency to think that deontic egalitarianism exhaustively captures this idea of 
human equality, while telic egalitarianism does not. In Section 2, I want to argue
5 Many philosophers have criticised this principle in this way. See, e.g., Nozick (1974: 222-224), 
Nagel (1979: 119), Norman (1987: 57-58), Gibbard (1991: 268-269), John Kane (1996: 388-389), 
Kolm (1996: 37), Pojman (1997: 283-284), and Hurley (2003: 154-155).
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against this tendency on two grounds. First, a pluralism of egalitarian principles 
does not undermine the normative relevance of telic egalitarianism. Second, more 
positively, the moral virtue of telic egalitarianism can be demonstrated by three 
egalitarian cases that any deontic egalitarian principle may not solely handle. This 
enables us to see that telic egalitarianism constitutes a non-arbitrary reason for 
simple equality and so would pave the way for the Principle of Baseline Equality.
The second point is that we can explain why simple equality is better placed 
as a point of departure. For this claim, I contend that it is important to attend to our 
social context. In egalitarian debates, the context-dependency of values, factors, 
and moral principles has not been appreciated. My argument will be that the 
emphasis on the importance of examining the actual conditions we are confronting 
leads us to take simple equality as a base point. As will be noted, that focus on the 
context dependency of egalitarian principles pushes us to go further: egalitarian 
justice can enjoy a pluralist synthesis between the telic egalitarian principle and the 
egalitarian principle of a deontic kind. In Section 3 ,1 explore this.
My third point is that while the Principle of Baseline Equality can be 
supported by virtue of a non-arbitrary reason that telic egalitarianism provides, the 
reason is nothing like that which is weighed automatically through a 
principle-based mechanical procedure. The Principle of Baseline Equality is not of 
an exceptionless, complete kind, such that no active deliberation is required in any 
case of a given context. In Section 4, I demonstrate that the Principle of Baseline 
Equality should not be taken as a perfect guide to any action, but rather be the 
moral principle which always, if necessary, engages us in overall deliberation over 
the moral status of reducing substantive inequalities. I show that the political idea 
of human equality plays a regulative role in deliberation of this kind, especially in 
conflicting cases in which moral requirements that different principles enjoin
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cannot simultaneously be met in the name of justice.
2. Defending Telic Egalitarianism
In defending the Principle of Baseline Equality, I want to show that telic 
egalitarianism is supportable and so enables us to see the moral weight of simple 
equality in itself. To do so, let me start with the commonsense idea of human 
equality: all people are of equally moral worth. This commonplace idea is, 
implicitly or explicitly, endorsed by many contemporary egalitarians.6 Among 
such egalitarians are some who simply presume this idea to develop their own 
argument; others try to provide a metaphysical justification for it. Ronald Dworkin 
is representative of the former. As is well known, he is committed to the abstract 
egalitarian thesis: all people are entitled to equal concern and respect.7 According 
to this thesis, policies of any kind that the social planners implement must be such 
that all people can accept them without abandoning their sense of equal human 
dignity.8 This is, however, supported without defending the thesis that “[equal 
human] rights have some metaphysical character.” 9 On the other hand, Kantian 
egalitarians attempt to justify human equality on grounds that all humans possess 
(potential) rational capacities of an essential minimum for setting and pursuing
6 As Will Kymlicka describes, this idea o f human equality has many supporters including Marxists 
and Robert Nozick (Kymlicka 1990: 4-5). This implies that many political theories share this basic 
idea, even though they disagree about how this should be fleshed out. My argument here does not 
deny the possibility that arguments o f a nonegalitarian kind might capture the idea o f human equality. 
My goal is rather to show that a pluralist synthesis o f egalitarian principles provides a plausible 
substantiation o f the idea o f human equality.
7 Dworkin (1977: 179-183; 1986: 296-301).
8 Dworkin (1985: 205-206). Elsewhere Dworkin refers to this thesis as ‘deep equality’ (Dworkin 
1985:271-273).
9 Dworkin (1977: xi).
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ends including what morality requires. 10 This metaphysical defence of human 
equality may gain support broadly. It has been challenged, however, to the effect 
that this could hardly convince Nietzscheans, (some kinds of) perfectionists, and 
Animal Liberationists. 11
Here I do not want to join metaphysical debates of this sort, because for our 
purposes, the metaphysical justification is not needed. That is to say, whether any 
metaphysical argument for human equality is successful or not, it seems reasonable 
to think that the idea of human equality is much less controversial as a regulative 
political ideal} 1 As Dworkin writes, “[fjrom the standpoint of politics, the interests 
of the members of the community matter, and matter equally. ” 13 This is because it 
is nothing less than perverse—at least counterintuitive—to claim that the fact that 
some people are more morally worthy than others (if at all) would make a 
difference to any distributive principle of justice. The perverseness of such a claim 
is easily grasped with a moment’s thought that the hierarchical view of persons 
would demolish our historical achievements of human equality through the French 
Revolution, the American Declaration of Independence, and the Emancipation 
Proclamation. It still might be said that human equality as such is no more than 
presumptive even at the level of political idea: no justification is provided for the 
idea of human equality. My response is that the political idea of human equality is 
forceful enough to shift the burden of proof to its opponents, if we consider
10 See, e.g., Rawls (1971: 504-512) and Gutmann (1980: 33-41). For a recent argument for the 
metaphysical defence of human equality, see Korsgaard (1996a: Ch.4; 1996b: 92-94).
11 See, e.g., Dubs (1944), Singer (1976), and Pojman (1997). For an illuminating discussion of this 
issue, see Ameson (1999b).
12 In Section 4 below, I shall discuss a distinct role of the regulative ideal. In particular, I will show 
that the regulative political ideal plays an important role in conflicting cases that a pluralism of moral 
principles may generate.
13 Dworkin (1983: 24; emphasis added).
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seriously the perverseness of rejecting human equality. In other words, those who 
deny the idea of human equality must provide a justification for their denial, 
whereas this is not a task for defenders of human equality. 14 This, I believe, helps 
us avoid the task of justifying human equality at the level of political idea.
Our focus now is on whether telic egalitarianism follows from this 
fundamental idea of human equality. At first glance, this seems so because in most 
situations, if not all, there appears at least some respect in which simple equality is 
in itself desirable. Nevertheless, many egalitarians, who endorse, explicitly or 
implicitly, the regulative political ideal of human equality, tend to favour the 
deontological line of argument that takes treatment as equals to be our 
fundamental concern, rather than the telic line. Famously, Dworkin writes: “the 
right to treatment as an equal, which is the right, not to receive the same 
distribution of some burden or benefit, but to be treated with the same respect and 
concern as anyone else . . .  is fundamental.” 15 Thomas Nagel, who explicitly 
supports the regulative political ideal of human equality that obliges us to see the 
well-being of others as having the same importance as ours, also insists: “A society 
that permits significant inequalities among its members, in advantages and 
disadvantages for which they are not responsible, will be perceived as failing to 
treat them equally: it distinguishes in its treatment of them along morally arbitrary 
lines.” 16 It is for a similar reason that Brian Barry, who endorses our reliance “upon
141 owe this to Shelly Kagan’s argument (Kagan 1988: 30).
15 Dworkin (1977: 227).
l6Nagel (1991: 106). See also McKerlie (1996: 282-283). However, Nagel’s position could be 
differently interpreted, since he sometimes advocates a prioritarian view as a substantive form of 
telic egalitarianism; for example, “[t]here are evils to which the equal concern o f impartiality 
responds, favoring those at the bottom of the heap and . . . institutions which improve their status.” 
(Nagel 1991: 69). Parfit thus thinks that Nagel is partially committed to telic egalitarianism, although, 
as Parfit points out, Nagel tends to blur the distinction between telic egalitarianism and deontic
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a fundamental commitment to the equality of all human beings,” also claims that 
“[t]his still leaves it open that inequalities may be legitimated.” 17 For these 
egalitarians, the idea of human equality has much less or nothing to do with telic 
egalitarianism; the connection in question is at most derivative from the human 
equality-deontic egalitarian line, not fundamental at any rate.
This is not unintelligible if we see what the regulative political ideal of 
human equality pushes us to care about. Although the idea of human equality does 
deny that some can be accorded special privilege on the basis of their worth, such 
denial does not necessarily promote distributive policies in a direction of simple 
equality. Rather, it allows that substantive inequalities obtain if, as Dworkin, Nagel, 
and Barry say with one accord, everyone is treated on the same footing. This is 
certainly echoed by the deontic framework within which the moral badness of 
substantive inequalities is judged in light of how they come about. To see this, 
suppose that we (or the social planners) are in a position to benefit only one person 
without any sacrifice. Suppose also that there are two people who are in dire straits: 
the first is a person who is responsible for being worse off, while the second is 
destitute through no fault of her own. Assume that we (or the social planners) are 
given the information about their responsibility. Which person should be 
benefited? Deontic egalitarians may say that the additional benefit should be 
conferred to the second, not to the first. 18 Since, in this manner, deontic
egalitarinism (Parfit2000: 86-88).
17 Barry (1995: 8).
18 Maybe not all deontic egalitarians say so, since some deontic egalitarians lay more weight on a 
fair sort o f social cooperation as a token o f deontology (Norman 1998: 38-41; see also Parfit 2000: 
87-88). But even so, it is important to note that responsibility can be interpreted in ways that fit with 
the fair scheme o f social cooperation; an institution-based view o f responsibility is exemplary. (1 am 
not committed to the institutional-based account o f responsibility. See Chapters 3 and 4.) So the 
example under discussion is also relevant to deontic egalitarianism o f a contractual ist kind that
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egalitarianism puts a greater emphasis on the non-arbitrary way of satisfying each 
person’s claim than on creating simple equality, the regulative political ideal of 
human equality that first and foremost directs us to exclude such arbitrariness 
underpins the deontic position.
It then may well be questioned if the Principle of Baseline Equality, whose 
form is telic egalitarian, could really be supportable under the regulative political 
ideal of human equality. This worry can be warded off, however. There are two 
reasons that telic egalitarianism can have a place under this idea.
First, it is mistaken to think that egalitarianism must be either telic or deontic 
in its form. 19 Unfortunately, there is a tendency to treat this issue as if telic 
egalitarianism is incompatible with deontic egalitarianism.20 This is undoubtedly a 
mistake, however. It is worthwhile noting that in defining the distinction between 
telic egalitarianism and deontic egalitarians, Derek Parfit clearly says that “[w]e 
might of course have beliefs of both kinds” .21 This is obviously true (but has been 
often ignored) since if we admit a pluralism of egalitarian principles then both can 
be endorsed, even though we might have to deal with conflicting claims based on 
each of the principles.22 In the following two chapters, I demonstrate that a deontic 
principle of egalitarian justice that permits substantive inequalities is that which 
reflects people’s exercise of responsibility. This is what I shall defend as the
advances the view o f a fair division o f responsibility among reasonable citizens. For defences o f this 
view see Scanlon (1988: 85-89) and Rawls (1999: 371-372).
19 See Temkin (1993: 18) and McKerlie (1996: 275).
20 A typical example is Elizabeth Anderson’s criticism o f luck egalitarianism. She treats luck 
egalitarianism as a monistic argument o f deontic egalitarianism, which cannot be compatible with 
her threshold-based argument for political equality (Anderson 1999; see also Scheffler 2003b). I will 
scrutinise Anderson’s argument as representative o f the compassion argument for basic needs in 
Section 3 o f Chapter 6.
21 Parfit (2000: 84).
22 In Section 4 below, I shall argue what we should do in the face o f such conflicting cases.
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Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality. The next section shows how this 
principle can fit into my desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice which, as I am 
arguing, also contains the Principle of Baseline Equality. Here, suffice it to say that 
the existence of such a deontic principle of egalitarian justice does not repudiate its 
compatibility with the Principle of Baseline Equality at all.23
Of course, merely allowing for the possibility of pluralist egalitarian justice 
does not provide any positive argument for telic egalitarianism, since this may be 
nothing more than rejecting the indirect objection to telic egalitarianism. I thus 
should say something positive in defence of telic egalitarianism. So the second 
reason that telic egalitarianism has a place under the regulative political ideal of 
human equality should tell us that there is no reason to stop at the level of deontic 
egalitarianism (at least in some cases if not all). In other words, we should confirm 
that deontic egalitarianism does not exhaust what the regulative political ideal of 
human equality requires. I contend that this is confirmed when we see that telic 
egalitarianism can deal with the following three egalitarian cases, whereas deontic 
egalitarianism may hardly do so:24
The first case is that telic egalitarianism can fully prescribe the helping of 
needy strangers, even when no injustices to them are involved. Let me show this 
by an appeal to a hypothetical story. Imagine people living on different and
23 This point is explored in Chapter 5, where I argue that the telic egalitarian principle o f  
justice— the Principle o f Baseline Equality— can provide a desert base in a way that can be 
combined with the one stemming from the Responsibility-Based Principle o f Inequality: both bases 
can indeed ground a normative force o f desert such that we incur corresponding duties to deserving 
parties.
241 do not mean that the three egalitarian cases discussed below are all telic egalitarianism can 
cope with. There may be more. For one thing, as 1 will mention elsewhere in Section 8 o f Chapter 3, 
the value o f simple equality that telic egalitarianism carries is relevant to merciful treatment o f the 
worse o ff through their negligence in their youth, even though they are responsible for the large 
portion o f their worse off outcome.
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completely isolated islands: on one island natural resources are bountiful; the other 
has almost no resources. Suppose that no relationship involving any institutional 
imposition of duties exists between the two. As a result, there is a great difference 
of the quality of life between the two islands.2' Assume that there is something we 
can do for redistributing resources between the islands. Given that there is no 
unfair treatment of people on each island, deontic egalitarianism may find nothing 
bad about the difference. But we may well deplore about this gap, because only 
one set of islanders enjoy an abundance of worldly resources. Telic egalitarianism 
can explain the badness of this discrepancy in people’s well-being between the two, 
because this state of affairs is evaluated as bad in itself. This, I think, suits our 
considered judgments, since in the face of this state of affairs, our sympathetic 
emotion may well urge us to consider how dire is the position of the people on the 
barren island.“ It should be evident that this hypothetical story is suggestive in 
dealing with the issue of whether and how much we owe a duty to aid needy 
strangers. Its details aside, we can now clearly see why telic egalitarianism is more 
appealing than deontic in cases of this sort: the telic view can justify the prompt 
response to people who stand in need of help even if they have never been
27wronged.
The second is our concern for the self-respect of those who are far worse off. 
Substantive inequalities of any extreme kind may impair the self-respect of the
25 This example is adapted from McKerlie (1996:280-181).
26 In Chapter 5, Sections 3 and 4, I will argue the role o f  reactive emotions such as sympathy in 
cases o f  this kind in detail.
27 Note that this case is that in which no negative duties are involved because o f no interaction 
between the two islands. I do not aim to deny, however, that deontic egalitarianism may explain a 
duty owed to the distant poor as a negative duty to them in the actual world (e.g., Pogge 2002). As 
will become apparent in the next chapters, our precise understanding o f an agent’s responsibility 
helps justify our corresponding duty to her in a way that matches our considered judgments.
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worse off, to the extent that their self-respect would find it hard to recover. As 
Thomas Scanlon observes:
The obvious examples are economic institutions which yield such great 
disparities of wealth and income that some people experience shame and 
humiliation because they must live in a way that is far below what most 
people in the society regard as minimally acceptable. There are also 
non-economic examples, such as a society in which almost everyone places 
great value and importance on certain forms of accomplishment, forms that
many, but not all, can attain, and in which it is regarded as a great misfortune
2 8not to be “successful” in these ways.
We thus may well perceive the worse off who suffer not merely from material 
disadvantages but also from personal wretchedness, owing to the impairment of 
their self-respect. On this point, there are two things worth mentioning. First, 
self-respect is seen as an essential component of the well-being of reasonable 
people—no matter what kind of metric is employed. 29 Second, undermining 
anyone’s self-respect runs afoul of the idea of human equality that entitles all 
people to equal respect and concern. It thus may make sense to favour simple 
equality in some situations if not all, under the regulative political ideal of human 
equality. Telic egalitarians can support this move, while deontic egalitarians may
T A
not. It is interesting to note that telic egalitarianism might be judged desirable at 
least in some respect, even in cases in which we have to lower the socioeconomic 
level of well-being; by taking into account the significant impact of the loss of 
self-respect, people might reasonably prefer a state of affairs in which they all 
enjoy a simple life style in an egalitarian community to the prosperous but 
extremely unequal state of affairs.31
28 Scanlon (2003:213-214). Nagel also notices this problem (Nagel 1991: 19).
29 Recall what Rawls says about self-respect: “self-respect is perhaps the most important primary 
good” (Rawls 1971:440).
30 See Wolff (1998). Cf. Hinton (2001).
31 For a presentation of this point, see Norman (1998: 51).
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The third case is that the exclusive attention to individuals’ claims in deontic 
terms may ignore the persistence of residual inequalities. For instance, social 
inequalities such as gender, ethnic, and racial inequalities are so resilient that to 
implement the only deontic framework in which people are treated as equals would 
not be doing enough, in the light of the political idea of human equality. This is 
because those inequalities are entrenched in historically shaped social relations, as 
is the case of the sexual division of labour. Iris Young writes: “the causes of many 
inequalities of resources or opportunities among individuals lie in social 
institutions, their rules and relations, and the decisions others make within them 
that affect the lives of the individuals compared.” 32 On inequalities of these 
structural sorts, a simple kind of egalitarian policy that promotes simple equality 
may often be more effective than that which cares only about whether and how the
33inequalities flow from the responsible exercise of individual choice.
It becomes increasingly clear that deontic egalitarianism does not exhaust 
what human equality regulates as our political idea. Telic egalitarianism is also 
morally relevant. I have shown two reasons— a negative reason and a positive 
reason: first, a pluralism of egalitarian principles does not deny the compatibility 
between a telic egalitarian principle and a deontic one. Second, there are at least 
three egalitarian cases that simple equality can handle, while treatment as equals 
may hardly do so. It thus can be said that there is a non-arbitrary reason for simple 
equality that is teleologically read. But a question arises: how much does telic 
egalitarianism carry the moral weight for reducing substantive inequalities? A 
good way of answering this question, I believe, is to compare the moral strength of 
the telic egalitarian principle with that of the egalitarian principle of a deontic kind
,2 Young (2001:8). See also Anderson (1999: 288).
33 In a similar vein, Anne Phillips stresses the value o f simple equality, especially as far as gender 
equality goes (Phillips 1999: 45-51; 2004).
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in our social context—the typical conditions of modem society. As will become 
clear, the attempt to tackle this question leads us to see why simple equality should 
be set as a point of departure. It is for the same reason that we can see how the 
principle based on telic egalitarianism can be combined with the egalitarian 
principle of a deontic kind, the responsibility-based one, in conditions we are 
facing. In the next section, I explore this.
3. Why ‘Baseline’ Equality
For the purposes of this section, it is worth re-examining a well-known objection to 
telic egalitarianism, not just because we need to defeat the powerful objection to 
the core thesis of the Principle of Baseline Equality, but because by refuting it we 
will be able to see the extent to which telic egalitarianism promotes simple 
equality: we can thereby see why simple equality should be a base point. So to start, 
I want to introduce the objection to telic egalitarianism: the Levelling Down 
Objection.34 Advocates of the Levelling Down Objection say that there is nothing 
good about producing simple equality if no one is benefited from the equalisation. 
Larry Temkin formulates this as the Slogan: one situation cannot be better than 
another in any respect if there is no one for whom it is better in any respect.3'^  The 
reason this is an objection to telic egalitarianism is that, no matter what kinds of 
side effects the change brings about, it is argued, telic egalitarianism claims that 
simple equality is in itself a desirable feature. But this implication seems quite 
absurd, since no one seems to find any plausibility in the claim that others should 
be brought down to the lowest level of well-being if it is the only way of simple
’4 There are many discussions over the Levelling Down Objection that cannot be explored in this 
thesis (e.g., Temkin 1993; 2000; Parfit 2000; Mason 2001; Brown 2003; and Crisp 2003).
35 Temkin (1993: 248-249,256-258; 2000: 134).
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equalisation. How can telic egalitarians respond to this accusation?
There is a way of showing that this reasoning is flawed.36 We can challenge 
an assumption on which the advocates of the Levelling Down Objection draw, 
implicitly or explicitly. The assumption is what Shelly Kagan calls ‘the additive 
assumption’ .37 This assumption consists of two theses: the ubiquity thesis and the 
independent thesis. The former says that, for any value or factor that is of moral 
relevance, if the value or factor makes a difference anywhere, it makes a difference 
everywhere. The latter says that the contribution made by such a value or factor 
should be tracked independently o f  contributions of other morally relevant values 
or factors. The two theses jointly generate the assumption that if the value or factor 
is of moral relevance, then it should affect the overall moral status of an action in 
any situation. In our argument, the assumption that a relevant value or factor makes 
an additive contribution to the moral status of the inequality-reducing act is that 
simple equality must always have a desirable effect.38 In other words, for those 
who support the Levelling Down Objection, it appears that telic egalitarianism 
bolsters the view that simple equality is always desirable in some respect, even in 
cases in which everyone is made equally far worse off.39
This reasoning is fallacious, however. This is because, from the fact that 
simple equality has a desirable effect intuitively, it does not necessarily follow that 
in all situations must it make a difference to the moral status of reducing
,6This point is already adumbrated in Temkin (2000: 156-157) and Tungodden (2003: 9).
37 Kagan (1988: 16).
j8 It might seem that the reasoning in question has more to do with the independence thesis that 
any morally relevant intrinsic value makes a difference to the world independently o f other values, 
than with the ubiquity thesis. Strictly speaking, the two theses are logically separate. Following 
Kagan, however, I take them to be naturally combined and so refer only to the additive assumption 
(Kagan 1988: 17-18).
39 Temkin does not think this view implausible (Temkin 1993: Ch.9; 2000).
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substantive inequalities. It only follows that at least sometimes the positive valence 
of simple equality should count as such. It is then reasonable for thinking that the 
particular effect of simple equality comes about differently with contexts. In other 
words, whether the contribution made by simple equalisation should be desirable, 
at least in some respect, depends on its interplay with other morally relevant values 
or factors in a given context. 40 Obviously enough, this context-dependency 
conflicts with the additive assumption, because the simple additivity of the 
contribution any value or factor makes is not guaranteed in this view. Since, as I 
see it, this view seems plausible, arguments of anti-egalitarians based on the 
additive assumption fail to undermine the relevance of telic egalitarianism.
To see this clearly, return to the Levelling Down Objection. In the first place, 
we should scrutinise the context in the Levelling Down Objection. We can easily 
see that the context in question involves conditions of some non-standard kind 
such as the excessive scarcity of resources, since simple equality can be attained 
only by severe levelling down: the dearth of resources of this sort almost ‘disables’ 
simple equality from having a particular effect.41 But this would not run counter to 
telic egalitarianism, were telic egalitarianism seen as free from any commitment to 
the additive assumption. Here again, simple equality may have normative effects of 
a different kind— in some cases, no effect—through the interaction with other 
values or factors in different contexts. To say the least, it seems unfair to rebut telic 
egalitarianism without any heed to the extremity of the conditions under which the
40 Frances Kamm refers to this as the principle of contextual interaction (Kamm 1996: 51).
411 draw the term ‘disable’ from Jonathan Dancy’s argument for moral particularism. As is well 
known, Dancy deploys the notions of ‘disabling’ and ‘enabling’ in describing conditions, the 
presence or absence of which determines (not in a strong sense) the status of a certain moral reason 
for action (Dancy 2004: Ch.3). Note, however, that I do not intend to take a stand on particularism at 
the level of moral metaphysics, even though my argument for the context-dependency of value and 
reason allies with moral particularism in many respects. See also note 48.
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Levelling Down Objection obtains.
For further confirmation of the plausibility of my defence of telic 
egalitarianism against the Levelling Down Objection, let me take an opposite case 
in which simple equality matters more. The levelling up case is of that kind. 
Suppose that there are unowned bountiful resources by which we can raise the 
well-being of those who are worse off at no cost. In this case, even when all of the 
destitute had become worse off through their own fault, it seems less implausible to 
make an actual move to simple equality; we should give favourable advantages to 
those who are responsible for being worse off, for the equalisation in question need 
not make anyone worse off.42 Note that full-fledged deontic egalitarians may 
object to this move, since they may think that those who are responsible for being 
worse off cannot have a legitimate claim for such benefits. My intuition, however, 
is that where people enjoy many more resources than could be expected in actual 
circumstances, producing simple equality is welcomed. Telic egalitarianism can 
explain this, while full-fledged deontic egalitarianism cannot. This illustrates the 
context-dependency of how desirable is any particular effect of the deontic concern 
for people’s responsibility, and thus how unfairly the Levelling Down Objection is 
directed at telic egalitarianism.
We are now in a position to answer the question: why should simple equality 
be taken to be a starting place? To get to the answer, recall first that I suggested in 
what circumstances simple equality could have no desirable effect. Conditions of a 
severe shortage of resources are such that it is not suitable for simple equality to 
make some favourable contribution to the moral status of the inequality-reducing
42 It could be that even in conditions o f super-abundance, not all deservingly worse off people 
should be brought up, because some might deserve being worse off in a purely non-comparative 
sense (for example, criminals). In this case, levelling up the level o f their well-being even to produce 
simple equality may not be morally acceptable.
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act. Put another way, in such conditions, other factors— such as the one which lets 
others be far worse off than they now are—may well weigh more than whatever 
reason determines that simple equality is desirable. Now compare such conditions 
with the typical conditions that constitute modem society. Following John Rawls 
(who follows David Hume), I propose that the conditions we are facing in modem 
society are of moderate scarcity of resources: these are called ‘the circumstances of 
justice ' . 43 What can we then say about the consideration of simple equality? The 
answer is that given moderate scarcity, to achieve simple equality may very likely 
require the transfer of advantages from the better off to the worse off, to such an 
extent that the feasible transfer in question has to ignore their responsibility for 
(dis)advantages. In circumstances of this actual kind, simple equalisation thus may 
enjoy some moral weight, but only some because of the high likelihood that the 
consideration of an agent’s responsibility would outweigh it as a result of the 
overall deliberation.
We should note that the circumstances of justice are more moderate than 
conditions of the levelling-down kind under which simple equalisation deprives 
most people of advantages they currently enjoy; so they are less suitable if not 
utterly unsuitable conditions for simple equality to have a desirable effect. We then 
may be able to say that the consideration of simple equality constitutes some 
normative force that pushes for the correction of substantive inequalities. This 
echoes the fact that simple equality may very likely be outweighed by the other
43 Hume (1975: Ill.i, 183-186; 1978: III.ii.2,487-488) and Rawls (1971: 126-130). For a long time, 
this implication o f the circumstances o f justice has been disregarded, except a few (e.g., Rescher 
1966: Ch.5; Gauthier 1986: 113-116). But now the importance o f moderate scarcity conditions is 
being recognised (e.g., Scheffler 2001:192; Munoz-Darde 2005: 277). Note that the circumstances o f  
justice consist not only o f conditions o f moderate scarce resources, but also o f mutual disinterests 
based on a certain bias in favour o f the self (Rawls 1971: 127). In this thesis, the former conditions 
are a main concern.
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considerations of values or factors, given the circumstances of justice. Still, simple 
equality is morally weighty enough to have a role as a base point, even though the 
baseline implies that simple equality is ready to be outweighed by some 
countervailing considerations of a relevant kind. This is, I think, why the principle 
of ‘baseline’ equality is defensible. There are two points that should be noted on 
this defence. First, simple equality has moral weight that sufficiently shifts the 
burden of proof even in the circumstances of justice: we should appeal to some 
further facts that provide relevant considerations in terms of which any substantive 
inequality is morally permissible. Second, and more important, such considerations 
are those with which deontic egalitarians are mainly concerned: on my argument, 
as will be seen, the consideration of an agent’s responsibility for substantive 
inequalities is of the relevant kind. We can now see that these points—especially 
the second point—not only explain why simple equality is better placed as a point 
of departure, but also indicate the pluralist synthesis between the Principle of 
Baseline Equality and the egalitarian principle of a deontic kind, since the latter 
purports to— and (as I will show in the following chapters) can plausibly—justify 
deviations from simple equality. In other words, the synthesis in question holds 
that all people should be equally well off unless they are responsible for 
substantive inequalities. It thus seems that the Principle of Baseline Equality can be 
combined with our deontic concerns for people’s exercise of responsibility, given 
the circumstances of justice.44
4. Pro Tanto Reason, Moral Principle, and Deliberation
As we have been seen above, there is a non-arbitrary reason to start with simple 
equality and hence the Principle of Baseline Equality is not groundless. Obviously
44 This point will be argued again in Chapter 5.
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enough, this is not the same as insisting that although there is no reason that simple 
equality should be aimed for, we should equalise people’s well-being unless there 
are morally relevant reasons for substantive inequalities. Here again, let me 
emphasise that the reason for simple equality has genuine weight, which means 
that the Principle of Baseline Equality enjoys a pro tanto reason for simple equality. 
The precise definition of ‘pro tanto (reason)’ tells us that it is not logically 
untenable to adopt the Principle of Baseline Equality. There are two points worth 
mentioning about the definition in question. First, a pro tanto reason differs from a 
prima facie reason which may turn out not to be a reason at all.45 Second, relatedly, 
a pro tanto reason for action plays a role at least counterfactually, in such a way 
that the reason would obtain were other reasons absent.46 So a pro tanto reason for 
simple equality has a certain role in the weighing explanation of why all people 
should be equally well off, even in cases in which it is outweighed by other 
morally relevant considerations. This is why we need not be worried about the 
criticism that has been made earlier of the original idea of baseline equality.
It might seem, however, that this pro tanto claim contradicts what the 
original idea of baseline equality addresses: simple equality should be taken as a 
default standard. The genuinely positive reason that telic egalitarianism provides is 
weighed for this principle, no matter how weighty the reason is. In other words, on 
my argument, simple equality seems nothing like a ‘mere’ default. To say that 
simple equality should be a point of departure but construed as a pro tanto claim 
cannot entail that it is automatically overridden whenever there are any other 
countervailing considerations, such as the relevant consideration of an agent’s 
responsibility for substantive inequalities. This appears a problem with my
45 For the distinction between prima facie reason and pro tanto reason, see Kagan (1989: 17).
46 See Broome (2004: 38-41).
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proposal of the pluralist synthesis between the Principle of Baseline Equality and 
the egalitarian principle of a deontic kind. It could be that the reason for simple 
equality is not automatically overridden by reasons that the latter provides, insofar 
as the former reason is seen as pro tanto, not as prima facie or default. It then might 
be a concern that a variety of deliberative procedures and exceptions must be 
tolerated under the combined principles, in that we might have to deal with them in 
an ad hoc way.
My response is that the objector has a wrong idea about the role of moral 
principles including (but not limited to) the egalitarian principles of justice. For the 
objector, moral principles must not only explain but also fully determine the moral 
status of every action. In other words, they must provide a complete guide to action 
even in new or hard cases.47 To take moral principles in this way seems to me 
far-fetched; indeed, only a few unpopular positions count such a role as qualifying 
for moral principles, such as full-fledged utilitarians (the believers of the absolute 
principle of maximising utility) and hard-core deontologists (the believers of the 
perfect principle that fully covers an entire list of moral duties). There are two 
reasons that moral principles should not be interpreted such that they provide a 
mechanical procedure on which we can fully rely in determining what ought to be 
done. First, there seems no epistemic means by which we can construct (or 
discover) moral principles that are capable of functioning as a complete guide to 
any action. It seems implausible to presume that in formulating moral principles, 
we can exhaustively list the exceptional cases or circumstances that disable the 
relevant consideration to constitute a morally relevant reason for action. Nor does it 
seem precarious to suppose that there might be features of a natural kind that are
47 This reflects a (somewhat oversimplistic) version of a principled ethic Dancy has attacked 
(Dancy 2004: 116-117). See also Wiggins (1987: Ch.6) and McDowell (1998: Ch.3).
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inaccessible to us (at this moment in time, at least), on which moral properties 
supervene. Any attempt to refine principles of an informative and definite kind in 
such a way as to cover the specified account of such exceptions and features, I take 
it, confronts epistemic difficulties of these kinds and so would seem to fail.48
Second, and more important, moral principles often (if not always) require us 
to engage in overall deliberation over the moral status of a certain action. Practical 
reasoning based on moral principles does not entail the dispensability of such 
deliberation at all, much less in hard cases in which few agree about whether the 
action is desirable or not. There are no moral principles of a plausible kind that 
command people’s lives—or even some parts of them— in such a way as to specify 
which act is to be performed at each decisional moment. Also, there seems a 
diversity of ways in which moral considerations enter into our actual deliberation 
about what is to be done; sometimes reflectively, sometimes non-reflectively (for 
example, abiding by custom), deliberation of some kind is processed. This 
diversity cannot overtly be structured by moral principles as such.49 Furthermore, 
we should admit that a multiplicity of moral principles sometimes engenders 
conflicts between their requirements in certain cases (even if they normally 
associate well), as in the case of whether I ought to save a stranger or to keep a 
promise. Quite often, no conclusive reason for action is automatically determined
48 Note that my argument is neutral about whether there are moral principles at the level of moral 
metaphysics. I am just claiming that the idea of moral principles which can function as a perfect 
guidance for everyone to do a certain act in any place at any moment are untenable due to its 
epistemic implausibility. So I need not— actually do not—join any discussion over the codifiability 
of moral principles at the metaphysical level, which is the focal point of particularist challenges 
against an ethic of principles. Relatedly, let me also say that my argument actually does not give the 
lie to at least some version of moral particularism; in some version of moral particularism, moral 
principles can be understood as part of plausible generalisations at the level of moral epistemology 
(e.g., Little 2000; cf. McKeever and Ridge 2006: 61-65).
49 See Scheffler (1992: 30-32).
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by the mechanical process of weighing reasons deriving from moral principles. 
This is, however, not a depressing fact that may commit us to scepticism about the 
role moral principles play in our deliberative activities.50
Notice that in conflicting cases, practical judgments of a certain kind may 
well be made such that a second-order ideal that we could reasonably accept 
anchors our engagement with the overall deliberation over the moral status of a 
certain act. Such an ideal loosely regulates (but does not constitute) our 
deliberative activities in arbitrating conflicts between oughts, in a direction of the 
systematic unity of our practical judgments about what is to be done. This is, in 
Kantian terms, a regulative ideal under which we should make practical judgments 
of a consistent and harmonious kind, as far as is possible. In order for the practical 
judgments to be made consistently, the regulative ideal may well demand that our 
moral faculties— such as imagination, perception, and sentiment—be put into 
operation, especially in cases in which the combined moral principles cannot help 
out conflicts of what each principle prescribes. The deliberative exercise of those 
moral faculties does not lead us to cope with the conflicts in question in an ad hoc 
way, since we should not ignore our regulative ideal in order to arrive at some 
practical judgment about what we ought do. Our regulative ideal thus has a distinct 
role especially in hard cases of this kind.51
Returning to the Principle of Baseline Equality, we now find no problem in 
the idea that the principle rests upon a pro tanto reason for simple equality. For the 
sake of simplicity, assume that we are given full information. As I mentioned 
above, given the circumstances of justice, it seems that the pluralist synthesis
50 For discussions o f this point, see Marcus (1980: 124), Scheffler (1992: 43-46), Herman (1993: 
75-77), and O’Neil (1996: 73-89,180-183; 2000: 58-61).
51 On the idea o f regulative ideal, see Kant (1998: A670-674/B698-702, 606-607). See also 
Marcus (1980: 134-135), Herman (1993: 78-83), and Hart (1998: 611).
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between the Principle of Baseline Equality and the egalitarian principle of a 
deontic kind is plausible. The synthesis is such that the former consideration may, 
on balance, be defeated by the latter if the latter obtains. From this, however, it 
does not follow that the desirable effect of simple equality is automatically 
overridden by the relevant consideration of responsibility. This is because if we 
simply weighed the consideration of responsibility more than that of simple 
equality even in the circumstances of justice, we might have to allow for a series of 
states of affairs of an unjustifiable sort in the light of the regulative political ideal of 
human equality. As I mentioned in the previous section, among such cases may be 
the suffering of needy strangers, the devastated self-respect of the worse off, and 
the resilience of structural inequalities. Under the regulative political ideal of 
human equality, as typically is the case of any regulative ideal, these possibilities 
concern us in pondering over the moral status of an inequality-reducing action, 
even if the consideration of responsibility is fairly strong. Our moral 
faculties—especially our sympathetic emotion—may push us to take the 
substantive inequalities with gravity. This demonstrates that our normative 
judgments gravitate towards simple equality, notwithstanding other morally 
relevant reasons that argue in favour of substantive inequalities. Simple equality 
thus should be seen as an input factor, in a way which enjoys pro tanto moral 
weight that would be taken into account for producing a morally relevant output.
Let me further add that simple equality is something that we should take into 
consideration weighed against other relevant factors, even when its effect might be 
null or negligible as a result of the overall deliberation. The consideration of simple 
equality may be outweighed in effect but not eliminated, as long as the conditions 
we face are not of the great scarcity kind. Even when it is outstripped, the value of 
simple equality is considered as an input factor. In other words, the value of simple
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equality remains a pro tanto reason for reducing substantive inequalities. This 
allows me to say that the Principle of Baseline Equality does not entail that the 
positive weight of simple equality disappears, even when we are justified in 
making departures from simple equality by the consideration of an agent’s 
responsibility for substantive inequalities in the name of egalitarian justice. We 
must accept that there is no way of living up to all moral principles (including the 
egalitarian principles of justice) and so some requirements are compelled to be 
unmet at least in some cases. We should, then, not disregard the fact that there may 
be some requirements we cannot meet. This could be a certain moral source that 
drives us to feel some regret, apology, or remorse. ' 2 It is inhumane to deny these 
moral sentiments which might direct us to help the worse off, even in cases in 
which they cannot be under the guidance of egalitarian justice. My argument need 
not deny the legitimacy of such acts of charity or supererogation.
5. Summary and Preview
In this chapter, I have argued for the Principle of Baseline Equality by appealing to 
the moral weight that telic egalitarianism carries in favour of the act of reducing 
substantive inequalities. In doing so, first, I have illustrated that telic egalitarianism 
is not merely defensible but also attractive if it is subsumed into the Principle of 
Baseline Equality in the desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice. My focus
52 For detailed discussions o f the role o f these emotions in cases in which we cannot meet all moral 
demands, see Marcus (1980: 130-133), Herman (1993: 173-176), and O’Neil (1996: 160-161; 2000: 
63).
53 This echoes a duty o f humanity which is based on our humanitarian beneficence. My argument 
then is that the importance o f this should not be unvalued, even though it should be sharply 
distinguished from what is to be done at the level o f egalitarian justice. For presentations o f this view, 
see, e.g., Rawls (1971: 191-192) and Campbell (1974; 1988: Ch.l).
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then has been on measuring the strength of telic egalitarian claims in their 
principle-wise form. The moral strength in question is clarified in two respects. 
First, simple equality in its telic egalitarian form is better placed as a point of 
departure, were we to take seriously the typical conditions of modem society—that 
is, the circumstances of justice. Second, this also entails that simple equality so 
understood is very likely to be outweighed by the moral consideration of an agent’s 
exercise of responsibility. These considerations fully support the principle of 
‘baseline’ equality. Finally, to avoid a misunderstanding of my argument, I showed 
two reasons for the implausibility of taking moral principles as an absolute guide to 
any action. First, there are no such principles. Second, moral principles as such 
cannot dispense with our deliberation over the moral status of a certain action. Our 
reliance upon the Principle of Baseline Equality does not undermine the 
importance of moral deliberation over the status of an inequality-reducing act. This 
means that we should consider the positive valence of simple equality even in 
cases in which it may very likely be outweighed by the consideration of an agent’s 
responsibility for substantive inequalities. This is redeemed under the regulative 
political ideal of human equality.
In the next two chapters, I turn to the conception of responsibility that an 
agent should bear. More precisely, I demonstrate the relevance of such a 
consideration by fleshing out the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality that 
can serve as a deontic egalitarian principle of justice. The next two chapters 
thereby explicate precise conditions under which substantive inequalities can be 
morally permissible. Chapter 3 clarifies necessary and sufficient conditions under 
which an agent is responsible for being worse off. Chapter 4 reveals two necessary 
conditions under which the positive deviation from simple equality can be justified. 
In those two chapters, I show that the consideration of responsibility is morally
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relevant to egalitarian justice, if it is articulated in a way that delineates a carefully 
narrowed understanding of what people are responsible for.
C hapter 3
The R esponsib ility-B ased  Principle o f Inequality I: 
R esp on sib ility  for Being W orse O ff
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued for the telic egalitarian principle—the Principle of 
Baseline Equality—on the basis of a pluralist synthesis of egalitarian principles of 
justice. In this chapter and the next chapter, 1 offer a full account of the deontic 
egalitarian principle, which is centrally concerned with how unequal outcomes are 
produced. I want to show that the relevant egalitarian principle of a deontic sort is 
the Responsibility-Based Principle o f Inequality. Roughly, I formulate this 
principle as follows:
The Responsibility-Based Principle o f  Inequality: Substantive inequalities are 
morally permissible only if they precisely reflect people’s exercise of 
responsibility.
As can be seen, the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality provides a 
justification for departures from simple equality.
My main purpose in this chapter is to argue the precise conditions under 
which an agent is responsible for being worse off. Admittedly, this is an essential 
part of the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality, as is shown by the fact 
that the careful examination of the conditions in question has been the main focus
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of contemporary deontic egalitarianism. As a matter of fact, contemporary 
egalitarian philosophers take responsibility to be a core conception which in 
principle justifies substantive inequalities. In particular, they tend to flesh out the 
conception of responsibility in terms of choice, in such a way that we should hold 
individuals responsible for chosen inequalities but not for unchosen inequalities. 
This core idea is intuitively appealing because, on the one hand, alleviation of 
substantive inequalities that people do not choose would thereby be encouraged, 
and, on the other hand, it avoids an egalitarian ‘moral hazard’: the situation in 
which people need care nothing for the consequences (economic or otherwise) of 
their own choice. G. A. Cohen thus goes so far as to say that (deontic) 
egalitarianism successfully incorporates “within it the most powerful idea in the 
arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility.” 1
Recently, however, this core idea has been challenged for three reasons. First, 
it seems almost impossible to find substantive inequalities simply resulting from 
people’s choice, since every choice “is routinely influenced by unchosen features 
of their personalities, temperaments, and the social contexts in which they find 
themselves.” 2 3If this is true, then no inequalities are justifiable. So under the 
choice-sensitive egalitarian scheme, any disadvantage that befalls people must be 
extinguished, even when this may disrupt our society. Second, if it is possible to 
distinguish between substantive inequalities of a responsible kind and of a 
non-responsible kind, an opposite problem may arise: egalitarian policies based on 
the connection between choice and responsibility seem anti-egalitarian. The core
1 Cohen (1989: 933).
2 Scheffler (2003b: 18).
3 In this line of argument, Saul Smilansky challenges choice-based deontic egalitarianism 
(Smilansky 2003a: 149-150; 2003b: 484). For a powerful response to his argument, see 
Lippert-Rasmussen (2004).
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idea may give rise to unequal results that involve harsh treatment of the responsibly 
worse off; it might be approved that those who are extremely worse off through 
their own choice are left unaided. This may seem unduly harsh.4 Third, there 
appears no feasible way of proceeding even based on the core idea, because of the 
administration costs and people’s freedom and privacy. The authorities (for 
example, the governmental bureau of equality) cannot track every person’s life 
history in any practical sense; nor should it be the case, because the attempt to trace 
each individual’s life involves invasive surveillance of an anti-liberal kind (like: 
“Hi! I'm  from the Ministry of Equality. Are you, by any chance, unusually happy 
today?”).5 For those reasons, there is now a tendency to doubt the plausibility of 
relying on the notions of choice and responsibility in deontic egalitarianism.
In this chapter, I shall demonstrate that my account of an agent’s 
responsibility for being worse off can defuse these three worries. In response to the 
first worry, my argument shows that responsibility is legitimately usable for sorting 
out substantive inequalities in one domain and in the other—that is, of a 
responsible kind and of a non-responsible kind. The key point in my argument is 
that we can plausibly employ the concepts of choice and responsibility in arguing 
which negative departures from simple equality are morally acceptable, just in case 
we have recourse to an account of rational capacities and employ two constraints: 
the Expectational Consequences Constraint and the Reasonable Alternative 
Constraint. A significant upshot of our reliance on the notion of rational capacities 
and the two constraints is twofold. First, we can avoid naive arguments on a binary 
basis— whether chosen inequalities are acceptable or not—which is, I take it, a 
main source of scepticism about responsibility. As I will argue, we can appeal to
4 See, e.g., Fleubaey (1995: 39-43), Anderson (1999: 295-298), and Fried (2003: 135-146). See 
also Chapter 1.
5 Cohen (1989: 910). See also Anderson (1999: 301).
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the degree to which people are responsible for being worse off. Second, any 
substantive inequality seems to be reduced, given that we cannot hold people 
responsible for being worse off to the full extent, for no one could be fully rational 
in a non-culpable sense, nor could it be the case that perfect information is 
accessible in actual circumstances. As will be seen, my argument thus can deal 
with the aforementioned second worry. In response to the third worry, I will 
demonstrate a feasible and convincing way of implementing the 
responsibility-ascription scheme, by reference to John Roemer’s egalitarian 
approach.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the choice-based 
proposition of responsibility that contemporary deontic egalitarianism has so far 
supported, and enumerates problems with this principle. I then suggest an 
alternative proposition of responsibility: the Autonomy-Based Principle o f  
Responsibility. In Section 3, in order to elaborate my account of an agent’s 
responsibility for being worse off, I explore the internal condition for 
responsibility-ascription that is the basis of practical reasoning, by recourse to the 
account of rational capacities. In Section 4, I show that the internal condition in 
question is not vulnerable to the Frankfurt-type case, which has been often used as 
a test of whether the alleged view of responsibility is plausible. Next, I spell out the 
external condition for responsibility-ascription that is decomposed into two 
constraints: the Expectational Consequences Constraint (in Section 5) and the 
Reasonable Alternative Constraint (in Section 6). Section 7 illustrates that this 
external condition can also pass the Frankfurt-type test. In Section 8, I consider 
three questions concerning the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility. In 
responding to the questions, I present a rough proportional idea of responsibility 
that enables us to attribute responsibility to people in a fine-grained and much less
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harsh way.
2. The Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility
Roughly, many egalitarian philosophers have supported the following deontic 
egalitarian proposition as an acceptable view of an agent’s responsibility for being 
worse off:
The Choice-Based Principle o f Responsibility: An agent is responsible for 
being worse off if and only if she is worse off through her own choice.6
As I suggested above, this seems intuitively appealing, since it can apparently cope 
with the common objection to egalitarianism in general: egalitarianism may bring 
about a ‘moral hazard’ by ignoring the causes of inequality—more precisely, by 
insufficiently recognising personal responsibility. If an egalitarian says that the 
worse off who repeatedly squandered money on gambling are entitled to be as 
equally well off as others, we doubtlessly think that her claim is counterintuitive. 
By contrast, the principle in question holds habitual gamblers responsible for being 
worse off through gambling. On the other hand, this principle claims that any 
negative departure from simple equality is morally unacceptable if a person is 
worse off through no choice of her own. For example, if she is harmed by 
unchosen events such as earthquakes, bushfires, and lightning strikes, this view 
insists that she not be responsible for being worse off. This standard view says that 
chosen inequalities are morally permissible, while unchosen inequalities are not. 
There are three problems with the Choice-Based Principle of Responsibility,
6 Admittedly, ‘through her own choice’ is crucially ambiguous, because this part does not tell us 
whether the principle includes cases in which she omits to act: it is not clear whether omission as 
such can be regarded as choice o f a certain sort. This ambiguity may be dealt with by admitting that 
omission can also be seen as choice o f some kind. For a scrupulous analysis o f omission in relation 
to responsibility, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998: Ch.5).
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however. First, the mere fact a person chose a certain option does not tell us 
whether the choice is voluntary or involuntary. Consider Akira who is a plump 
person. He might have been brainwashed to purchase ostensibly ‘healthy’ food by 
subliminal TV advertisements, although the food is in fact ineffective and 
expensive. Even though we can hardly say that Akira voluntarily chose to buy that 
food, the principle in question may obtain.7 Second, a person might make a choice 
in the light of massively false beliefs. To illustrate: a housewife who only faces a 
poor set of options in her expected life paths might have falsely believed that a life 
without a tyrannical husband was not as valuable as a life dictated by him .8 Even in 
this case, the Choice-Based Principle of Responsibility may obtain because it may 
be said that she chose the life with her husband. Third, whether consequences of a 
choice were due to sheer (bad) fortune does not matter to the truth value of the 
proposition in question. Suppose, for example, Bob was presented with a choice 
between being a banker or a postgraduate after graduation from the University of 
Oxford. After becoming a banker, there was a worldwide financial crisis, the 
occurrence of which he could not have foreseen even through careful deliberation. 
In consequence of the crisis, Bob lost his job and is reduced to poverty.
Such cases cannot be excluded in the Choice-Based Principle of 
Responsibility, since it does not take into account the responsibility-defeating
7 Note that some egalitarians who support the Choice-Based Principle o f Responsibility may 
conceive o f this objection. For instance, Cohen refers to choice as ‘genuine’ choice that implies its 
voluntariness, in such a way as to leave open what exactly this amounts to (Cohen 1989: 934).
8 There are two cases o f the tyrannised housewife. The first is the case in which she does not know 
any other possible lives, due to her lack o f relevant information. Strictly speaking, this partially 
reflects irrationality on her part. The second is the case in which she has information as such, but 
those different lives seem to her as inaccessible. In this case, she has a rational motivation to falsely 
believe that nothing is better than the current life. For the moment, 1 blur the distinction between two 
cases. But in Section 6 I focus on the latter case as the case o f ‘informed’ tyrannised housewife.
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factors such as (involuntarily formed) irrational beliefs, (rationalised) false beliefs, 
and effects of sheer bad fortune. No doubt they should be counted in articulating 
the formulation of responsibility for being worse off in such a way as to explain the 
unacceptability of those negative departures from simple equality. The standard 
view thus must be revised.
I propose the revised principle as an appropriate view of responsibility for 
being worse off:
The Autonomy-Based Principle o f Responsibility: An agent is responsible for 
being worse off if and only if (1) she has rational capacities to have chosen 
otherwise and (2) she is worse off through the expectational consequences of 
her own choice made out of options, including at least one sufficiently good 
alternative that she could have reasonably expected to obtain.
As will be seen, this principle can evade the problems enumerated above. To see 
this clearly, I elaborate the revised principle in the following sections.
3. Rational Capacities: Condition (1)
Let me begin to explore condition (1) which I want to call the internal condition for 
responsibility-ascription. In moral philosophy, condition (1) is something of a 
platitude. But what does “an agent has rational capacities to have chosen 
otherwise” mean precisely? As I see it, it requires that an agent satisfy the three 
practical reasoning-related conditions:
(a) The agent has a capacity to form rational beliefs about what she ought to 
do given relevant information.
(b) The agent has a capacity for self-control of desires in accordance with the 
rational beliefs, under the increasing impact of relevant information.
(c) The agent has a capacity to choose intentionally what she does, somehow 
independently of what her rational beliefs and informed desires guide.
In the case of condition (la), if the agent has no capacity to hold rational beliefs, or
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if the agent is not given the minimum pertinent information required for forming 
true and rational beliefs, then the responsibility for being worse off should not be 
assigned to her. Recall the case of Akira, who is brainwashed by (illegal) TV 
commercials to purchase supposedly ‘healthy’ food. He could not have formed 
rational beliefs about that food in his everyday life since, as in the case of ordinary 
people, he often watches TV commercials. It is then counterintuitive to hold Akira 
responsible for being worse off through continuing to spend all of his money on 
that diet. The same is also true of the case of a tyrannised housewife who may have 
no easy access to relevant information while being monitored by her husband, even 
though she might rationalise the belief about her deprived situation. Thanks to 
condition (ia), we can properly eliminate those cases in which people’s beliefs 
were manipulated to be irrational or rationalised in the light of their truncated 
preferences.9
Similarly, given that the agent’s beliefs are rational, unless her desires are 
conditional on these beliefs we ought not to hold her responsible for being worse 
off through her resulting behaviour, for, in this case, her desires are insensitive to 
the increasing credence to her rational beliefs, under the impact of relevant 
information. Even if she has true and pertinent beliefs about each option, she may 
be susceptible to a robust disposition to her strong cravings. To see how, consider 
Campbell who is a wonderfully knowledgeable, but very addicted, unwilling 
smoker. Not only does he have a rational belief that he ought to stop smoking (and
9 This condition may not always be a necessary condition for responsibility-ascription, since 
irrational beliefs as such may not play a causally relevant role in making an irrational choice. To see 
this, imagine that Akira has irrational beliefs about vegetables by virtue o f the false information. 
Suppose that he non-deliberately decides to eat lots o f the commercialised food. It then is not plain 
that he is not responsible for the outcome that he has several health problems related to getting more 
obese. We might want to hold him (at least partially) responsible for that outcome o f the irrational
act.
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might otherwise become far worse off) but he also knows that his craving for 
cigarettes is uncontrollable even in the presence of his rational belief: his desire for 
smoking is uncontrollably stronger than his rational disposition to do what he 
ought. If we attempt to attribute to him the responsibility for being worse off 
through continuing to smoke, then Campbell may complain, “Why am I being 
punished? I can’t do otherwise!” Under (lb), however, he need not complain, since 
we can allow that he not be responsible, provided that his desperate desire to 
smoke is not sensitive to his true and rational beliefs. 10 (It might actually be the 
case that Campbell once had a capacity for the self-control but lost it through his 
negligence. I shall discuss how we can cope with this diachronic type of culpability 
later.)
It might be thought that the above two conditions are enough for the agent 
having rational capacities. * 11 But there is good reason for thinking that the further 
condition is necessary—that is, condition (lc). It requires that the truly responsible 
agent be able to choose otherwise, apart from her rational beliefs and informed 
desires of various strengths. It is important to note that this volitionalist 
requirement does not imply that she can ignore those dispositions in her 
motivational mechanism. Nor does this imply that she can choose in no way that 
is responsive to reasons. It simply means that there is an independent stage of
10 Note that my argument is neutral about the well-known debates between intemalism and 
extemalism of normative motivation (Williams 1981: Ch.8). To be sure, the proposed argument 
could associate well with the model of intemalism such that true and rational beliefs motivate us to 
act for their specified end (Smith 1994: Ch.3; 1995). However, informed desires themselves may be 
construed as conditional on such rational beliefs in a non-instrumental way that may lead my 
argument to pro-extemalism (e.g., Copp 1997; Johnson 1997; Dreier 2000; Wiland 2000).
11 Michael Smith thinks that the two conditions are sufficient for the agent to be regarded as 
possessing rational capacities (Smith 1994: Ch.5; 1997; 2003).
12 See Mele (1995:47-56) and Haji (1998: 76-79).
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choice as such, after deliberative reflection on her possible options. 13 The 
significance of this stage is that without it the notion of choice has no application; 
the agent becomes a mere servant of her dispositional states which issue in a most 
rational act. To see how, suppose that a deliberative mechanism operates 
decisively—deliberation that entirely governs a certain choice— in such a way that 
one would make the choice in any logically possible scenario. In this case, the 
mechanism in question is not deemed responsive to reasons for which one would 
choose differently, even in cases in which one’s decision were fully rational. 14 To 
put it another way, consider that those whose choice is perfectly directed all the 
time by their rational beliefs and informed desires are the only responsible agents. 
It is then likely that most actual people, who are often susceptible to the weakness 
of will, are not responsible for their behaviour. Qua a responsible agent, the agent 
thus must be able to choose not in accordance with the reasons endorsed by her 
rational beliefs and informed desires. 15
Consider Emilka. Like Campbell, she is a wonderfully knowledgeable 
individual and also a heavy smoker. But unlike Campbell, Emilka possesses a 
capacity to control her desire for cigarettes in accordance with her true, rational
13 Note that this dose not conflict with the view o f seeing choice as a certain disposition, since 
choice involves the following schematic form of intentionality: “I shall do x, in circumstances C, in 
order to y/as a way o f y-ing.” (Wallace 1999: 239; see also Wallace 1996: 127-136, Ch.6) Following 
Simon Blackburn, we can thus say that it is mistaken to think— as many Kantians implicitly or 
explicitly presume— that a truly responsible agent can objectify her beliefs and desires o f various 
sorts (Blackburn 1998: 252-256). This is because my argument admits that no one can be immune 
from those dispositional states. From this fact, however, it does not follow that there is no 
independent conception o f choosing otherwise, nor that this volitional condition indicates that the 
noumenal self dictates other parts o f the agent.
14 See Fisher and Ravizza(1998: 46-49).
15 Note that the claim here does not mean that to be responsible, an agent could choose otherwise 
in an outright sense. See the next section below.
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belief that she ought not to smoke. It might be said that, hence, Emilka is 
responsible for being worse off through smoking. Nevertheless, if she is merely 
passively subject to those inner states, we might want to say that she was 
psychologically pushed to stop smoking rather than that she chose to quit. In this 
case, is Emilka sure to be responsible for being worse off? We might want to say 
no. Since we ordinarily take it for granted that the agent can normally choose 
whatever she likes in light of her preferences, it appears counterintuitive to ascribe 
such responsibility to Emilka, given that she cannot volitionally choose otherwise. 
As condition (1 c) requires, if Emilka is a truly responsible agent, she must be able 
to choose otherwise even in the face of her fully rational belief-desire sets.
4. The Frankfurt-Type C ase
To see the plausibility of condition (1) “an agent has rational capacities to have 
chosen otherwise,” and to avoid confusion (one might think that my argument
shows a commitment to incompatibilism), consider the following:
The Conspiracy o f the Tobacco Industry: Black, a genius neuroscientist, is 
employed by the tobacco industry. In some way or other, he can make 
precise judgments about whether smokers will decide to stop smoking and, 
moreover, has the ability to cause them to decide to continue smoking by 
manipulating their brain states. Black does not want to intervene 
unnecessarily; if the smokers were to keep smoking, he would do nothing. 
He would cause them not to quit just in case they intended to do so.16
Suppose that Emilka was thinking about quitting smoking, but actually did not 
intend to do so and thus continued to smoke. In the end, she suffers a severe illness 
due to that habit; she is worse off. Intuitively, we want to claim that she is 
responsible for that outcome on grounds that she has chosen voluntarily to smoke.
16 This case originally comes from Frankfurt (1988). But this case is more inspired by its 
adaptation by Lippert-Rasmussen (Lippert-Rasmussen 1999a: 486).
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But she could not actually have chosen otherwise because of the presence of Black. 
Can condition (1) then endorse our intuition that Emilka is responsible for being 
worse off, even though she could not actually have chosen otherwise?
Yes it can. This is because condition (1) does not require that Emilka could 
have chosen otherwise in an outright sense, but that she possess rational capacities 
to have chosen otherwise. The significant difference is that in the latter sense, 
unlike the former sense in which the availability of alternative sequences 
simpliciter is required, we can abstract those capacities away from the presence of 
Black. Regardless of whether Black intervenes in her brain states, Emilka has 
rational capacities to stop smoking for three reasons. First, she holds a rational 
belief with pertinent information that she ought to quit smoking. Second, her 
desires can be sensitive to such rational consideration. Third, Emilka decided to 
continue to smoke even after engaging in deliberation that satisfies the above two 
conditions. Even if, unbeknownst to her, Black would have caused her to continue 
to smoke had Emilka made up her mind to stop smoking, it remains true that she 
has rational capacities to have chosen otherwise insofar as the above three 
conditions are met. All else being constant, we can plausibly say that Emilka is 
responsible for being worse off.
5. Expectational Consequences Constraint: Condition (2a)
So far I have elaborated the internal condition for responsibility-ascription, by 
recourse to the account of rational capacities. Now let me turn to the external 
condition in the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility—that is, condition 
(2): an agent is responsible for being worse off only if she is worse off (a) through 
the expectational consequences of her own choice, and (b) the choice was made 
out of options, including one sufficiently good alternative that she could have
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reasonably expected to obtain. This condition is as important as the internal 
condition, because in actual circumstances there are many events over which a 
rational agent cannot exert control even through ideal deliberation. Those events 
often make consequences of her choice unexpected, as in the case of the financial 
crisis Bob encountered. In this and next sections, I explore condition (2).
In spelling out condition (2), two parts—(a) and (b) as is shown above— can 
be decomposed, although they are closely related in that both have to do with how 
an agent’s expectations obtain. To begin with (2a) ‘through the expectational 
consequences of her own choice’, pay heed to the neologism ‘expectational’. This 
term is adapted from John Broome’s argument on expected utility function: in 
cases of any choice under uncertainty, various as its degree may be, each possible 
option should be evaluated by reference to a prospect for outcomes that an agent 
could reasonably expect to obtain at a deliberative moment of her choice.17 
Roughly, it then may be said that an agent is worse off through the expectational 
consequences of her own choice if and only if her being worse off is one of the 
outcomes she could have reasonably expected to obtain through the choice. ‘The 
Expectational Consequences Constraint’ is thus construed such that the agent is 
responsible for being worse off only if the outcome is among the expectational 
consequences of her own choice.
It may well be asked what outcomes can count as reasonably expectational. I 
here propose that the outcomes in question can be identified by weighing value that
17 Broome (1991: 91-92). See also Dreier (1996: 253). Here I assume that prospects can be valued 
in a way that is weighed against (normally multiplied by) their probabilities. Admittedly, this 
assumption that involves the expected value property is open to question, because it presumes two 
controversial principles: first, all prospects valued as such are commensurable; and second, they can 
be evaluated individually. I shall not enter into debates over the validity of these principles. For 
discussions of them, see Broome (1991: Ch.5) and Dreier (1996: 262-267).
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an agent assigns to certain outcomes of a prospect against the related risk in the 
light of her considered preferences.^ Each person’s considered preferences 
constitute a proper ranking of prospects such that their value roughly corresponds 
to her informed desire and is probabilistically weighed on the basis of the risk that 
is calibrated in terms of her true and rational belief. Obviously enough, whether an 
agent can form considered preferences rests upon her rational capacities—whether 
or the extent to which rational beliefs go hand-in-hand with informed desires.19 As 
such, the Expectational Consequences Constraint relates strongly to condition 
(1)— the internal condition of responsibility-ascription. To see how, recall Bob’s 
case in which he is worse off due to financial meltdown. Suppose that Bob has full 
rational capacities. Suppose, further, that he chose to be a banker through careful 
deliberation with pertinent information of the extremely low probability that some 
financial crisis occurs. In this case, it is counterintuitive to hold him responsible for 
being worse off through the financial meltdown simply because he chose to 
become a banker. This is confirmed by the fact that the probability of financial 
crisis occurring was rightly evaluated as substantially low, and that the outcome in 
question was not the one to which Bob would have assigned great disvalue, based 
on his considered preferences. On the proposed principle of responsibility, thanks 
to condition (2a), there is no need to attribute such responsibility to Bob; we should 
hold him responsible only for the worse off consequences of his choice that could 
have been expected as a reasonable prospect in the light of his considered
18 For presentations o f considered preferences, see Gauthier (1986: 29-38) and Ameson (1989: 
82-83; 1990: 161-164).
19 This echoes a standard picture o f Bayesian decision theory that explicates desires and beliefs an 
agent would have in the relevant conditions in terms o f the value and subjective probabilities. Philip 
Pettit calls this ‘the explication thesis’ in reflection upon what David Lewis says about decision 
theory (Pettit 1991: 150-151; see also Lewis (1983: Ch.8).
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preferences. Indeed, to be plausible, the proposed condition of responsibility need 
not apply to all the further consequences that follow from any choice.
Notice that according to this argument, reasonableness comes into the picture 
in examining rational beliefs which are reasonable ones to act upon.20 Such an 
examination requires an agent to possess a capacity to investigate information. This 
capacity is germane to what condition (la) says: an agent should have a capacity to 
form rational beliefs about what she ought to do under the impact of relevant 
information. Whether an individual could have reasonably expected the 
consequences to obtain through her own choice depends on whether she has a 
rational capacity to make reasonable judgments, the judgments which can track 
what an agent ought to do in the light of her considered preferences. If the 
individual lacks the rational capacity to form such judgments, she may very likely 
form her prospect for the outcomes based on her irrational beliefs and so may not 
attempt to seek adequate information. To see this, reconsider Bob's case again. 
Now suppose, unlike the previous case, Bob has no rational capacity to reasonably 
assess all prospects for the outcomes of any choice. This would have made him 
wrongly shape the belief about the probability of financial crisis in question; he 
thought it extremely less probable despite its high probability. Should a world-wide 
financial meltdown come about, we say that Bob could not have reasonably 
expected his bankruptcy to result from his choice. And we continue: this is mainly 
due to the deficiency of his rational capacity for the formation of reasonable beliefs 
and so the non-culpable failure to gain more precise information. In this case we 
thus should not ascribe the responsibility to him.
It might be claimed that the actual market is full of the outcomes that people 
could not predict prior to their own choice even in the light of their considered
20 See Jackson (1986: 358-365; 2001: 29-33).
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preferences. We then can in no way hold people responsible for being worse off 
through the expectational consequences of their own choice. This might seem a 
re duct io ad absurdum.
My response is twofold. First, many if not all unpredictable fluctuations in 
the market are reasonably foreseeable in advance of any choice. In other words, 
when people form a prospect for the outcomes of each option, they may well be 
expected to take uncertainty of this sort into account to a reasonable extent. In 
making a choice no one can ignore the effects of other people’s choices in the 
market. Nor can people neglect the changes in their tastes and technological 
conditions in the long run. Note that those standard cases differ from the original 
Bob’s case in which a most well-informed and rational agent could not have 
reasonably expected the disastrous consequence to obtain through their own 
choice—going bankrupt through being a banker; the financial panic is that which 
Bob could not have reasonably anticipated had he been relevantly informed and 
rational. In ordinary cases, people who possess rational capacities should conduct 
their deliberation in reflection upon the occurrence of minor unforeseeable events 
they could reasonably count. No rational people can escape from the attribution of 
responsibility in such cases.
Second, it could be that the market would be made more stable if the 
proposed principle of responsibility were dominant and institutionalised in our 
society. In the society under my proposal, people may be normatively motivated to 
abstain from reckless choice that often gives rise to market fluctuations of an 
excessive sort (for example, choices driven just by speculation mania). We then 
could say that the more stable the market, the fewer the difficulties in holding 
people responsible for being worse off through the expectational consequences of
their own choice.
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6. Reasonable Alternative Constraint: Condition (2b)
As a component of the necessary condition for responsibility-ascription, the 
Expectational Consequences Constraint is not satisfactory, for, otherwise, 
condition (2) might not consider cases in which people have no reasonable 
alternative, even though they have relevant knowledge and are able to act upon it. 
Recall the case of a tyrannised housewife. Now consider a particular—more 
common—kind of a tyrannised housewife: one who has relevant knowledge that 
her current life is of incredible misery and hardship, but for whom any different life 
is inaccessible to her in her social situation (she is in the male dominated society, 
for instance). In such a situation, she may well be disposed to falsely believe that 
nothing is better than her current life. We should note that this tyrannised 
housewife—hereafter called ‘the informed tyrannised housewife’—can exercise 
rational capacities under the impact of the relevant information that no sufficiently 
good alternative which would secure her a decent life is choosable. It is intuitively 
unacceptable to hold her responsible for her dire situation, even though this is an 
outcome of her own choice that she could have expected to obtain.21
It is time to turn to (2b) to defuse this worry. Now I want to propose a more 
precise form of (2b): we should hold people responsible for being worse off only in 
cases in which they could have reasonably expected the other possible 
altemative(s) to obtain, at least one of which would, with near certainty, guarantee 
a decent life at no high opportunity cost. This is what I call ‘the Reasonable 
Alternative Constraint’. Admittedly, this is a formulation similar to a definition of
21 Admittedly, this is a typical case o f adaptive preferences (e.g., Elster 1983: Ch.3; Sen 1987). 
Amartya Sen raises examples o f this sort as follows: “The battered slave, the broken unemployed, 
the hopeless destitute, the tamed housewife, may have the courage to desire little, but the fulfilment 
of those disciplined desires is not a sign of great success and cannot be treated in the same way as the 
fulfilment o f the confident and demanding desires o f the better placed.” (Sen 1987: 11).
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optional luck—optional risks for which people are responsible—except the part ‘at 
no high opportunity cost’ .22 The formulation that involves the added part contains 
not only a necessary but also sufficient condition of a reasonable alternative. The 
reason is that we can thereby count certain (expectational) advantages with other 
options that people would lose by choosing the alternative in question. Such 
options include a chance of achieving a much greater good, which is slightly riskier 
than the alternative at stake.23 In this section, I show why opportunity cost should 
be necessarily low for the alternative to be qualified as the sufficiently good one 
below.
We should first and foremost notice that the Reasonable Alternative 
Constraint plays a significant role in legitimately avoiding holding the informed 
tyrannised housewife responsible for being worse off. This is because this 
constraint does not endorse the implausible claim that even if people fully realise 
that they are actually unable to choose a sufficiently good option, they may be 
responsible for being worse off as among expectational consequences of their own 
choice. Such a claim is seriously counterintuitive, since it requires people to 
responsibly evaluate any set of options with prospects for the outcomes, even when 
they realise, on the basis of deliberative judgments, that those options could in no 
way be selected. To see how, suppose that an appeal to options that the informed 
tyrannised housewife could not pursue (in any reasonably imaginable scenario) 
were used to guarantee her responsibility for her wretched situation. It would 
follow that whatever she chooses validates the attribution of such responsibility to 
her, on grounds that she chooses to keep being a housewife of the tyrant among her
22 For presentations o f this definition o f option luck, see Olsaretti (2004: 151-154) and Otsuka 
(2004: 153). See also Dworkin (2000: 73).
23 For relevant discussions o f this point, see Lippert-Rasmussen (2001: 572-574), Otsuka (2004: 
155-156), and Sandbu (2004: 297-299).
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options, none of which can be expected to obtain except the option she chooses. By 
contrast, the Reasonable Alternative Constraint is not vulnerable to this problem, 
because, for responsibility-ascription, it requires at least one sufficiently good 
alternative that the housewife could reasonably expect to obtain. In other words, 
the Reasonable Alternative Constraint does not direct us to hold her responsible for 
being worse off, on grounds of the existence of alternatives that she knows she 
would not be able to select in any case.24
It seems increasingly clear that the Reasonable Alternative Constraint 
prevents us from ascribing the responsibility to the informed tyrannised housewife 
who realises that she has no selective option to lead a decent life. Still, there is 
ambiguity in why only one sufficiently good alternative an agent could reasonably 
expect to obtain is enough. Now the consideration of opportunity cost comes into 
play. A good place to start in seeing this point is to consider in what circumstances 
the currently tyrannised housewife would be responsible for being worse off. 
Recall that she cannot reasonably pursue options that, she relevantly acknowledges, 
lack feasibility. This is because in her situation in which she could in no way make
24 It might be claimed that for the precise attribution of responsibility, we should know whether the 
informed tyrannised housewife would have chosen the reasonable alternative had this option been 
accessible to her in the expectational terms. But obviously, this is not only epistemically impossible 
but rather metaphysically indeterminate, since her hypothetical choice is essentially indeterminate 
(Hurley 2003: 162-163). One then might say that we cannot indeed engage in the precise ascription 
of responsibility to the housewife in question. My response is that responsibility in a relevant sense 
need not involve the consideration of such hypothetical choice, since for responsibility-ascription, all 
we need to know is whether the housewife is responsible for being worse off, not whether she would 
have been responsible for being worse off. The former question of responsibility, unlike the latter of 
counterfactual responsibility, has nothing to do with whether the housewife would have opted for 
the reasonable alternative had it been available to her. Unlike luck egalitarianism (in its caricatured 
version), my argument bases our responsibility judgments about the worse off upon not all kinds of 
luck, much less upon counterfactual luck. See also my argument on circumstantial good luck 
elsewhere in the next chapter.
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a living were she to divorce from her tyrannical husband, the opportunity cost is 
prohibitively high. It is then likely that the formation of her considered preferences 
is negatively affected by the extent to which she has to be burdened with this 
exceptionally high opportunity cost of getting a divorce. She thus cannot 
reasonably prefer such an option to the one which would keep her submissive to 
the dictatorial husband. But what if the society constituted circumstances in which 
there is low opportunity cost to win a divorce, by virtue of few obstacles for a 
divorced female to lead a decent life? In this scenario, we might want to say that 
the informed tyrannised housewife could deliberatively prefer the separation. It 
would seem that she cannot waive the responsibility for her dreadful life with the 
current husband, if chosen. This promisingly demonstrates that there being one 
sufficiently good option an agent could have reasonably expected to obtain at no 
high opportunity cost is sufficient for responsibility-ascription, all other things 
being equal. The essential point is not the number of relevant opportunities that can 
reasonably be expected to obtain, but rather that the opportunity cost of a 
sufficiently good alternative must be low.
Some contemporary egalitarian theorists, on the contrary, have claimed that, 
for responsibility-ascription, all persons must have effectively equivalent arrays of 
options. According to this argument, in order to hold the informed tyrannised 
housewife responsible for her hardship, her actual circumstances must become 
close to an ideal situation in which she can lead any life in light of her own 
preferences reasonably formed in the same way as other members’ own. In other 
words, we can hold her responsible for being worse off only if all agents “face 
equivalent decision trees—the expected value of each person’s best (= most 
prudent) choice of options, second-best, . . . nth-best is the same” in an effective
25 See Ameson (1989; 1990) and Cohen (1989).
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sense, among other things.26 In cases of this sort, without any reservation we 
should hold the informed tyrannised housewife responsible for being worse off. 
However, it seems too demanding to equalise each person’s set of options at each 
deliberative point, for three reasons. First, the full-equal-opportunity scheme may 
have high administration costs, since it needs to gather relevant information about 
each person's decision tree.27 Second, it is much less feasible to reduce the 
opportunity cost of every alternative at each rank in such a way that all agents have 
effectively equivalent options in their expectatioinal terms. Third, even if possible, 
it is likely that the result could be achieved by severely levelling down (for 
example, by exploiting economic and human resources of an extant kind).28 All 
these three points show the infeasibility of the proposed scheme. There is no 
difficulty in imagining that, according to this line of egalitarian policies, we can by 
no means hold people responsible for being worse off.29
To hold them responsible, however, there is no need to require that all 
agents’ options be effectively equivalent in their expectational terms. Here again, 
there being a sufficiently good alternative that they could reasonably expect to 
obtain is enough for responsibility-ascription, every other thing being equal.
7. The Frankfurt-Type Case Again
To avoid confusion, let me emphasise that condition (2) does not require the
26Ameson (1989: 85-86).
27 See Vallnetyne (2002: 544).
28 Andrew Mason points to this problem in arguing how demanding the view of fair access to 
qualifications is (Mason 2004: 380-382).
29 In this line of reasoning, Lippert-Rasmussen interprets Richard Ameson’s position as refusing to 
take a stand on whether people are ever responsible for being worse off (Lippert-Rasmussen 1999b: 
66) .
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availability of alternative sequences simpliciter. Consider the case of Emilka under 
the influence of Black again. Recall that, qua a fully rational agent, she was 
seriously considering quitting smoking. But she found it difficult to quit smoking, 
due to her weakness of will, semi-addiction to tobacco, or for whatever reason. 
Now suppose that there is one option that she could reasonably expect to obtain at 
very low cost—the option to regularly have giving-up-smoking candies that are 
amazingly effective. In addition, there are no social and economic difficulties in 
doing so, because the government successfully promotes the campaign of those 
candies. She thus faced little opportunity cost to avoid smoking. Nevertheless, she 
continued to smoke and suffered a serious illness. In the end, she is worse off. It 
seems that she is responsible for that outcome. Yet the reasonable option at stake 
could not be actualised because of Black, since, unbeknownst to Emilka, Black 
would have intervened in her brain states and caused her to continue to smoke had 
she not intended to smoke. It then may well be asked: can condition (2), which 
entails the requirement that there be at least one reasonable alternative the 
consequences of which an agent could reasonably expect to obtain, really hold her 
responsible for being worse off?
Yes it can. This is because, notwithstanding the reasonably obtainable 
scenario that Emilka would have had giving-up-smoking candies with no 
difficulties in the expectational terms, she intended not to put an end to her 
smoking habit. There are two points that should be noted here. First, in her social 
setting, giving-up-smoking candies of an effective sort are easily purchased at low 
cost, and what is more, there is no high opportunity cost of having them (since the 
government encouragingly promotes the use of the candies in question). This is a 
striking fact that makes the option in question the reasonable alternative to her in 
its expectational terms. She thus could have reasonably taken into account the
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prospect that she would not be affected with the smoking disease were she to have 
those candies.
Second, in the case under discussion, Emilka is not determined to decide to 
smoke continually, since her psychological mechanism from her motivation to 
actual choice is undetermined. In this case, the Reasonable Alternative Constraint 
obtains because it requires only that at least one alternative available to her is such 
that she could reasonably expect it to obtain. In other words, the Reasonable 
Alternative Constraint requires only that the decision to have giving-up-smoking 
candies instead of cigarettes be such that Emilka can regard it as a sufficiently 
good option in the light of her considered preferences. The very facts that those 
candies are actually sold at low cost and having them is socially encouraged render 
the decision in question responsive to the first-person deliberative judgments based 
on her informed practical reasoning. But it does not entail that the option of having 
those candies be actualised.30
The plausibility of this argument is confirmed by seeing the recent discussion 
as regards moral responsibility. Proponents of the alternative possibilities 
requirement for moral responsibility tend to ignore the fact that the point is not 
whether an agent has any kind of leeway to avoid moral responsibility, but whether 
the agent has option(s) of a relevant and significant kind that motivates her 
practical reflection upon it. Such alternatives’ responsiveness to an agent’s 
deliberative judgments based on her healthy practical reasoning provides a
”3 1
sufficient ground for her moral responsibility. This argument is relevant to the 
Reasonable Alternative Constraint, because the essential point is not whether the
l0It goes without saying that when Black intervenes with Emilka’s brain states to cause her to 
smoke she is not responsible for the resultant health conditions. See also note 39.
31 See, e.g., Mele (1995: 186-191), Fisher and Ravizza (1998: 69-76), Haji (1998: 75-79), Fisher 
(1999: 117-123), and Watson (2001: 382).
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reasonable alternative is not thwarted in any possible scenario, but whether it 
makes an agent’s decision responsive to relevant judgments on the basis of her 
practical reasoning. In sum: under the Reasonable Alternative Constraint, a fully 
rational agent like Emilka is responsible for being worse off even in cases in which, 
unbeknownst to her, she could not actually have opted for the reasonable 
alternative.
8. Proportionality, Culpability, and Harshness
So far I have argued that the conception of responsibility can play a major role in 
specifying which deviations of a negative kind from simple equality are morally 
permissible, given the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility which contains 
the two necessary conditions for responsibility-ascription. The first has to do with 
rational capacities. The second consists of the two constraints: the Expectational 
Consequences Constraint and the Reasonable Alternative Constraint. We are now 
in a position to examine how the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility can 
cope with the aforementioned three worries. For that purpose, let me take up three 
related questions.
First Question: The proposed principle says that an agent is responsible for being 
worse off if and only if she has rational capacities to have chosen otherwise and the 
two constraints are met. But even among people whose capacities are rational 
enough to be responsive to reasons in accordance with their considered preferences, 
there is a difference in how effectively they can respond to the reasons in question. 
This seems of much significance, since the sufficiently rational agents have 
different background conditions, some of which may diminish rational capacities, 
such as poor native and social endowments. Furthermore, how easily an agent can
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pursue a sufficiently good alternative is relevant even in cases in which its 
opportunity cost is sufficiently low. Is it fair then to ascribe to people the same 
degree of responsibility for being worse off, simply on grounds that they possess 
sufficient rational capacities?
To see the problem clearly, imagine another heavy smoker, Geoff. He has rational 
capacities to have quit smoking but actually continued to smoke, notwithstanding 
the availability of giving-up-smoking candies of an effective kind. Like Emilka, he 
seems to be responsible for being worse off. But Geoff has grown up in a squalid 
slum (in which it is natural for the dwellers to smoke heavily) while Emilka has a 
good family background and is well-educated. It then may well be that in Geoff s 
case the decision to avoid smoking by using a certain measure—by having 
giving-up-smoking candies— is less effectively responsive to reasons endorsed by 
considered preferences than in Emilka’s case. Obviously enough, we can conceive 
a rough correlation between such differential responsiveness to the reasons in 
question and their differential background conditions in this example, given that 
neither Geoff nor Emilka fail to develop their own rational capacities in a culpable 
way. Provided that they are not negligent in this way, do we not think it unfair to 
ignore the difference between Emilka’s and Geoff s background conditions in 
attributing to them the responsibility for being worse off? Should we not say more 
about the difference since their background conditions may have differential 
effects upon the two people’s rational capacities?
We can deal with this problem by appealing to two arguments for 
fine-grained assignments of responsibility for being worse off. Both arguments
,2I scrutinise the correlation in question and how to differentiate the cases mentioned above and 
culpable cases. See my response to the second question in this section below.
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consist of a rough proportional idea o f responsibility. The first argument is that the 
less an agent’s rational capacities are, roughly, the less proportionately she is 
responsible for being worse off, other things being equal. On this proportional 
construal, we can avoid an all-or-nothing way of responsibility-ascription, for the 
proportional construal can reflect the fact that people’s rational capacities come in 
degrees. Recall that in the case under discussion, the differential degree of rational 
capacities is directly associated with particular factors determining the difference 
of their uncontrollable background conditions such as internal and external 
endowments.33 It is thus reasonable to regard Emilka as more responsible for being 
worse off, as compared with Geoff, even though their capacities are rational 
enough to regard them as responsible agents. This trait of the proportional 
construal can be called a responsibility-reflecting role o f  proportionality. (There is 
another significant role of the proportional construal. It will be argued later.)
The second argument for the proportional idea of responsibility is closely 
related to the Reasonable Alternative Constraint. This claims that an agent’s 
responsibility for being worse off be curtailed by the degree to which the agent 
would face differential opportunity cost in pursuit of her reasonable alternative, 
even in cases in which the opportunity cost is substantially low. Consider Geoff s 
case again. In the squalid situation in which Geoff was bom and raised, the 
opportunity cost of refraining from smoking may not be extremely low, even when 
it is below the threshold of low opportunity cost that can be seen as minimally 
constitutive of his reasonable alternative. To illustrate: if Geoff attempted to stop 
smoking, he might have to sacrifice a larger proportion of possible friends than 
Emilka might in her very' different neighbourhood. It then seems unfair to attribute
33 Later, I will consider Roemer’s proposal as a relevant way o f counting these uncontrollable 
effects o f background conditions on each person’s rational capacities.
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to him the same responsibility as Emilka, who could have chosen not to smoke at 
much lower opportunity cost. So, should both suffer from lung cancer caused by 
the same kind of smoking habit, Geoff s responsibility ought to be comparatively 
lower than Emilka’s, not only by virtue of the differential degree of their rational 
capacities, but also because of the relatively higher opportunity cost to break his 
habit of smoking.
To sum up: first, the rough proportional idea of responsibility allows that 
people’s rational capacities come in degrees even in cases in which their capacities 
can be seen minimally as rational, and, correspondingly, responsibility for the 
worse off consequences should be held in degree. Second, responsibility-ascription 
should also be sensitive to the difference of opportunity cost that an agent would 
have to incur with the view to the reasonable alternative, even if it is sufficiently 
low. In my account, there is no need to apply the same degree of responsibility to 
rational agents across the board.
Second Question: The proposed principle says that if an agent has no (or fewer) 
rational capacities then we should not hold her responsible (or as responsible) for 
being worse off from her own choice. But this formulation appears to overlook 
culpable cases in which people lack rational capacities (or have only diminished 
ones), owing to some past negligence. Is it possible to distinguish those negligent 
cases from non-culpable cases (such as Geoff s case) in which shortcomings of an 
agent’s rational capacities stem from the adverse effects of uncontrollable 
background conditions?
Recall the case of Campbell, who lacks a capacity for self-control in the face of his 
desperate desire to smoke that is completely insensitive to what his informed,
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rational beliefs guide. Now suppose that he used to have a rational capacity to 
make his desire for cigarettes responsive to reasons in accordance with his rational, 
well-informed beliefs, since he enjoyed favourable background conditions (he was 
bom in an upper-class family, for instance). It follows that, all else being constant, 
he lost the rational capacity through his culpable negligence. In other words, he 
could have secured the rational capacity for self-control over the desire in question 
had he not taken up smoking. In this case, even if he now finds it all but impossible 
to control this craving in such a way as to respond to his true and rational beliefs, 
our considered judgments are that he is responsible for being worse off through 
smoking, because he had, and could act upon, relevant knowledge about what he 
would be in the future were he to develop a smoking habit.34 How can we hold 
Campbell-like people responsible for such worse off consequences under the 
proposed principle?
There seem two ways of bringing to light whether a person’s shortcomings 
of rational capacities are in fact due to some past negligence. One obvious way of 
drawing the line between culpable and non-culpable cases is to examine the whole 
history of decisions made by each person from the beginning of life. However, this 
bluntly diachronic method seems of no feasibility, since it would involve 
insurmountable epistemic difficulties. Even if possible, it demands huge 
administration costs to collect relevant information of each personal history, and 
worse, may transform our society into a suffocating Panopticon. We thus should 
consider a more feasible and liberal way of distinguishing between negligent and 
non-culpable cases. The key point, I think, is to find the simple method of
34 Note that this kind of diachronic sense o f responsibility can also be described under the 
proportional construal o f responsibility mentioned above: even in cases in which a person lost a 
certain degree o f rational capacities due to some analogous kind o f negligence, we want to hold her 
more responsible than other people whose capacities are non-culpably less rational.
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revealing the adverse effects of uncontrollable background conditions on rational 
capacities. My first approximation of the method in question is this: introduce the 
idea of an imaginable state in which the capacities people possess are determined 
in ways that are beyond their control. This is what I call a canonical state. Put 
another way, the canonical state illustrates that the comparative degree of 
individuals’ rational capacities is due to the difference of their uncontrollable 
background conditions. To a first approximation, we thus can say that the 
Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility should be applied on the basis of an 
agent’s rational capacities in the canonical state. In other words, to avoid mitigating 
responsibility in cases of a culpable sort, the degree of people’s responsibility for 
being worse off should be, among other things, roughly in proportion to the degree 
of their rational capacities in the canonical state.
An essential question remains. How can we identify the canonical state? 
There are, I think, two ways of identification. The first is to employ the idea of the 
canonical moment at which people should start being responsible agents. What lies 
behind the canonical moment is the thought that we can draw a non-arbitrary and 
morally significant line between childhood and adulthood, where children are not 
responsible beings while adults are.35 Rational capacities of the former, it is argued, 
are vulnerable to the negative effects of background conditions, while the latter’s 
are not seriously undermined by those effects.
Yet this line drawn at the canonical moment seems to me false, since it is not 
clear that there is such a moment based on which the degree of responsibility for 
being worse off is determinate. In other words, there is no clear reason for thinking 
that the comparative degree of rational capacities people enjoy at the canonical 
moment is determined in ways that are beyond their control, even in a rough sense.
35 The idea of canonical moment draws from Ameson’s argument (Ameson 1990: 179).
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Two reasons: first, rational capacities come on line gradually, and in a piecemeal 
fashion, so to draw a line is simply misguided. Second, and more important, the 
effects that differential background conditions generate may well exert more or 
less ongoing influence on people’s rational capacities. It seems that the canonical 
moment cut-off distorts the fact that the adverse circumstantial influence may 
persist even in adulthood, when it comes to the uncontrollable effects on rational 
capacities.36
It might be countered that this conclusion is too hasty, because there may 
seem a promising means to define the canonical moment. For instance, we can take 
a plausible measure such as establishing a good educational system that all children 
can freely and easily access. To ensure the provision of a good education system 
may make the canonical moment more reliable and stable. What is more, this 
might even eradicate the negative effects of original backgrounds. Were it 
successfully done in this way, we might be able to simply start holding adults 
responsible for being worse off, such that the proposed principle synchronically 
applies to each state of affairs.
This demonstration, I suspect, is too optimistic. As empirical studies show, 
the effects of individuals’ original background conditions—especially when it 
comes to the effects of their class of origin— are persistent. Even under the 
excellent educational system, it would seem difficult to view differences in 
achieved success purely as a matter of people’s personal responsibility.37 Of course, 
this does not deny that to improve the current educational system may help 
alleviate the negative influence that background conditions of an uncontrollable 
kind yield. All I want to say here is that the canonical moment cut-off can hardly
36 In a similar vein, Marc Fleurbaey criticises Ameson’s proposal of the canonical moment 
(Fleurbaey 1995:42).
'7 See, e.g., Marshall, Swift, and Roberts (1997: 70-132) and Bowles and Gintis (2002: 10-19).
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provide a reliable understanding of the canonical state.
Hence we should turn to a different way of assessing how much 
responsibility should be ascribed with respect to the culpable lack of rational 
capacities, without recourse to the canonical moment. My thought is that John 
Roemer’s approach can be taken as supplying a better understanding of the 
canonical state. Roemer suggests that all people can be partitioned into 
‘types’—the groups of individuals in a population with a certain set of 
circumstances—roughly by appealing to the following statistical data: their 
occupation, ethnicity, gender, what their parents do, and the parents’ income level. 
We can thereby observe the frequency distribution of degrees of effort that agents 
of the same type exert for earning income in each different type. The point of this 
observation is that the distribution of effort levels is different across types; for 
instance, the median level of effort in type 1 is 5 while it is 10 in type 2. This is 
because the difference of type means that the range of effort levels, which are 
reasonably available to members of each type, differs across types. Any non-trivial 
difficulty in altering the relation between a person’s own effort level for her lower 
type and the effort level of someone else for his higher type thus represents the 
(adverse) effects to which their background conditions differentially give rise.38
I suggest that this ingenious argument can be employed for singling out the 
resilient influence of uncontrollable background conditions on people’s rational 
capacities in the canonical state, for Roemer’s distinction between effort degrees 
and levels, roughly, can be taken as the distinction between degrees and levels of 
effort exerted for the development or improvement of rational capacities. This 
distinction is useful for examining approximately how culpably the worse off have 
diminished their rational capacities. What we should know is that people belong to
38 Roemer (1994: Ch.8; 1996: 276-310; 1998: 5ff;2003). See also Moriarty (2005: 217-221).
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different types that echo the differential influence of their own backgrounds on 
rational capacities. We can thereby see why those whose rational capacities are 
underdeveloped in the same degree are often comparatively responsible for being 
worse off. This seems to be a less demanding—thus feasible—way of collecting 
relevant information.
Third Question: As in other responsibility-sensitive formulations in deontic
egalitarianism, the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility seems unduly 
harsh in that rational agents may bear full responsibility for being worse off 
through their own choice. For instance, they may be left unhelped even in cases in 
which they are extremely worse off, given that they have rational capacities and the 
two constraints are met. Can the proposed principle ward off this harshness worry?
It is time to turn to the other significant role of proportionality. Recall the rough 
proportional idea of responsibility: by examining the degree of rational capacities 
and how accessibly a reasonable alternative could be obtained, we can assign to 
people the corresponding degree of responsibility for being worse off, even in 
cases in which they have sufficient rational capacities and the two constraints are 
satisfied. Now we should notice that this rough proportional idea of responsibility 
diminishes the range of negative deviations from simple equality for which 
individuals are responsible, for it is extremely unlikely that when they are worse 
off as the result of a less than fully rational choice, the responsibility should fully  be 
attributed to them in actual circumstances: no one has perfect rational capacities, 
nor is it possible for anyone to gain perfect information.39 The proposed principle
39 There are two senses in which no one can be fully informed. In the first sense, it seems 
practically impossible to collect all existing information, including tacit knowledge; should it be 
possible it would be o f much difficulty and costliness. Second, there seems no possible way to
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of responsibility thus insists that no one is perfectly rational. This constitutes a 
reason for not holding people fully responsible for any negative departure from 
simple equality. This enables us to avoid the prevalence of substantive inequalities 
of an extreme sort— it can be called an inequality-appeasing role o f  
proportionality.
This implication of proportionality should be taken more seriously, since this 
is ignored by philosophers who accuse the responsibility-sensitive deontic 
egalitarianism of not caring about the responsibly worse off.40 We can find no 
grounds for such antipathy towards the Autonomy-Based Principle of 
Responsibility, as long as we notice the point of my argument that attends to the 
crucial gap between agents in ideal circumstances and in actual circumstances. 
According to my proportional view of responsibility, it could hardly be said that 
any agent in actual circumstances has rational capacities of a perfect kind, no 
matter how well-educated or talented she is. This is empirically endorsed: as 
Kahneman and Tversky argue, the psychological experiments on people’s 
contradictory attitudes towards their options reveal the imperfection of their 
capacities to rationally frame choice opportunities and outcomes, which is far from 
the case of an ideal agent. Because the experimental data are obtained from 
university students and teachers, and because further complexities are involved in 
the case of decisional situations of an actual kind (such as a lack of information), 
the observations assure that no one can be fully rational in the actual
acquire future information, such as future technology available for certain medical treatments. The 
second sense in which we cannot be perfectly informed firmly guarantees that we should not be fully 
responsible for being worse off. With these in mind, we may say that Emilka’s case can be seen as 
that o f less than full information, because she can by no means know about Black’s possible 
intervention. It means that, even in Emilka’s case, her responsibility should certainly be curtailed by 
that extent.
40 See Section 1 above (note 4). See also Chapter 1.
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circumstances. 41 The remaining irrationality on any agent’s part in the 
non-culpable sense has an interesting implication: this may approve a policy to 
guarantee everyone’s basic needs, on grounds that there remains residual 
irrationality of capacities for choice in any situation of an actual kind.42
It still might be objected that the proposed principle of responsibility may be 
cruel. Take the case of Campbell again. Suppose, here, Campbell made imprudent 
decisions to smoke in his earlier life. He realised that his choices would give rise to 
the foreseeable consequence that he would not be able to effectively exercise his 
rational capacities later. He is deemed responsible for being worse off through 
those cumulative adverse effects on his capacities But how much responsibility 
should he bear? My proportional view of responsibility holds that the degree of 
responsibility should be assigned to him, roughly in proportion to the degree of his 
rational capacities in the canonical state, among other things. Yet it seems unduly 
harsh, since this suggests that Campbell should have assigned heavy weight to his 
early decisions: he was expected as a responsible agent to consider not only the 
current satisfaction of his desires but also the possible threats of losing his rational 
capacities in the future, in the light of his considered preferences. In other words, 
he should have borne in mind the high potentiality that he would find it much more 
arduous—even impossible—to control his craving for cigarettes later on. This 
seems too heavy a burden of deliberation to reasonably expect of anyone
My response to this objection is that there is no need to deal with all of the 
remaining harshness within the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality.
41 Kahneman and Tversky (1986; 2000). Pace critics o f the responsibility-sensitive deontic 
egalitarianism (e.g., Fried 2003: 146-149), this unavoidable element o f irrationality on people’s 
capacities does good to the Autonomy-Based Principle o f Responsibility.
421 will argue at full length how my desert-sensitive egalitarian theory o f justice can appreciate the 
normative space o f basic needs in Chapter 6.
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Recall that given a pluralism of egalitarian principles under the regulative political 
ideal of human equality, the telic egalitarian consideration may weigh more than 
reasons of any kind for substantive inequalities, even in the circumstances of 
justice. There may be a need to take the moral status of ascribing responsibility 
under deliberation in hard cases in which the two combined egalitarian principles 
cannot automatically apply. The above-mentioned case may be of this kind. The 
rough proportional story might seem merciless in that it possibly attributes to 
rational agents such as Campbell the heavy task of deliberative choice, especially 
at the early stage of life. On account of the practical difficulties in retrieving all of 
the relevant information about rational capacities at an earlier time, however, the 
responsibility for being worse off in question should be discounted in the light of 
the political idea of human equality, even if such difficulties result from the 
cumulative consequences of responsible choices in the past.43 As in cases of the 
distant needy, the worse off whose self-respect is severely damaged, and the worse 
off who are stuck by structural inequalities, the fact that Campbell’s negligence is 
at earlier stages of life may well provide a fairly strong reason for a policy in a 
direction of simple equality. The remaining harshness thus does not itself 
overthrow the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility.44
9. Summary
Before turning next to the conditions under which an agent is responsible for being
43 This is not far from the ordinary thought that young people are in the stages of developing their 
rational capacities to be responsible agents. See Scanlon (1998: 280), for a similar presentation of 
this.
44 This response might seem ad hoc. But it is not, because, on my argument, this kind of weighing 
the value of simple equality more than the relevant consideration of responsibility is redeemed by the 
regulative political ideal of human equality. See Chapter 2, Section 4.
The Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality I 73
better off, let me briefly summarise the argument of this chapter. I opened my brief 
discussion of the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality by suggesting that 
this can be seen as providing a morally relevant reason for deviations from simple 
equality. This chapter proposed the principle that designates an agent’s 
responsibility for being worse off as an important component of the 
Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality. I showed that the principle in 
question plays the role as long as it is construed as having the relevant accounts of 
rational capacities and the two constraints: the Expectational Consequences 
Constraint and the Reasonable Alternative Constraint. This is what I call the 
Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility. I then clarified three key points by 
responding to the three typical worries about the proposed principle of 
responsibility. First, this principle allows the assignment of the differential degree 
of responsibility to sufficiently rational people in its proportional terms. Second, 
this principle can be applied in such a way as to differentiate culpable defects of 
rational capacities from their non-culpable lacks, by recourse to Roemer’s 
approach. Third, this principle can ward off the harshness worry, since its 
proportional construal essentially allows that no one be fully rational in actual 
circumstances. I thus conclude that the Autonomy-Based Principle of 
Responsibility comes into full play, in considering a deontic egalitarian reason for 
negative departures from simple equality.
C hapter 4
The R esponsib ility-B ased  Principle o f Inequality II: 
R esp on sib ility  for Being Better O ff
1. Introduction
In the last chapter, I clarified the conditions under which an agent is responsible for 
being worse off. In this chapter, I turn to consider the conditions under which an 
agent is responsible for being better off. This constitutes another part of the 
Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality. In recent debates, advocates of the 
deontic version of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism have not sufficiently 
discussed the conditions in question, since their focus is fundamentally on negative 
cases—the cases in which people are worse off. 1 Thus, questions that they pose are 
usually the following kinds: should we help those who are worse off across the 
board? How can we differentiate the worse off who are qualified to receive some 
aid from the worse off who are not? Although, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
answering these questions is a primary task for the theory of egalitarian justice, it is 
also essential to argue how and why positive departures from simple equality can
1 This may not be true o f theorists o f desert such as David Miller and George Sher, because their 
interest is principally in positive cases (Miller 1976; 1999; Sher 1987). I shall also argue for the 
relevant conception o f desert that endorses a desert-sensitive egalitarian scheme in the next chapter.
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be justified. There are many cases in which it may be questioned whether the 
riches of the better off are legitimately enjoyed. This question strikes us as crucial 
not simply with respect to the completion of the Responsibility-Based Principle of 
Inequality. A proper response to this question may justify taxing certain advantages 
away from the non-responsibly better off for the assistance of the non-responsibly 
worse off (even though this may not be the only way of raising money needed for 
helping the worse off).
This chapter explores what conditions should be met by an agent in order to 
have a legitimate claim for being better off. I argue that there are two necessary 
conditions of an agent’s responsibility for being better off. The first is the Principle 
o f Self-Ownership: one must possess and exercise one’s own rational capacities, 
with the view to the justification for one’s being better off. The next three sections 
in this chapter demonstrate why the conception of self-ownership constitutes a 
necessary condition of an agent’s responsibility for being better off. In Section 2 ,1 
introduce the notion of self-ownership and show that the normativity of 
self-ownership cannot itself justify any positive departure from simple equality, 
due to its formality and shallowness. I thus propose two substantive constraints 
concerning the Principle of Self-Ownership: Section 3 argues the Expectational 
Consequences Constraint that purports to reflect how an agent makes a 
deliberative choice by recourse to her rational capacities. Section 4 argues for the 
Non-Arbitrariness Constraint that can cope with our concern about the effects of 
internal and external endowments.
The second condition has more to do with the ownership of material 
advantages besides oneself. This condition is as important as the first in that 
reaping positive benefits normally involves issues of whether an agent is 
legitimately entitled to the material goods external to her, which may well give rise
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to our concern about whether an action in pursuit of positive advantages privileges 
others. I argue for the other-regarding principle that is called for to defuse this 
concern. Section 5 scrutinises familiar arguments for the principle of justice in 
acquisition—the Lockean Proviso— and then proposes the relevant principle of just 
appropriation that can respond to the worry in question. Section 6 expands that 
argument to the Principle o f  a Fair Opportunity that can serve as another necessary 
condition of an agent’s responsibility for being better off.
Section 7 responds to two main concerns about my proposal.
2. The Principle of Self-Ownership
A good place to start in spelling out the conditions of responsibility for being better 
off is to consider an uncontroversial condition. To the first approximation, such a 
condition can be that an agent must be an owner of her own rational capacities. 
Setting aside its complication, there seems little disagreement about this proposal, 
for, as I discussed in the previous chapter, it is reasonable to think that to be a 
responsible agent, one must be able to engage in practical reasoning based on one’s 
rational capacities, under the impact of relevant information, and that this requires 
that the agent possess the capacities that are regularly conducive to practical 
deliberation of a rational kind. Here again, on this proposal, the agent can be 
described as the owner of the power of self-control over her intentional decisions, 
even in the presence of the Frankfurt-type of counterfactual intervener. This is 
because even in cases in which the agent would be caused to take a specific action 
although she has an intention to perform different actions, her possession of 
rational capacities is not undermined because the responsiveness to reasons in 
accordance with which she forms a decisional intention is secured. Let me
2 See Smith (1997: 311).
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propose that this ownership condition be considered as the core of the Principle of 
Self-Ownership which defines the liaison between rational capacities and their
3owner.
Many political philosophers have taken for granted this principle. 3 4 5 In 
particular, libertarians endorse the Principle of Self-Ownership in a stronger sense 
which holds that each person has a right of self-ownership. Robert Nozick 
famously attempts to defend the right of self-ownership in its fully extended sense 
which holds “each person as having a right to decide what would become of 
himself and what he would do, and as having a right to reap the benefits of what he 
did.”' Yet many supporters of the right of self-ownership do not take this hard line 
any more, since the fact that each person is a rightful owner of herself—her mental 
capacities and physical traits—does not entail that she has a right to the benefits 
that would accrue through the exercise of her rational capacities. Among them are 
left-libertarians who more modestly claim that each person has the right to control 
over herself, while this should be sharply distinguished from the right to reap the 
benefits through exercising her rational capacities. 6 Michael Otsuka
3 Note that the Principle o f Self-Ownership need not be o f the robust kind, because this does not 
require an outright sense o f freedom to do otherwise. As has been seen above, this principle is 
compatible with the Frankfurt-type case in which the counterfactual intervener has the power to 
govern the agent’s behaviour— that is, the agent could not do otherwise. But the principle in question 
is not o f the weak kind, since it requires the agent’s rational capacities per se to be her own, not to be 
set up or manipulated by someone else. For this point, I bear in mind discussions over autonomous 
agents in Mele (1995: Ch.9) and Fischer and Ravizza(1998: Ch.7, 230-236).
4 As Otsuka notes, liberal egalitarians— such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin— may not 
hesitate to endorse the idea o f self-ownership, much less for right- and left-libertarians (Otsuka 2003: 
15).
5 Nozick (1974: 171).
6 There is a variety o f left libertarianism. On this point, see Vallentyne and Steiner (2000) and 
Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka (2005).
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paradigmatically describes the former right of self-ownership as follows:
A very stringent right of control over and use of one’s mind and body that 
bars others from intentionally using one as a means by forcing one to 
sacrifice life, limb, and labour, where such force operates by means of 
incursions or threats of incursions upon one’s mind and body (including 
assault and battery and forcible arrest, detention, and imprisonment) .7
Now it seems perverse to deny that this right of self-ownership should be 
guaranteed for all agents, because this is a fundamental right against basic 
infringements on one’s mind and body that no one could reasonably decline.8 And 
it seems evident that this right of self-ownership represents the Principle of 
Self-Ownership in such a way as to associate an agent with her rational capacities 
in the realm of her rights. This explains, prima facie at least, why the agent appeals 
to the fact that she has exercised her own rational capacities, in claiming for certain 
benefits that render her better off.
So far so good. Obviously enough, however, the right of self-ownership, so 
understood, does not strongly ensure an agent’s positive claim for being better off. 
True, the proposed right of self-ownership protects us from trespass against our 
mind and body, at least without our consent. Since such infringements are potential 
threats even in contemporary society, this right is undoubtedly important and so 
must be respected. Nevertheless, the importance in question reveals mainly a 
negative role for the right of self-ownership to play, in such a way that no one must 
make use of anyone else’s mental and physical entities, at least without his or her 
consent. This does not prove any positive reason that someone can have a 
legitimate claim for being better off; by appealing to this right, we can say, at most, 
that an agent is not responsible for being better off if she did not act on her rational
7 Otsuka (2003: 15). In a similar vein, John Christman describes this right as ‘control rights’ 
(Christman 1991:29).
8 See Thomson (1990: Ch.8).
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capacities, or if she has no control over the use of her mind and body. This shows 
only a negative structure of self-ownership, not its positive aspect.9
It is now plain that the right of self-ownership is too formal and thus 
substantially thin for one to have a positive claim for being better off. This means 
that in order for an agent to claim that she is responsible for being better off, the 
proposed right of self-ownership is not enough even in the issues only related to 
the Principle of Self-Ownership. There is a need to have more substantive 
constraints concerning which the agent is said to be responsible for being better off, 
as far as the conception of self-ownership goes. To see what constraints in the 
Principle of Self-Ownership are to be met, let me sketch two reasons that the right 
of self-ownership cannot be so robust as to give the owner of mind and body an 
entitlement to being better off through their exercise.
First, the bare notion of self-ownership is not concerned with how 
deliberatively an agent exercises her own rational capacities. It can be easily 
imagined that some outcome of a person’s choice is a fluke: it is unexpected, 
unanticipatable, against the ordinary run of natural consequences. This does not 
matter to the crass consideration of self-ownership, since the right of 
self-ownership may authorise such a fluky result insofar as that is through her own 
choice, whether it is a result of her careful deliberation or not. Relatedly, how 
defective or irrational a person’s capacities for autonomous choice are is of little 
concern from the viewpoint of mere self-ownership. 10 Consider that an agent who 
possesses only minimal kinds of physical and mental capacities might be 
extremely better off through some choice (for instance, making a big fortune on 
gambling of an irrational sort). The right of self-ownership is indifferent to any
9 See Cohen (1995: 98): “Self-ownership is not eliminated, but it is rendered useless, rather as it is 
useless to own a corkscrew when you are forbidden access to bottles of wine.”
10 For discussions of this point, see Cohen (1995: 236-238) and Vallnetyne (1998: 612-613).
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difference between cases of this utterly lucky kind and cases where an agent is 
better off through the execution of her intention formed in the light of her 
considered preferences.
Second, self-ownership itself pays no heed to how one’s capacities for 
rational choice have been acquired. Imagine people who enjoy a high degree of 
rational capacities. Among them some are naturally blessed with excellent 
capacities for winning profits, but others put in tremendous efforts to the 
improvement of their rational capacities over the course of their lives.
For these reasons, the Principle of Self-Ownership should involve two 
corresponding constraints. I show them below.
3. Expectational Consequences Constraint
As has been argued above, the mere consideration of self-ownership per se has 
little to do with how people have engaged in practical reasoning and formed their 
will based on their rational capacities for choice: one might find precious and 
valuable ore without any information, when wandering aimlessly around on a 
mountain; people who utterly lack skills and knowledge of any sort about the 
moves of the stock market might amass huge marginal gain from stock exchanges; 
and so on. In these cases, the bare consideration of self-ownership may 
counterintuitively hold people responsible for being far better off simply because 
the better off result is one of the consequences they achieve through their own 
choice, whether deliberative or whimsical. Nor does the bare notion of 
self-ownership reflect the degree of their rational capacities exercised for the 
choice. It seems that to hold a person responsible for being better off, we should 
see whether she engages in deliberative activities and the extent to which she has 
rational capacities.
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To do so, we can adopt the Expectational Consequences Constraint. 
Admittedly, this constraint was spelled out in Section 5 of Chapter 3. But it should
be slightly modified for its application to positive cases.
Expectational Consequences Constraint: An agent is responsible for being 
better off only through the consequences she could have reasonably expected, 
and did actually expect, to obtain by her intentional choice.
The modified part of this constraint is that in order for an agent to have a claim for 
being better off, this outcome should be that which she did actually expect through 
her intentional choice. This is because, unlike negative cases, an agent’s 
responsibility for positive goods has more to do with whether she actually 
deliberates upon judgments about choice opportunities; if an agent did not actually 
foresee and intend her better off outcome, we are inclined to regard the good 
fortune as a fluke and so not credit her with a performance for positive advantages 
that lets her be better off.
So adapted, the Expectational Consequences Constraint can reflect how an 
agent makes deliberative judgments about choice opportunities and—as in the 
original Expectational Consequences Constraint (proposed in the previous 
chapter)— the degree of her rational capacities. The judgments made by recourse to 
her rational capacities thus are germane to give enough credence to her own 
rational belief about how reasonably she would gain certain advantages. In other 
words, the consequences that are reasonably expected to obtain through choice are, 
on her part, the results of actual deliberation in the light of her considered 
preferences. This roughly determines the responsible range of her better off 
outcomes. To illustrate: good consequences of a fluky sort that are antecedently 
unlikely are normally those which a person could not have reasonably expected to 
obtain; the treasure a person found by chance when taking a walk does not express 
such deliberation at all because the result in question is not the main purpose of her
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chosen act. The same is true of the case where people who dabble in stocks without 
any relevant knowledge luckily make money on the stock market. By virtue of the 
Expectational Consequences Constraint that enables us to see how (and the extent 
to which) the outcome an agent enjoys flows from her deliberative choice, we can 
say that the people in these examples may not be responsible for being better off. 11
To see the importance of the Expectational Consequences Constraint more 
clearly, it is useful to attend to David Miller’s notion of integral luck. 12 By ‘integral 
luck’ Miller means luck that has effects on a person’s actual performance itself. 
The example Miller gives is a poorly skilled archer who wins the archery 
competition through lucky strikes. It seems that luck of this sort counts against 
responsibility for the good because the outcome— winning the archery 
competition—could not have been reasonably anticipated in forming her intention 
to attend the game. Now suppose that this archer is just a layperson who has never 
done archery before. Suppose, further, this person is not talented in sports at all. 
We are reluctant to hold her responsible for her win against the other competitors 
who have trained every day. The Expectational Consequences Constraint plays a 
major role in factoring out such effects of sheer integral luck, since it asserts that 
the consequences that can be claimed as those one is responsible for are only those 
which could have been reasonably, and were actually, expected to obtain through 
her intentional choice. Under this constraint, the layperson in question cannot be 
seen as responsible for the lucky result.
It is important to note that meeting this constraint should not be regarded as 
an all-or-nothing matter. Rather, the degree to which the Expectational 
Consequences Constraint is met does essentially matter to us, for there is nothing
11 For a similar discussion of the expectational element of consequences for which people are held 
responsible, see Sher (1987: Ch.3).
12 Miller (1999: 143-146).
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wrong in claiming how much an agent’s better off consequence exceeds her 
reasonable expectation. For example, if an agent received slightly better outcome 
than those which she could have reasonably expected, and did actually expect, to 
obtain, she would be responsible for the outcome in a slightly weaker way than if it 
was within the expectational consequences of her own choice, other things being 
equal. Were extraordinary benefits acquired far beyond the reasonable expectation, 
then an agent would be deemed as much less responsible for them than if they 
were within her reasonable expectation, all else being constant. As such, there is no 
need to say that an agent is not responsible for being better off at all, even in cases 
in which the better off consequence she enjoys is not the one that she could have 
reasonably expected, and did actually expect, prior to the choice. In the application 
of the Expectational Consequences Constraint, we should instead refer to the 
degree to which she is responsible for being better off.
This might seem too obvious. But this is not negligible, since integral luck as 
such could hardly be nullified even in the ideal kind of market in which there are 
supposedly few departures from a competitive equilibrium: even in such a market, 
non-reproducible resources (for example, scarce natural resources and specific 
hand-made resources) might be valued anomalously higher than their equilibrium 
prices; nor might the process of production be stable, due to economies of scale 
involving technological innovation of some sort. Much more uneven is the 
existing market—which is obviously far from the ideal kind— in which many 
people reap windfall profits, sometimes through their own whimsical action, 
sometimes based on their economic behaviour of a purely speculative sort. It is 
certain that less extreme cases involving integral luck of some kind are prevailing
13 As Miller admits, this is the very fact that should be realised by people like Miller himself, who 
support the maintenance o f an ideal sort o f market (Miller 1989: 172-173). See also the following 
paragraph above.
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in the market. In circumstances of this actual kind, the Expectational Consequences 
Constraint should apply so as to allow us to refer to the degree to which an agent is 
responsible for being better off. Otherwise, we might have to say that most of the 
outcomes of people’s acts are something like ‘spoils’ in the market. Or more 
modestly, we should say that these outcomes do not inherit their originally formed 
intentions.
It might be proposed instead that the market be regulated by a politically 
controlled agency that monitors market activities of this kind, in order to minimise 
the unnecessary fluctuations of market in question. As is well known, Miller puts 
forward this proposal. 14 Pace Miller, however, it is implausible to assume that such 
a political agency can shift the market economy into a (temporal) competitive 
equilibrium, for, due to various factors such as globalisation, technological 
progress, and the existence of many venture companies, controlling the market in a 
direction of equilibrium (if there is any) is extremely difficult, and may be 
detrimental because of the likelihood for the authority to misjudge such an optimal 
point. As proponents of the notion of government failure say, it is mistaken to 
presume that a political agency is capable of acting upon collective information to 
effectively maintain the perfectly working order of the market.1'^  In lieu of such 
control, it seems better to simply appeal to the degree to which the Expectational 
Consequences Constraint is satisfied, in such a way that deviations from the 
expectational consequences of an agent’s own choice make her less responsible for 
being better off.
14 Miller (1989: Ch.6).
15 See, e.g., Hayek (1960: Ch.15) and Buchanan (1962).
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4. Non-Arbitrariness Constraint
It is time to turn to another constraint which can deal with the problem that the bare 
consideration of self-ownership cannot. The problem is that by appealing only to 
the right of self-ownership we cannot distinguish between the better off who are 
blissfully influenced by the initial endowment of natural and social assets, and the 
better off who have struggled for rational capacities. To cope with this problem, I 
propose the ‘Non-Arbitrariness Constraint’ that enables us to make the needed 
differentiation.
Non-Arbitrariness Constraint: An agent is responsible for being better off 
roughly to the extent that the better off consequence is not substantively due 
to the influence of natural and social endowments.
The Non-Arbitrariness Constraint echoes John Rawls’s famous statement: “the 
initial endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of their growth and 
nature in early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view.” 16 But Rawls is 
suspicious of any attempt to extinguish their effects, because “[t]he better endowed 
are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems to be 
no way to discount for their greater good fortune.” 17 Pace Rawls, I argue here that 
there is a reasonable way of discounting for the greater good fortune of the better 
endowed.
For us, this is an easy task because we have established an approximate way 
of knowing the extent to which people are endowed with natural and social assets 
of an initial kind. Recall that to distinguish between culpable lack of (a certain 
degree of) rational capacities and their non-culpable defects, we can introduce the 
idea of a canonical state in which the degree of people’s rational capacities are 
determined in ways that are beyond their control. The canonical state thus purports
16 Rawls (1971: 311-312).
17 Rawls (1971: 312).
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to show the degree of rational capacities under the influence of uncontrollable 
background conditions. As we have already seen, there is a rough connection 
between such rational capacities and natural assets in that native gifts render not 
only possible but also rational a certain choice out of alternatives presented to the 
gifted. Hence, to discount the greater good luck of the better endowed, we should 
weigh an agent’s responsibility for advantages by reference to the effects of 
rational capacities in the canonical state.
Let us consider two agents, Katie and Laurie. Suppose both currently have 
effective capacities for rational choice. And further, both are in the end better off to 
the same degree. For the sake of simplicity, assume that integral luck of any kind 
has no influence on the process of their being better off. There is, however, one 
difference: Katie originally owned the higher degree of capacities for rational 
choice, owing to her good background conditions (for instance, she had received a 
good education since she was bom), whereas the degree of original capacities 
Laurie possessed is extremely low due to her unfortunate circumstances (for 
instance, she was bom in a very poor family living in a slum). It then seems that 
their responsibility for being better off differs in degree, among other things. In 
light of the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint, we can say that their responsibility for 
being better off differs such that Laurie is more responsible than Katie, all else 
being constant.
But how much is Laurie held more responsible for being better off, as 
compared to Katie’s better off state of the same level? Put another way, to what 
extent should we take into account the differential effects of natural arbitrariness at 
the early stage of life, in holding Laurie more responsible for being better off? 
There are two ways of taking those effects into account. The first is to ascribe to an 
agent the responsibility for being better off only to the extent of the proportional
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improvement of her rational capacities from the canonical state. I call this the 
strong version o f the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint. What lies behind this version is 
an idea that counts pure efforts exerted for the improvement of rational capacities 
only as responsible. In other words, this version attempts to strictly exclude any 
part of rational capacities affected by natural lottery. This can be contrasted to the 
weak version o f the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint, which simply says that the more 
an agent’s rational capacities improve from the canonical state, the more she may 
be held responsible for being better off in an essentially comparative sense. The 
reason this version is weaker is that it allows some residual effects of natural and 
social contingencies: people’s responsibility for being better off is not 
non-comparatively but comparatively weighed in terms of the efforts put in to the 
improvement of rational capacities. In the following I point to two reasons that the 
Non-Arbitrariness Constraint is more plausibly interpreted as this weak version 
than in its strong version that aims to completely extinguish any uncontrollable 
effects on the improvement of rational capacities.
First, the improvement of one’s rational capacities from the canonical state 
does not entail that one has never been fortunate on it. We can easily imagine the 
following kind of case: a person whose parents are slum dwellers and who is 
racially discriminated against encounters one excellent teacher who encourages her 
to seek higher education. In this kind of case, although the person is endowed with 
a relatively lower degree of rational capacities that results from her adverse
18 Note that this is not the same as the simplistic idea o f effort-based responsibility, the idea that 
bases an individual’s responsibility on the degree to which she has made efforts o f any kind. The 
Non-Arbitrariness Constraint in its strong version claims only that we should reward efforts poured 
into the growth o f rational capacities from the canonical state, not every effort For the normative 
idea o f rewarding pure efforts o f any kind and its theoretical problems, see, e.g., Lamont (1995), 
Levine (1999), and Hsieh (2000).
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background conditions, it might be that, thanks to the teacher, she would fight 
against this plight and finally achieve a higher degree of capacities for rational 
choice through receiving higher education. Luck of this common kind is what 
David Miller calls ‘circumstantial luck’ . 19 Since circumstantial luck of this sort 
always lies in the background of human performance, it is impossible to 
completely factor it out in evaluating the improvement of rational capacities. This, 
I think, gives a reason not to employ the strong version of the Non-Arbitrariness 
Constraint.
It might be countered that although circumstantial luck of this common sort 
is rampant, it is undoubtedly luck that is beyond our control and thus should be 
nullified. But the nullification of circumstantial luck of this kind involves the 
attempt to annul counterfactual luck, which not just epistemically but 
metaphysically goes beyond our practice of judging people’s responsibility. To see 
this, suppose that the aforementioned person successfully acquires rational 
capacities of an ideal kind, owing to greater effort made with the help of her 
teacher’s strong encouragement. It seems evident that the fact that she luckily had a 
great teacher plays an important role in the improvement of her rational capacities. 
Now suppose, in line with the strong version of the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint, 
we try to discount for counterfactual luck of this kind in precisely assessing her 
responsibility for being better off. To do so, we should know what she would have 
been like had she not had the luck of having met the good teacher. In other words, 
we should know what she would have been responsible for instead. This is, 
however, not just epistemically unknowable but essentially indeterminate. This
19 Miller (1999: 143-144): “luck may determine whether someone has the opportunity to perform 
in the first place. The car carrying the athlete to the track meet may break down so that she has no 
chance to run. One soldier may be given an opportunity to show courage in battle, while another 
never gets within range of the enemy. Luck of this kind can be called ‘circumstantial luck’.”
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demonstrates the implausibility of adopting the strong version of the
• 20Non-Arbitrariness Constraint.
Relatedly, there is a paradoxical problem with circumstantial luck of the kind 
discussed above in assessing the improvement of rational capacities from the 
canonical state. This is a paradox which Saul Smilansky calls ‘fortunate 
misfortune’ . 21 To see the paradox, consider Maureen. She was bom with 
unfortunate defects and thus has had difficulties in her life, not only because of her 
disabilities, but also because of social discrimination against her. But in the process, 
she recorded every hardship in her diary. This habitual writing fulfilled her 
emotionally and improved her writing skills. She then published a novel based on 
her diary, which became a great hit all over the world. In the end, she is far better 
off.22 Here, interestingly, the background conditions of an apparently adverse kind 
are not consequently unfavourable in that she is better off through having gone 
through and surmounted her initial predicament. In view of her resultant 
well-being, her background conditions that roughly determine the substantively 
lower degree of rational capacities may well be regarded as ‘good fortune’ for her, 
even though Maureen, admittedly, managed to overcome the hardships of her
20 For a relevant discussion o f this point, see Hurley (2003: 29-30, 161-168). It is important to note 
that the point o f my contention is that not all kinds o f circumstantial luck can be extinguished 
through our practice o f responsibility judgments. As a matter o f fact, I have argued in the previous 
chapter that there must be a sufficiently good alternative that an agent could have reasonably 
expected to obtain, in order to hold her responsible for being worse off. Admittedly, whether the 
reasonable alternative is absent is a certain kind o f circumstantial luck. This is not inconsistent with 
what I am arguing here, however, since circumstantial luck o f this kind has nothing to do with 
counterfactual responsibility. In other words, it has nothing to do with whether or how much the 
agent would have been responsible had she not been affected by circumstantial luck, such as the luck 
of having encountered the excellent teacher.
21 Smilansky (1994).
22 This example draws on Smilansky’s Abigail case (Smilansky 1994: 153-154).
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earlier life. Here I do not intend to give a complete solution to this puzzle of 
circumstantial luck of this sort; nor do I deny that Maureen has put in intensive 
efforts to achieve that success. No one seems to deny that we should reward her for 
the efforts poured into the improvement of rational capacities. All I want to 
emphasise is that cases of this sort are seen everywhere, and that this leads to the 
difficulty of employing the strong version of the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint.23
So much for the first reason. A second reason that the Non-Arbitrariness 
Constraint is better interpreted as the weak version is that to count the only 
consequences in proportion to the development of an agent’s capacities as a token 
of pure efforts she has made may radically thin down the evaluation of such efforts 
that we make every day.24 Consider, for example, professional pianists. They are 
more or less naturally talented in piano playing, although, we can imagine, some 
have practiced more to train their talents. We may well praise the huge amount of 
effort they have poured into the piano practice. It might seem that this appraising 
attitude favours the strong version of the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint, since it 
insists that the more efforts some pianists have made for the cultivation of skills, 
the more favourable a claim they can make for being better off as a reward for their 
first-rate play, other things being equal. Nevertheless, it could be that the growth of 
their skills from the canonical state might be negligible as compared to the
23 It might be claimed that the case o f fortunate misfortune similarly undermines the weak version 
of the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint: this problem would render unfair favourable treatments o f any 
sort towards a Maureen-like person because original ‘misfortune’ is resultantly not misfortune at all. 
In response, the fact that misfortune results in fortune in some sense does not erase the significant 
fact that (as in Maureen’s case) an agent has put in efforts to overcome serious difficulties with her 
rational capacities in the canonical state. The Non-Arbitrariness Constraint in its weak version can 
roughly reflect the fact in question, in a way that holds her more responsible for being better off than 
those who enjoy the same kind o f better off state, even though there is the ineliminable influence o f  
natural luck.
24 For similar presentations o f this point, see Sher (1987: 157) and Miller (1999: 146-149).
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presence of their native assets and good fortune in their life. Because in special 
kinds of skills such as musical talent people’s native endowments may occupy a 
large part of their performance skills, the development in question might be only 
slightly detectable (if not null). So if the strong version of the Non-Arbitrariness 
Constraint were employed, it would follow that those pianists are held responsible 
for little of what they gained through their performance. By contrast, its weak 
version allows us to say simply that some ‘diligent’ pianists more responsibly 
enjoy their better off consequence as a result of their performance, as compared to 
other genius pianists who also enjoy the same sort of consequence. In the weak 
version of the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint, all that is needed is such comparative 
judgments that involve no absolute measure of the development or improvement of 
rational capacities.
5. Lockean Proviso Revisited
So far I have elaborated the two constraints concerning the Principle of 
Self-Ownership: the Expectational Consequences Constraint and the
Non-Arbitrariness Constraint. The Principle of Self-Ownership, thus understood, 
provides a necessary condition of an agent’s legitimate claim for being better off. 
However, the completed principle of self-ownership seems not sufficient for 
regarding a better off agent as a legitimate claimant for positive advantages, since 
to examine whether an agent legitimately claims such positive advantages 
necessitates a shift in our focus from issues of self-ownership to ownership of 
material goods. The implication of this shift is essentially important in positive 
cases, because an agent might prejudice other people’s interests in ways that 
restrict their opportunities for acquiring positive benefits, or simply expropriate the 
benefits from them. It goes without saying that the world in which we are standing
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is not of Robinson Crusoe’s kind. Choices that render some people better off thus 
nearly always involve social interactions with others, especially when it comes to 
economic activities in the market. As I already argued, such interactions consist in 
the circumstances of justice which are typically marked by conflicts (and an 
identity) of people’s interests over moderately scarce resources. ' This shows that 
in addition to the Principle of Self-Ownership, we need an other-regarding 
principle that constitutes another necessary condition of an agent’s responsibility 
for being better off through her own choice, given the situation in which most 
people pursue their own interest in becoming better off. It is time to discuss such a 
principle.
I think that any such principle is germane to the Lockean proviso, for the 
Lockean proviso directly states occasions on which an agent can enjoy advantages 
that lead her to be better off. Following the strand of debates over the Lockean 
proviso, I consider a primitive situation— which, to a greater or lesser extent, 
represents our current situation—where reasonable people have an ordinary 
interest in acquiring unowned worldly resources to as great an extent as possible. 
This, I believe, can boil down our argument over the other-regarding principle to 
that which focuses on a principle of justice in acquisition.
Let me start by considering what John Locke himself says about the proviso. 
As is well known, Locke puts forward an account of how an agent can legitimately 
appropriate such worldly goods in the following way: an agent “can have a right to 
what that is one joyned to [through mixing one’s labour with it], at least where 
there is enough, and as good left in common for others.” 26 There has been much 
controversy over how we should interpret this statement: whether this states a
25 See Chapter 2, Section 3.
26 Locke (1960: Sec.27, 306).
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necessary condition of legitimate acquisition (Robert Nozick), or sufficient 
(Jeremy Waldron), or neither (Richard Ameson); whether the ‘enough’
stipulation means ‘enough for similar use’ (A. John Simmons) or ‘enough for 
survival by use of the remaining resources’ (G. A. Cohen); and so on.28 Such 
exegesis of Locke’s original argument aside, it is plain that Nozick adopts a 
sophisticated version of the Lockean proviso that specifies occasions on which an 
agent can appropriate unowned objects by mixing her labour with them. His way 
of adapting Locke’s statement ‘enough and as good left in common for others’ is 
that initial acquisitions of any sort must worsen nobody else: “The crucial point is 
whether appropriation of an unowned object worsens the situation of others.” But 
an ambiguity remains: the situation of others is not to be worsened as compared to 
what? Nozick seemingly takes the baseline for comparison to be the well-being of 
other people in a state of nature, in which no one privately owns worldly resources 
and so each can be free to avail herself of them .30
Notice that Nozick’s Lockean proviso is different from the original Lockean 
proviso in a crucial sense: while the latter does not allow any appropriation if it 
undermines anyone else’s full range of opportunities to improve his or her situation 
by his or her particular appropriation, the former only prohibits the acquisition of 
resources from making others worse off than if they would have free access to 
them. Locke writes:
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of Land, by improving it, any 
prejudice to any other Man, since there was still enough, and as good left; 
and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that in effect, there was
27 Nozick (1974: 175-182), Waldron (1979), and Ameson (1991: 45).
28 Simmons (1992: 292) and Cohen (1995: 76-78).
29 Nozick (1974: 175).
,0 Nozick (1974: 178-182). But notoriously, his way o f setting the baseline for comparison could 
be variously interpreted. For a detailed discussion o f this, see W olff (1991: 112-115).
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never the less left for others because of his inclosure for himself. For he that 
leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at 
all. No Body could think himself injur’d by the drinking of another Man, 
though he took a good Drought, who had a whole River of the same Water 
left him to quench his thirst. And the Case of Land and Water, where there is 
enough of both, is perfectly the same.31
By contrast, Nozick’s Lockean proviso permits one to own (or even monopolise) 
worldly objects by offering compensation to other people who would in 
consequence lose the opportunity to acquire them. This weak version of the 
Lockean proviso seems prima facie more plausible than the original 
version—especially in the circumstances of justice that involve conditions of 
moderate scarcity: under the original Lockean proviso, it is highly likely that no 
one can privatise unowned worldly goods in such circumstances; nor, to say the 
least, can we know whether appropriation in such circumstances are illegitimate.32 
In what follows, hence, I mainly target Nozick’s version of the Lockean proviso.
Now the question is whether Nozick’s Lockean proviso is sufficient for just 
appropriation. Taking the base point in Nozick’s way renders the answer negative, 
for the Lockean proviso as adapted by Nozick may neglect the extent to which 
people differ in their bargaining powers: Nozick’s Lockean proviso does not forbid 
a person to monopolise all resources, insofar as she guarantees others 
compensation of a meagre kind. To see how, imagine a case in which people are 
washed up on a desert island in conditions of moderate scarcity.34 Suppose that 
they can be divided into two kinds, ‘the incompetent’, endowed only with poor
31 Locke (1960: Sec.33, 309). See also Cohen (1995: 77-78). Cf. Simmons (1992: 288-294).
32 See Nozick (1974: 176) and Waldron (1988: 214; 2002: 172-173).
33 In fairness to Nozick, we should note that he admits the problem with monopoly of this kind, 
though in a limited sense (Nozick 1974: 181-182; cf. Steiner 1977: 47).
34This way of constructing the relevant argument draws from Dworkin (2000: 66). See also 
Otsuka (2003:22).
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skills to acquire worldly resources, and ‘the competent’, gifted with great abilities 
to appropriate resources effectively. For the sake of simplicity, assume that people 
differ in such talents to acquire worldly goods through no fault of their own (for 
instance, the difference is due to their native talents). Now consider that Nozick’s 
Lockean proviso is employed as the principle of justice in acquisition. The problem 
then is that even if the competent appropriated a great deal more than the 
incompetent, the amount of which leaves the incompetent barely sufficient to live 
off, the Lockean proviso might obtain. This may be the case as long as the 
competent offer the incompetent compensation that would lead them to be no 
worse off than if nothing had been appropriated. Note that this problem also occurs 
even in cases in which there is no difference of such talents between people: the 
first appropriators may legitimately take over land or worldly resources by offering 
the others certain benefits that, for instance, make their position slightly better than 
if nothing had been appropriated. Nozick’s Lockean proviso thus seems too weak 
to prevent people being exploited unfairly by those who have more leverage in the 
bargaining process after their initial acquisition.36
This charge levelled against Nozick’s Lockean proviso tells us that there is a 
need to impose a more strict principle on an agent’s claim for the appropriation of 
unowned worldy resources. One obvious way of coping with the problem at stake 
is that the original Lockean proviso— which is more stringent than Nozick’s— is 
adopted as the principle of justice in acquisition instead. But, as has been argued,
’5 It might be suggested that there is a further possible case: the incompetent may legitimately 
monopolise unowned objects insofar as the competent are compensated to the point that is better 
than if nothing had been appropriated by them (Ameson 1991: 49). Although this may be logically 
possible, this is very unlikely because the incompetent, in our example, are placed at a huge 
disadvantage with respect to the appropriation of worldly resources.
36 For further discussions of this problem, see Cohen (1995: 79-83) and Otsuka (2003: 23-24).
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this version of the Lockean proviso would be too stringent especially in the 
circumstances of justice; under this proviso, no worldly objects may be 
legitimately acquired in the conditions of moderate scarcity. The more moderate 
principle of justice in acquisition I want to propose is the Principle o f  a Fair 
Opportunity. This principle enjoins an appropriator not to undermine all 
sufficiently good alternatives for everyone else to reasonably choose or accept after 
the appropriation, given that he or she is well-informed and rational.37 This 
principle reflects upon the possibility that under Nozick’s Lockean proviso there 
could remain no reasonable alternative to all but the first appropriators after their 
initial acquisition. For the proposed principle, such problems are not threatening 
any more, because this principle enjoins that any appropriation be compatible with 
the sufficiently good alternative that any well-informed and rational agent can 
accept through careful deliberation. For instance, the proposed principle requires 
an appropriator who monopolises all opportunities for the improvement of life to 
give the rest of the people compensation up to the degree to which they can lead a 
sufficiently decent life. The Principle of a Fair Opportunity thus is, on the one hand, 
more robust than Nozick’s Lockean proviso in that it guarantees anyone a decent 
life. The Principle of a Fair Opportunity, on the other hand, is (plausibly) weaker 
than the original Lockean proviso that prohibits appropriators to damage any 
opportunity for others to improve their situation through particular acquisitions.
37 For a similar presentation, see Otsuka (2003: 23-29). While Otsuka employs an 
opportunity-for-welfare metric in specifying the sufficiently good alternative, as I said in Chapter 1, 
my thesis does not tackle the question of which metric should be endorsed, so I want to leave aside 
the metric issue.
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6. The Principle of a Fair Opportunity
Return to our main interest in the other-regarding principle that states a necessary 
condition of responsibility for being better off. Admittedly, to appropriate unowned 
worldly resources is typically among cases in which one receives benefits that 
make one better off through one’s own choice. It seems that the aforementioned 
argument has strong relevance to the condition of such responsibility. It is true that 
arguments concerning the Lockean proviso are lodged normally for the 
justification of property rights of an exclusive sort. The aim of my argument is less 
ambitious than that, since it is to clarify a necessary condition under which people 
can be held responsible for being better off, not to provide an indefeasible 
justification of property rights. But there is an undeniable link between advantages 
for which the better off are responsible and their advantages protected in terms of 
property rights; the responsibility for being better off generates a strong if not 
decisive reason for the duration of private property rights.38 Furthermore, the fact 
that my argument has a more moderate aim than the arguments for absolute 
property rights does not deny the applicability of the relevant principle of justice in 
acquisition to the evaluation of each individual’s claim for being better off. These 
thoughts, I think, allow me to employ the relevant principle of a Lockean-proviso 
sort as a necessary condition for their responsibly being better off in general.
Hence I propose that the Principle of a Fair Opportunity can apply to how we
’8 Leif Wenar— a contemporary theorist o f property rights— demonstrates that property rights o f  
an exclusive sort could hardly derive their moral ground only from the labour o f original acquisitions 
even under the relevant Lockean proviso. So he argues for a more moderate account o f property 
rights which do not solely depend upon the conception o f historical entitlements to worldly objects 
(Wenar 1998). My argument here could resonate with arguments o f his kind. This is because my 
argument does not purport to give full endorsement to property rights o f an absolute kind, even 
though it may supply a justification for a certain system o f property rights as long as the rights 
associate with the conception o f responsibility for being better off.
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assess people’s responsibility for being better off. Let me formulate this principle 
as follows:
The Principle o f  a Fair Opportunity: To be responsible for being better off, it 
should necessarily be the case that a better off agent leaves available at least 
one sufficiently good alternative that others could reasonably pursue or 
accept were they well-informed and rational.
As has been seen above, this principle does not disregard the presence of 
bargaining leverages that enable the better off to expropriate others of their 
advantages, whether directly or indirectly. Since exploitation in its contemporary 
form is characterised by the (potential) exercise of such bargaining powers that 
differ among people, the Principle of a Fair Opportunity, I believe, has prima facie 
plausibility even in a complex society.39
Imagine a world in which no electricity has been invented and so candles are 
used for lighting. That world stands in a state of nature in which many people 
engage in making candles without obstructing other people’s activities of a similar 
sort. Consider Michael who is a talented organiser. He has capacities to run an 
efficient process of producing candles from natural wax at low cost. Suppose also 
that he justly collects all of the resources necessary for manufacturing candles. He 
now monopolises the market of candlemaking. Is he then allowed to reap benefits 
that make him far better off? My answer is that as long as he does not damage all 
sufficiently good alternatives that others—people who work on a candlemaking 
job—could reasonably pursue or accept were they informed and rational, he is 
responsible for being better off, all else being constant. In Michael’s case, the most 
promising way of meeting this condition is to employ the people and offer a salary 
that would certainly promise them to lead a decent life.
I now consider two objections that may be moved against the Principle of a
39 See, e.g., Ameson (1981: 212-213), Miller (1989: 190-193), and Van Parijs (1995: 141-142), for 
the explanations of exploitation in its contemporary form.
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Fair Opportunity. The two possible objections have opposite directions such that 
the proposed principle is too weak, on the one hand, and too strong, on the other 
hand, to allow people to be responsible for being better off through their own 
choice. Neither of them is, as I will show, successful, but to respond to the two 
objections helps us see the plausibility of the Principle of a Fair Opportunity.
Consider, first, the charge that the proposed principle is too weak. This 
objection is made for the reason that to leave anyone with at least one reasonable 
alternative available is not enough. True, the original Lockean-proviso kind of 
principle would be too demanding were it applied as a necessary condition of 
responsibility for being better off. This principle says that any outcome flowing 
from any choice people might make should not be made worse than if one had not 
acquired certain advantages that let one be better off. This then would require that 
to be responsible for being better off, the agent must leave every choice 
opportunity open to others to be as well off as they would otherwise have been. 
This is certainly a big ask. But from this, the objector argues, it does not follow that 
the principle requiring the better off not to damage all sufficiently good alternatives 
for others is the most plausible other-regarding principle, for we may well be 
concerned about the opportunity of the far better off that others could not have 
reasonably pursued. In the example of Michael’s candle factory, even if he 
provided a decent amount of salary for his employees, the latter have had no 
chance to get the same benefits Michael is receiving. It then might seem that the 
proposed principle is not fair enough, because it allows that opportunities of an 
appropriator’s kind are even absent to many.
In response, first, I want to say that ex post equalisation based on such 
differential opportunities seems hopeless. This is because, to discount the benefits 
Michael is receiving on the above-mentioned ground involves the not just
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epistemically but rather metaphysically implausible task of inquiring into the 
effects of counterfactual luck. Recall what I said about circumstantial luck before: 
not all kinds of circumstantial luck can be rooted out, especially when it involves 
counterfactual luck, since we can never know whether an agent would have been 
responsible for being better off had she not been affected by such luck. The same is 
true of the argument here. It is not just epistemically unknowable but essentially 
indeterminate what Michael’s life would have been like had he not been presented 
with the opportunity to pursue the current career. Counterfactual judgments of this 
sort, however, are needed for assessing precisely how much opportunities of an 
appropriator’s kind have impacted on the life paths of the better off like Michael. 
This is highly implausible; we can hardly tell what the Michael-like better off 
agents would have been responsible for instead. By contrast, this indeterminacy 
problem does not occur with our practice of judging whether a reasonable 
alternative in which Michael’s employees can lead a decent life is guaranteed, for 
there is no need to appeal to counterfactual judgments of that kind: we can judge 
whether the better off are responsible for their current position by recourse to 
whether others do have any sufficiently good alternative. This is entirely different 
from estimating what the better off would have been responsible for had they not 
been affected by counterfactual good luck.40 In the example under discussion, for 
responsibility-ascription, all we need know is whether Michael’s employees have 
sufficient salary to make a decent living.41
Second, I contend that the objection in question underestimates the
40 See Hurley (2003: 162-163) and also note 20.
41 It might be suggested that ex ante equalisation of each person’s set of opportunities is possible. 
As I mentioned elsewhere in Section 6 of Chapter 3, however, such equalisation is unfeasible, 
because of the seemingly high costs such as those of administration. Even if possible, the 
equalisation may strictly level down the distributive pie itself in contemporary society.
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normative force of the proposed principle. We should note that the sufficiently 
good alternative that well-informed and rational people could reasonably choose or 
accept is not of the minimum kind. For instance, this constraint may require that 
advantages be assigned to the incapacitated such that they could enjoy a decent life 
through the option in question. This means that, even putting the metric issue aside, 
a fair amount of resources might have to be indemnified to the non-culpably 
disabled whose opportunity to acquire such resources is undermined by some 
resource-taker. We can now see that this requirement could be more radical than 
holding everyone to an equal title to the same share of valuable resources, which is 
often set as a baseline of how much the acquirer has to compensate the disabled in 
question."2
I turn next to another entirely opposite challenge against the Principle of a 
Fair Opportunity: it is too strong. The objection is made for the reason that this 
principle apparently imposes a heavy duty on the better off, in such a way that they 
should compensate everyone else whenever all of his or her reasonable alternatives 
are undermined by the actions of the better off. This is very demanding, it is argued, 
because our society may consist of unintended consequences that are not 
reasonably foreseeable beforehand even for well-informed and rational agents. In 
particular, the market is filled with the outcomes of economic activities that may 
worsen people’s situation inadvertently.43 It then might seem that this principle 
could rarely be satisfied, because it is often the case in the market society that the
42 See, e.g., Steiner (1994: 268): “each is entitled to an equal portion o f [unowned natural 
resources]. Hence persons who appropriate a greater than equal portion (‘over-appropriators’) are 
thereby engaging in a redistribution. They are imposing an unjust distribution on some or all o f those 
who have appropriated a less than equal portion (‘under-appropriators’). And they consequently owe 
them redress.” See also Steiner (1977).
43 For classical arguments about the importance o f unintentional consequences in modem society, 
see Popper (1966: 94-96) and Hayek (1979: 68-69).
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influence the better off generate through their own choice is adverse to some others, 
even when utterly beyond their intention. An obvious example that compels us to 
take this concern seriously is effects of new technology some people invent, 
develop, and/or use for business.
To see this clearly, let me expand on Michael’s example in a way that his 
candle factory exists in a more complex world where various people live and 
constitute the work force. Imagine that a genius named Edison invents electricity 
and develops the commercialised way of using it for lighting. He has excellent 
management skills and so begins to run a company that sells people electricity for 
lighting. His company now has many employees. By contrast, Michael’s candle 
factory is facing the falling demand for candles as an unavoidable consequence of 
the innovation. Now suppose that in order to maintain his company Michael has to 
fire most of his employees. In this situation, should it follow that Edison should 
hire them in order to have a legitimate claim for being better off? It seems to the 
objector that the Principle of a Fair Opportunity requires Edison’s company to 
employ them. But Edison’s company has enough manpower and thus cannot 
afford the new recruitments. In this case, it is argued, the Principle of a Fair 
Opportunity cannot authorise Edison as a legitimate claimant for being better off. 
Because the market society is full of cases of this sort, it looks as though the 
proposed principle does not hold the better off responsible for their achievements 
of most kinds.
My response is that even under the Principle of a Fair Opportunity, Edison’s 
claim for being better off may not be rejected for three reasons. First, the Principle 
of a Fair Opportunity should be based not on each individual’s bare preferences 
formed simply through her actual expectations of certain advantages, but rather on 
considered preferences she would have were she to engage in careful deliberation
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about her relevant options. In the latter case, the preferences are shaped in such a 
way as to calibrate the expectational consequences in terms of the value of her 
options that corresponds to each person’s informed desires and that is statistically 
or probabilistically weighed in accordance with her true and rational beliefs.44 This 
means that in having the prospect for a certain outcome, each individual should 
think about whether the outcome in question could be reasonably expected to 
obtain based on what ordinarily happens. In other words, each rational agent 
should bear in mind that there are many changes embodied in the contemporary 
market— such as changes in tastes and resource conditions and ongoing 
technological innovations—the systematic (negative) effects of which are 
unknowable precisely in advance.
Let me now return to Edison’s case. Edison’s invention and development for 
the commercial use of electricity brings about a reduction in demand for candles 
for lighting. But things of this kind frequently come about in the market and thus, 
to a reasonable extent, this could and should have been foreseen as a possible 
outcome.45 We thus may say that whether Edison can have a claim for being better 
off depends partially on what prospect could be reasonably held in the light of 
considered preferences that Michael’s employees would have; if the widespread 
use of electricity for lighting in the near future could be reasonably foreseen, the 
prospect should correspondingly be changed. (Otherwise, the Autonomy-Based 
Principle of Responsibility says that they are somewhat if not fully responsible for 
being worse off). This allows many cases in which Edison-like entrepreneurs are 
responsible for being better off.46
44 See Chapter 3, Section 5, for this decision-theoretic characterisation o f considered preferences.
45 See also my first response to the reductio concern about the Expectational Consequences 
Constraint in Chapter 3, Section 5.
46 Some might take this argument as claiming that it is not unfair for someone to cheat others
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Second, relatedly, it should be noted that the Principle of a Fair Opportunity 
obtains only if the better off leaves available at least one reasonable alternative for 
everyone else to pursue in some way or other. This means that having anyone 
else’s reasonable alternative undamaged need not take the form of directly 
compensating him or her for the loss of access to advantages that would be secured 
in the reasonable alternative. The economist’s familiar attention to entrepreneurial 
profits may help us see the indirect way of counterbalancing the reduction in 
access to such advantages and so guaranteeing all others’ reasonable alternative.47 
Entrepreneurial profits such as Edison’s are common in the modem competitive 
market, in which an optimal allocation of resources or goods is changeable in 
response to the ever-changing technological and economic conditions. 
Entrepreneurs may in the beginning monopolise pure profits because of the new 
market conditions that they generate through the discovery or even creation of 
demand for a certain product. Although such conditions may constitute barriers of 
a non-illegal kind to entry, this happens only in the beginning. Such new 
conditions would attract many competitors’ attention because of the remaining 
opportunities to gain profits. Given a tendency to equilibration, the pure profits in 
question are to be exploited by an increased number of such competitors entering 
the market. This often provides alternative sources of employment for people
simply because they could reasonable expect to be cheated in market dealings. But note that this 
argument can in no way extend to the justification of fraud or deceitful exploitation, which are more 
or less intentional. Recall that my argument based on the Principle of Self-Ownership undoubtedly 
holds that people not have a claim for being better off if taking advantage of anybody else, in the 
form of infringements upon his or her right of self-ownership, at least without his or her consent.
47 See, e.g., Schumpeter (1943: 82-85) and Kirzner (1973: Ch.2). But the standard textbook of 
economics does not normally provide the full account of entrepreneurial profits. For example, no 
account of entrepreneurial profits can be found in any discussion of profit maximisation in Varian 
(1987).
48 See Arnold (1987). Cf. Nell (1987).
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who lose their jobs, owing to the changed market conditions.
Of course, what I have just claimed above is nothing more than one possible 
(but very likely) case, which is somewhat twisted in an ideal direction of the 
market as neo-Austrian economists tend to do. Even putting aside fraud and 
exploitation, entrepreneurial profits are not as simple as neo-Austrian economists 
think: entrepreneurs do not harm others at all because the thing exploited by them 
never existed before. 49 Even in cases in which the entrepreneurs indirectly 
contribute to the creation of job opportunities, as I will argue below, the transaction 
cost of certain kinds—such as the cost of relocation and adaptation— is likely to 
fall on workers especially in the secondary (or ‘hard’) production.50 Some of these 
costs would impede some workers from getting employment. But the argument 
about entrepreneurial profits shows, I believe, that for Edison to have a claim for 
being better off, it should not follow that his company should hire Michael’s 
current employees. As long as they have at least one sufficiently good alternative 
that they could reasonably pursue or accept, we can hold Edison responsible for 
being better off, everything else being equal.
It might be argued that even in cases in which the employment would be 
enhanced in the above-mentioned way, we are stuck with the well-known problem 
of the plasticity of labour in economics: the transaction cost of adaptation to, or 
relocation for, a new job might be very high in some cases, to the extent that it is 
not feasible for some to pursue such a jo b f'T h is  seems true in cases of the 
aforesaid kind in which job opportunities resulting from the new conditions are 
qualified as ‘open’ to Michael’s employees. If the openness of job opportunities
49 Kirzner (1981: 403-404; 1992: 223). For an extensive attempt to justify entrepreneurial profits 
in this line o f argument, see Harper (1996).
50 See Alchian and Woodward (1988: 69).
51 For discussions o f this point, seeNell (1987:409-410) and Christman (1988: 12-13).
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entails that they have to incur cost of a prohibitive extent, it seems that these 
opportunities could by no means be reasonably expected to obtain and then the 
Principle of a Fair Opportunity simply would be violated.^2 To respond to this 
worry is actually to show the third reason that Edison’s claim for being better off 
may be legitimatised under the Principle of a Fair Opportunity: this principle 
allows the degree to which a person is responsible for being better off. The degree 
in question partially depends on how prohibitive the cost of pursuing new kinds of 
job opportunities would be. This rough proportional application of the proposed 
principle, I hope, defuses the concern about the relevance of my argument to the 
real world. I discuss this point below.
7. Responses to Two Concerns
In the previous sections, I have demonstrated the two principles which state two 
necessary conditions under which an agent has a legitimate claim for being better 
off: the Principle of Self-Ownership and the Principle of a Fair Opportunity. Now 
it is time to consider concerns about this argument. Here I would like to take up 
two concerns and show how we can cope with them.
The first concern I would like to consider is that my argument seems a 
reductio ad absurdum: the conditions under which an agent can legitimately claim 
for being better off seem to be so strict that they could rarely obtain. There appear 
many examples which show how stringent the alleged conditions are: many if not 
all companies have gone through windfall revenue of some kind; the natively 
endowed are far better off, owing to their natural talents; to launch a new business
52 This partially corresponds to a part o f the condition under which an agent is responsible for 
being worse off, which says that opportunity cost to opt for the reasonable alternative must be 
sufficiently low. See Chapter 3, Section 6.
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gives rise to employment arrangements of a devastating kind in some other 
companies; and so on. It then might seem that my argument does not allow the 
better off to have any claim for their reception of benefits, on grounds that they can 
in no way meet the conditions that the two principles discussed above stipulate.
This worry is mistaken, however, because, as I have mentioned, 
responsibility-ascription is not an all-or-nothing matter. Rather, responsibility as 
such involves judgments based on the degree to which the agent can claim to be 
legitimately better off. To see how, first, recall the two constraints concerning the 
Principle of Self-Ownership: the Expectational Consequences Constraint and the 
Non-Arbitrariness Constraint. Under the Expectational Consequences Constraint, 
we can say that the new business owners in the example mentioned above are less 
responsible for their income because of its windfall nature. Similarly, under the 
Non-Arbitrariness Constraint, it may be said that the better endowed are less 
responsible for being better off, as compared to the better off' (at the same level) 
with less natural and social assets. That an agent’s responsibility for being better 
off can come in degrees is essential for the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint, because 
this constraint should be interpreted as its weak version that bases appropriate 
judgments upon a comparative degree to which the better off are influenced by 
their natural and social endowments.
This is also true of the Principle of a Fair Opportunity. To be sure, some 
workers may be caught in cutbacks that arise in the development of a new business, 
which brings about a drastic change in market conditions. But, as we have seen, 
such a change does not always mean that no job opportunities would be accessible 
to them, since new job opportunities are normally created through the change. Of 
course, we should not ignore the occurrence of transaction cost that those workers 
are compelled to bear in seeking the new career possibilities. Here again, there is a
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need to consider how much cost of a transaction sort they have to incur. And this 
consideration involves our judgments made in terms of the degree to which an 
owner of the new business is responsible for profits that make him or her better off: 
the higher the transaction cost is, the less responsibly the owner can claim the 
profits. We thus need not hold the new business owner either responsible or 
non-responsible for being better off? 3
Another concern is about the feasibility of my argument: even if one accepts 
what I have laid out with respect to being responsible for being better off at the 
level of ideal theory, one might wonder how my argument can be applied to the 
non-ideal circumstances in which we are standing. For one thing, there seems little 
desirability of operating a watchdog agency to trace every consequence of every 
choice and examine how much every better off individual is responsible for her 
current state of affairs. There is a huge problem with collecting and acting upon 
relevantly detailed information about each person’s performance. Even if possible, 
methods of this sort would be unacceptably costly, and—more fatally—extremely 
anti-liberal, as though Big Brother were to always monitor everyone’s every 
performance. How can my proposal be schematised at the level of non-ideal 
theory? 54
My first response is that legal enforcements of an inviolable kind can be 
employed for some obvious cases in which nobody is permitted to be better off, 
without recourse to the omniscient and omnipotent agency. For instance, to
53 Of course, there is a threshold up to which the better off must satisfy the two conditions in order 
for them to be legitimate claimants for being better off. For instance, the better off must leave 
available at least one sufficiently good alternative that most well-informed and rational agents could 
reasonably pursue or accept, regardless of its transaction cost. The degree to which the better off are 
responsible enters into the consideration above the threshold.
54 For presentations of the distinction between an ideal theory and a non-ideal theory, see Rawls 
(1971: 245-246) and White (2003: Ch.4).
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infringe upon people’s mind and body, at least without their informed consent, 
should be legally punished in standard cases. This can be viewed as a fundamental 
kind of violation of the Principle of Self-Ownership. Also, the better off are 
prohibited from taking advantage of others in ways that involve actions of 
(quasi-)ffaudulent and deceitful kinds, whether direct or indirect. That some 
company temporarily lowers the price of a product, for the purpose of 
monopolising the market of it, may be seen as an anti-trust violation; that 
employees are compelled to consent to the dramatic cut-off of their payments 
under the threat of layoff may be seen as an ostensive violation of minimum wage 
legislation; and so on. Legislation of this sort—such as the anti-trust law and the 
minimum wage legislation—are a promising means to institute the rough 
approximation of the scheme under the proposed argument at the level of ideal 
theory.
More worrying cases, I take it, have to do with how the two 
constraints— especially the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint—are applied in 
circumstances of an actual kind. One way of coping with this worry is to 
implement certain tax reforms. As in legislation of above-mentioned kinds, the tax 
system can be framed in such a way as to reflect what I have argued at the level of 
ideal theory and also respect the feasibility of my proposal in the presence of 
imperfect information. A few examples—though they are not exhaustive—are 
available. The current tax scheme in many countries guarantees a low rate of 
inheritance and estate taxes; in the US, for instance, the Economic Growth and 
Reconciliation Act, which reduces estate and gift taxes gradually and will abolish 
the estate tax in 2010, was recently enacted. On my view, it seems difficult to 
justify the low rate and such exemption of inheritance tax which allows capital 
gains to accrue to descendants or donees, since any bequest and gift to them has
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almost nothing to do with the exercise of their rational capacities and so their 
deliberative choice. Another example is that we may possibly expand windfall 
profit taxes to various commodities other than crude oil, in such a way that the tax 
scheme meets the Expectational Consequences Constraint. Finally, an endowment 
tax that is levied on the basis of individuals’ potential earnings should be 
introduced so as to meet the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint. Admittedly, this final 
proposal seems more controversial than the two former ones, because it has almost 
never been institutionalised so far and thus gives rise to the feasibility concern 
more distinctly. So let me focus on the endowment tax.55
I contend that, as has been discussed elsewhere in the previous chapter, John 
Roemer’s proposal can be taken to provide the most sophisticated way to enforce a 
scheme of such initial assets-based taxation.56 Recall that we can portion the 
population into types characterised in terms of essential factors such as gender, 
race, parents’ occupation and income, and birthplace, without recourse to detailed 
information about each person’s life history. A type is thus a set of persons whose 
background conditions of an uncontrollable kind have, very roughly, the same sort 
of influence upon their life. For the sake of the endowment tax, all types can 
roughly be ranked such that the higher type a person belongs to, the higher rate of 
tax should be imposed upon her income. The person in question has more potential 
to earn higher income than anyone of a lower type, mainly by virtue of her 
favourable endowments. As I see it, this can be regarded as the taxation scheme
55 This does not mean that taxing inheritances and windfall profits is less controversial. Take up the 
inheritance tax: whereas there seems reasonable agreement about taxing away some receipts to 
descendants or donees, many people have disagreement about donor’s rights to make bequests or 
gifts to them. For thorough discussions of this issue from the viewpoint of tax justice, see Murphy 
and Nagel (2002: Ch.7) and White (2003: 180-186).
56 Roemer (1994: 184-193; 1996: 276-310; 1998: 5ff; 2003).
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that plausibly meets the Non-Arbitrariness Constraint (in its weak version), since 
under this scheme the actual income of people who are suffering differential effects 
but succeed in overcoming such difficulties can be boosted more than that of those 
who are better endowed. Put another way, a larger portion of actual income of the 
latter can be taxed away than that of the former under this endowment tax 
scheme.57
It goes without saying that my suggestion about those tax reforms is 
provisional and so more needs to be said. But I hope that these illustrations have 
shown, to some extent at least, the feasibility of my proposal on the conditions of 
an agent’s responsibility for being better off.
8. Summary
I have argued that in order to have a legitimate claim for being better off, an agent 
should satisfy two conditions that the two principles stipulate: the Principle of 
Self-Ownership and the Principle of a Fair Opportunity. The first involves two 
substantive constraints: the Expectational Consequences Constraint and the 
Non-Arbitrariness Constraint. The Expectational Consequences Constraint says 
that an agent is responsible for being better off only through the consequences that 
she could have reasonably expected, and did actually expect, to obtain through her 
intentional action. The Non-Arbitrariness Constraint says that an agent’s 
responsibility for being better off is weighed according to the comparative degree
57 We should note that, in addition to the tax reform, policies concerning institutional 
rearrangements— such as equalising access to education, health care, and workfare— are important, 
since they address the eradication o f natural arbitrariness which is the source o f adverse background 
conditions (Roemer 1998: 114). Should social policies o f this sort be successful then the 
Non-Arbitrariness Constraint might not be needed. This seems too optimistic, but the optimism does 
not deny the significance o f the policies in question.
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to which she is not under the influence of natural and social endowments. The 
Principle of Self-Ownership, so construed, thus says that the justification for an 
agent’s being better off requires more than her possession of rational capacities.
The second principle is the other-regarding principle: the Principle of a Fair 
Opportunity. The Principle of a Fair Opportunity requires a better off agent to 
leave available at lease one sufficiently good alternative that other well-informed 
and rational agents could reasonably pursue or accept. I argued that this principle is 
epistemically and metaphysically plausible, and what is more, not a weak 
other-regarding principle, because the reasonable alternative is not of the minimum 
kind. I argued that, on the other hand, this principle is not too demanding, since the 
content of the reasonable alternative should be based on considered preferences 
that a well-informed and rational agent would form were she to carefully deliberate 
upon her relevant options. Furthermore, all the better off should do is leave the 
alternative in question available to all other people in some way or other. Should it 
not be secured sufficiently to others, this would mean that positive advantages the 
better off are currently enjoying may be curtailed down to the degree of their 
responsibility, but not be nullified. This shows that we need not appeal to the 
Principle of a Fair Opportunity (and the two constraints) in an all-or-nothing way. 
An agent’s responsibility for being better off can come in degrees.
C hapter 5
D esert, D uties, and R eactive A ttitudes
1. Introduction
My argument to this point has demonstrated that we can plausibly espouse the two 
egalitarian principles of justice under the regulative political ideal of human 
equality. The first is the Principle of Baseline Equality which says that people 
should be equally well off as a point of departure. The second is the 
Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality which holds that substantive 
inequalities are morally permissible only if they accurately reflect people’s exercise 
of responsibility. As noted in Chapter 2, these principles can be combined in such a 
way that people should enjoy equal standings unless they are responsible for 
substantive inequalities. In the previous two chapters, I stressed that the 
consideration of an agent’s responsibility specified by the Responsibility-Based 
Principle of Inequality helps evade any implausible implication of the 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian scheme.
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the principles in question have not just a 
conceptual unity of egalitarian justice, but also carry a grounding force that 
designates prima facie moral duties holding among individuals in our society. 
Since (as I noted in the opening chapter) our primary subject of egalitarian justice
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is to reveal how the relevant principles of justice can ground moral duties, the topic 
explored in this chapter is fundamental. In what follows, I argue that the 
conception of desert can indicate the synthesised association of the proposed 
egalitarian principles in such a way as to embrace them as the relevant desert bases. 
I then demonstrate that the conception of desert that comprises the desert bases in 
question can provide a bedrock for a fair system of moral duties, and that this can 
be tracked by our reactive emotions, if properly construed.
But why desert? There has been a dramatic revival of our theoretical interest 
in desert falling within distributive justice, despite the long-standing scepticism 
about the role of that desert plays therein. This renewed interest is not due simply 
to the fact that desert suits our ordinary thought (for example, giving reward for 
efforts poured into work or productive contributions to the market society), in 
examining how just a certain assignment of advantages can be. The more 
important point is that desert can enjoy an articulated formulation in its own terms, 
to such an extent that desert plays a vital role in our moral practice of egalitarian 
justice. This can be ascertained if we see that the conception of desert can resonate 
with our appraising practice on the basis of our properly made reactive emotions. 
In other words, reactive attitudes of an apt sort can serve as the morally relevant 
mechanism through which we discern our prima facie duties to deserving parties, 
within the domain of egalitarian justice.
For our purposes, the present chapter sets out the argument as follows: 
Section 2 explains the general structure of desert and then argues that there is a 
plausible conception of desert on account of the synthesis of two desert bases 
echoing the two egalitarian principles of justice. I shall show that this conception 
can defuse various and widespread forms of scepticism in debates over the issues 
of egalitarian justice, especially when it comes to the desert-responsibility
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connection. Section 3 demonstrates that the normative aspect of desert can be 
captured very well in terms of its orientation of our reactive attitudes. I argue that 
the key to achieve this is that the relevant class of reactive attitudes be narrowed 
down such that they are well-informed and formed impartially in dispositional 
terms. Section 4 spells out the content of the reactive attitudes by an appeal to their 
expectation-sensitivity. Section 5 deals with Samuel Sehe filer’s famous objection 
to a desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice that acknowledges a central role of 
desert in moral thought and practice.
2. Desert and its Combined Bases
For our purposes, we should first and foremost clarify the connection between the 
two egalitarian principles and the conception of desert. To do so, let me begin by 
noticing the basic structure of desert. As is well known, desert can be described as 
a three-place relation in the following scheme: S deserves X by virtue of F, where 
S is a person, X is an advantage (or a disadvantage) such as a material object or a 
mode of treatment, and F is a desert basis.1 2By this three-relation scheme, we can 
immediately point to three things. First, S’s deserving X indicates that there is 
some sort of fittingness in S’s having X. For example: a lazy surfer deserves his 
resulting worse off position; a prolific researcher deserves promotion to professor; 
and so on. Second, we cannot plausibly say why S deserves X without specifying 
desert base(s), F. In other words, to identify the desert base(s) is a clue to fleshing 
out the relevant conception of desert. As Joel Feinberg says: “Desert without a
1 Joel Feinberg is the first to provide a thorough analysis o f desert-based claims in light o f this 
three-place relation scheme (Feinberg 1970: Ch.4).
2 See Cupit (1996: Ch.l).
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basis is simply not desert.5'3 Third, this desert scheme allows a pluralist notion of 
desert. This means that X could be evaluated differently in terms of a multiplicity 
of desert bases. Not only is there a variety of one-to-one correspondences between 
X and F, but X could also be specified by virtue of multiple desert bases; for 
instance, S deserves X by virtue of both Fi and F2, but not by virtue of F3 and F4.4 5
So much for the schematic formulation of desert. The next step is to examine 
how the conception of desert can incorporate the two principles of egalitarian 
justice. What is distinctive about my argument for the two principles in question is 
the essential role assigned to responsibility in egalitarian justice. So a good place to 
start is to scrutinise how responsibility and desert are connected, as far as 
egalitarian justice goes. Responsibility has been often viewed as a necessary 
condition of desert. Among supporters of this view James Rachels clearly states 
this thesis as follows:
The concept of desert serves to signify the ways of treating people that are 
appropriate responses to them, given that they are responsible for those 
actions or states of affairs. That is the role played by desert in our moral 
vocabulary.5
As we have seen in the previous chapters, many examples can be adduced for this 
thesis: a gambler who is relevantly informed and capable of acting upon such 
information deserves any subsequent loss of money because of his responsibility 
for the expectational consequences of gambling; an informed tyrannised housewife
3 Feinberg (1970: 58).
4 See Kristjänsson (2003: 42), for this point. Note that this does not mean that there is nothing 
unifying with respect to the concept of desert, since a multiplicity of desert bases does not 
necessarily undermine the commonality among desert claims (e.g., Sher 1987: 21; Miller 1999: 
133-138; Baiasu 2006: 228). This is important because my argument, I shall show, supports the idea 
that desert bases can be pluralistically synthesised.
5 Rachels (1978: 157; emphasis original). See also Sadurski (1985: 116-117) and Miller (1999: 
133-134).
Desert, Duties, and Reactive Attitudes 117
does not deserve to be worse off because she is not responsible for the miserable 
life with her dictatorial husband (given that no other reasonable option is available 
to her in its expectational terms); an entrepreneur who is a responsible claimant for 
her earned profits is said to deserve to be better off (as long as the entrepreneur did 
not undermine all sufficiently good alternatives that others can reasonably pursue 
or accept); and so on. It seems natural to think that those who are responsible for 
being worse (or better) off deserve to be worse (or better) off.
Nonetheless, this thesis—which I will hereafter call this ‘the 
desert-responsibility thesis’ (following Geoffrey Cupit)— has been subject to two 
attacks.6 The first attack against this thesis holds that if responsibility plays a 
necessary role in giving people their due, then it could be that no one deserves 
anything. As I see it, this attack is made in two different ways. The first way of 
making this attack is a famous one: all actions and characters, including efforts and 
contributions, depend entirely upon natural and social endowments for which
people are not responsible. John Rawls writes:
It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments that no 
one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more 
than one deserves one’s initial starting place in society. The assertion that a 
man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to 
cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in 
large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can 
claim no credit. The notion of desert seems not to apply to these cases.7
This challenge, I take it, is underscored by metaphysical scepticism that no agents 
are capable of behaving or having characters so as to deserve them, if 
responsibility as such is a necessary condition of desert. This is because actions of 
any sort as well as agents’ characters cannot be detached from any influence of
6 Cupit (1996: 39).
7 Rawls (1971: 104).
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their native and social endowments.8 To put it another way, the robust notion of 
voluntariness for which individuals are responsible cannot be identified simply 
because there is no such choice that is unaffected by the circumstantial effects of 
their background conditions. As Samuel Scheffler observes, this metaphysical 
scepticism has been dominant among contemporary political philosophers, since 
they, explicitly or implicitly, tend to regard responsibility-sensitive desert as 
ascribable only to ‘individual agency’ whose personality or character is not 
predetermined by uncontrollable factors, genetic or environmental.9 In other words, 
whether an agent deserves a certain advantage, they think, depends on whether it 
results from her non-causally determined choice out of possible alternatives. 10 It is 
implausible to presume, however, that an agent can make such a radical choice. * 11 It 
is thus concluded that given the desert-responsibility thesis, no one deserves 
anything because no one is responsible for anything.
Another way to put the attack is to suspect that the desert-responsibility 
thesis is impracticable. There are two ways in which the impracticability of 
rewarding desert can be pointed out. First, as the cited passage from Rawls’s A 
Theory o f Justice implies, there seem too many cases in which an agent cannot be 
held responsible for being better (or worse) off, on grounds that any influence of 
her inborn talents defeats her responsibility, even if it could be identifiable in some 
way or other. In other words, it could be that because one’s talents have more or
8 It might be objected that the above passage does not show Rawls’s commitment to any 
metaphysical scepticism. Following Feldman (1997: 178) and Moriarty (2003: 522), however, I take 
Rawls’s argument above to be a metaphysical challenge against the desert-responsibility thesis.
9 Scheffler (2001:20-21).
10 See, e.g., Barry (1965: 108): “a person’s having being able to have done otherwise is a necessary 
condition of ascribing desert.” Cf. Lamont(1994: 47-49).
11 This may be so even if determinism is false, since indeterminism may only support randomness, 
not self-causing action (Strawson 1994: 17-20). Cf. Robert Kane (1996: 181-183).
Desert, Duties, and Reactive Attitudes 119
less impact upon one’s current holdings, the better (or worse) off bom with the 
(marketable) talents cannot deserve to be better (or worse) off. Second, there is no 
epistemically feasible way of singling out an agent’s desert in such a way as to 
respect her responsibility. In particular, it is impracticable to discount the positive 
effects of such natural endowments, since, as Rawls says, “[t]he better endowed 
are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously.” Impracticability of 
these kinds, it is argued, would remain problematic, even if people’s responsibility 
were precisely identifiable. Given the desert-responsibility thesis, no one deserves 
anything because in actual circumstances no one can be held responsible for 
anything.
In what follows I will demonstrate that these challenges against the 
desert-responsibility thesis are not as powerful as it might have been thought. My 
argument for the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality shows that 
responsibility can play a vital role in legitimating substantive inequalities in a 
plausible sense. Responsibility thus could go hand-in-hand with a proper desert 
basis in the practice of egalitarian justice. To confirm this, let me respond 
respectively to the metaphysical and impracticability arguments against the 
desert-responsibility thesis.
As for the metaphysical scepticism, I want to repeat here that to be 
responsible an agent need not be able to choose otherwise in an outright sense. It is 
important to note that the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility requires 
only that an agent possess rational capacities and have at least one alternative that 
could be judged as reasonably obtainable based on her healthy practical reasoning: 
she has capacities to form rational beliefs and desires given pertinent information, 
and also a capacity to choose otherwise in the expectational terms, independently
12 Rawls (1971: 312).
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of what such belief-desire sets guide. The agent’s responsibility thus can obtain 
even in the presence of the Frankfurt-type of counterfactual intervener.13 This way 
of holding people responsible, I believe, reduces the force of the metaphysical 
scepticism, since it does not rest upon the idea of something like ‘ultimate control' 
that cannot be traced back to heredity or environment. In other words, my 
argument does not demand that in order to be responsible, agents must be 
‘individual agencies’ who are capable of making a choice in some non-causally 
determined way. This helps avoid the line of thought that because no one is 
responsible for anything no one deserves anything.
Yet this does not automatically guarantee that there is a way of overcoming 
difficulties in factoring out, as far as is reasonably possible, the effects of natural 
and social circumstances, which are the main source of the metaphysical 
scepticism. Given that not all kinds of circumstantial luck are to be extinguished, 
however, my argument provides a promising way of holding people responsible. 
This can defuse the impracticability worry. Two things I argued in the previous 
two chapters should be recalled. First, responsibility-ascription need not be taken to 
be an all-or-nothing matter. For instance: the natively talented person can be said to 
be more or less responsible for the consequences of a choice even in cases in which 
her talents have a major role in such a choice and the resultant states of affairs; the 
negative responsibility of heavy smokers who have only minimum capacities for 
rational choice is comparatively less than that of smokers of a similar kind who 
have more rational capacities, given that no fault of their own has been involved in 
the development of their rational capacities; and so on. Desert could be ascribed in 
a corresponding way in which an agent weakly (or strongly) deserves the
13 See Chapter 3, Sections 4 and 7.
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consequences of her own action or character.14 Second, there is a feasible way of 
counting (or discounting) the effects of bad (or good) fortune that have fallen upon 
the worse (or better) endowed. My argument endorses such computations in order 
to hold individuals comparatively responsible for being worse (or better) off, 
roughly in proportion to the degree of their rational capacities determined in ways 
that are beyond their control—that is, in the canonical state. As I argued, Roemer’s 
approach of apportioning the population into types makes this argument much 
more feasible, because responsibility-ascription thereby does not require the 
detailed information on the development or improvement of each person’s rational 
capacities.1'Thus, there is no need to conclude that since no one could be held 
responsible for anything, nobody deserves anything.
So much for the first attack. Let me turn to the second attack against the 
desert-responsibility thesis. This challenge purports to rebut the thesis by claiming 
that responsibility is not always a condition of desert. As 1 see it, there are two 
examples that seem to support this challenge. First, consider a case in which a 
person contracts a painful disease through no fault of her own. It seems that 
whereas she is not responsible for the suffering, she may deserve some medical 
care; even if no medical treatment is available she may deserve our sympathy, at 
least.16 The second example is of being a person, or, more precisely, a human 
being. We normally consider each of us as equally respectable at least in a certain 
minimal sense. Thus, there is reason for thinking that all people deserve the
14 This way o f using the language o f desert involves comparative judgments, in that desert claims 
count relative to the conditions o f other parties. Obviously, this echoes that people’s responsibility, 
on my argument, is comparatively fair in a rough proportional sense. For recent discussions o f the 
comparative element o f desert, see Kagan (1999; 2003), McLeod (2003b), Miller (2003), and 
Olsaretti (2003: 17-21; 2004: 33-37).
15 See Chapter 3, Section 8, as well as Chapter 4, Section 7, and the next section below.
16 A similar counterexample is raised in Feldman (1997: 183).
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correspondingly minimal amount of advantages that meets the fundamental 
requirement of human equality. However, it is plain that none of them are 
responsible for the fact that they are persons. 17 These examples show that desert 
does not always presuppose responsibility on the recipient’s part.
Since these two cases illustrate that responsibility is not always a condition of 
desert, it might seem that the desert-responsibility thesis is simply false, If so, my 
argument seems vulnerable to this charge, because it draws heavily on the 
Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality that would underpin the 
desert-responsibility thesis. In order to counter this challenge, let me make clear 
what the two examples cannot undermine. There are, I think, two things worth 
mentioning, both of which help us see that the examples in question are not 
devastating.
First, from the fact that in the aforementioned cases responsibility cannot 
provide a condition of desert, it does not follow, of course, that in a wider range of 
cases there is no connection between responsibility and desert. 18 As we have seen 
above, many cases in which people are legitimately better (or worse) off can be 
explained by the desert-responsibility thesis. This is particularly so in cases in 
which we place the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality in a core of the 
thesis in question. I further contend that, given the circumstances of justice, we 
may be able to say that most cases are definitely within the purview of the thesis in 
question. Many issues of distributive justice arise in conditions of limited resources, 
which make an agent’s responsibility more relevant to the practice of egalitarian
17 See Cupit (1996: 161) and Feldman (1997: 183-4). On the contrary, Aristotelians might hold 
people responsible for possessing personhood of a minimal kind if they want to deserve respect. For 
this line of defence of the desert-responsibility thesis, see Kristjänsson (2003: 54-60).
18 Fred Feldman admits this point in his reply to Smilansky’s criticism (Feldman 1996: 166).
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justice. 19 It thus seems better to retain a view like the desert-responsibility thesis. 
Second, and more important, the above-mentioned counterexamples do not deny 
that there could be a different kind of desert base that may save the proposed 
argument. In other words, these examples show, at best, that there is no 
responsibility-related desert base which can solely deal with those counter-cases. 
As I mentioned above, desert could have multiple bases. Furthermore, the 
examples in question reveal nothing about the incompatibility between the 
desert-responsibility thesis and some other relevant desert base. It could be that 
conflicting considerations revolving around such a pluralism of desert bases may 
be weighed properly.
There thus could be a different desert base of the relevant kind that is not 
incompatible with the desert-responsibility thesis. But what is such a desert base? 
My answer is that it is equality. More precisely, I propose that the desert base in 
question can be provided by the Principle of Baseline Equality, which holds that all 
people are equally well off as a point of departure. With this in hand, what can we 
say about the two counterexamples? As for the first, we can say that the invalid 
who is not responsible for the disease deserves some treatment, on grounds that she 
has an equal entitlement to some medical treatment. This seems guaranteed if we 
take seriously the base point that all people are equally well off. In its own light, it 
is morally wrong not to save the person, on conditions that no responsibility is 
involved and the disease can be treated without huge sacrifice or cost; should any 
treatment of the ill not be available, we may well feel compassion for her misery, at 
least. To the second counterexample, we can respond by appealing to the 
Principle of Baseline Equality, to the effect that while all people are not responsible
19 See Chapter 2, Section 3, and the next section below.
201 shall argue the role of reactive sentiments such as compassion in the practice of egalitarian 
justice in the next section below.
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for being human beings, all deserve equal standings as a starting point. A relevant 
desert base thus should reflect the fact that there is a deserved baseline of equality, 
in the sense that no one should be deprived or privileged unless there are specific 
reasons. The desert base is that which the Principle of Baseline Equality can 
provide.21
We are now in a position to see why my specification of the two desert bases 
is not susceptible to the second attack against the desert-responsibility thesis. On 
the one hand, my argument demonstrates that the relevant conception of 
responsibility—which can avoid scepticism of metaphysical and practical 
sorts—plays a pivotal role in giving people their due in most cases, given the 
circumstances of justice. On the other hand, my argument need not support the 
obtaining of the desert-responsibility thesis in all cases. Here again, egalitarian 
justice consists of the Principle of Baseline Equality as well as the 
Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality. The former principle directly derives 
some normative force from the consideration of simple equality in its telic form. 
The political idea of human equality lying behind the consideration in question 
regulates us to set simple equality as a baseline in the circumstances of justice, 
where departures from the baseline are likely to be justified. The important point is 
that the Principle of Baseline Equality coexists with the Responsibility-Based 
Principle of Inequality, if we admit a pluralism of egalitarian principles.22 Given 
that a multiplicity of desert bases is allowed, by parity of reasoning we may say 
that the desert base which stems directly from the value of simple equality can
21 For a similar presentation o f the idea o f a baseline, see Smilansky (1996: 159; 2000: 43-44). But 
Saul Smilansky does not interpret the baseline as a different desert base from the 
desert-responsibility thesis. While, on his argument, the base point in question is simply assumed 
and so merely presumptive, it is provided by the Principle o f Baseline Equality in my argument.
22 Recall what I argued as a reason for telic egalitarianism in Section 2 o f Chapter 2.
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• 9 ^pluralistically coexist with the desert-responsibility thesis.
My proposal goes further: we can even support something like the combined 
claim that no one deserves substantive inequalities unless they are responsible for 
the inequalities. As has been seen above, this conception of desert can not only 
comprise the equality-related desert base which dismisses the aforementioned 
counterexamples against the desert-responsibility thesis, but also it performs very 
well in the circumstances of justice, where we may very likely encounter cases 
involving subtleties and complexities of a standard kind. Consider, for example, a 
case in which an ailing person is now somewhat responsible for contracting the 
disease. (For the sake of simplicity, assume that this corresponds to her rational 
capacities in the canonical state.) Since her responsibility counts less than the case 
in which a fully rational agent could have reasonably avoided contracting the same 
kind of disease, she weakly deserves some treatment. But her desert of such 
treatment is less than that of people who are not responsible for the suffering at all. 
In many cases if not all, this may enable us to impose differential burdens on those 
invalids (for example, through a subsidy scheme). In the circumstances of justice 
where resources are moderately scarce, this, I suggest, matches our considered 
judgments. The synthesis of the two desert bases that the two egalitarian principles 
correspondingly endorse can explain why such differential burdens are justified in 
situations of a standard kind.
It might be questioned if the conception of desert that the combined desert 
bases underlie can really support the view that all people— including the worse off 
who are responsible—deserve some minimal level of advantages, lest they be 
treated as something less than human beings. The answer might seem no, because
23 Feldman suggests a similar line of argument which claims that both equality and desert can be 
compatible in such a way as to adjust the weight of welfare together (Feldman 2003: 154-160).
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the equality-related desert base is anchored by nothing but a weak force of simple 
equality: it would very likely be outweighed by the consideration of an agent’s 
responsibility for substantive inequalities in the circumstances of justice. But this 
answer is untrue for two reasons. First, as I argued in Section 8 of Chapter 3, my 
proportional view of an agent’s responsibility for being worse off has an 
inequality-appeasing aspect, since it allows that no one be fully responsible for 
being worse off. This is (even empirically) grounded in actual circumstances in 
which no one is fully informed and rational. If this principle provides a desert base 
as the qualified desert-responsibility thesis, then advantages of a minimum kind 
seem to be guaranteed for almost everyone in our context of a standard kind—that 
is, in the circumstances of justice. Second, the Principle of Baseline Equality 
should not be taken as a stringent principle which forbids cases of any exceptional 
kind. As I argued in Section 4 of Chapter 2, moral principles are not of an 
exceptionless kind, but rather of a kind that often engages us in deliberation over 
the moral status of a certain action. The Principle of Baseline Equality is 
exemplary, in a way which allows the possibility that the value of simple equality 
might weigh more than the consideration of an agent’s responsibility for 
substantive inequalities. As has been seen in Section 2 of Chapter 2, there are 
several cases in which simple equality is better pursued if we take seriously the 
political idea of human equality: our concerns for needy strangers, self-respect of 
the worse off, and structural inequalities of a resilient kind may prefer the direction 
of simple equality to the strict line of policy based on their responsibility. These 
cases illustrate that we may well favour simple equalisation over the policy to 
permit substantive inequalities as a result of our overall deliberation regulated by 
the second-order political ideal of human equality. The proposed conception of 
desert which reflects the egalitarian principles in this manner thus would assure all
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people some minimal level of advantages in actual circumstances.24
3. Duties and Reactive Attitudes
So far I have argued that desert could be a plausible conception of egalitarian 
justice, given the synthesis of multiple desert bases: there is no need to recant the 
desert-responsibility thesis, since the thesis is fully compatible with the 
equality-related desert base. This not only shows that desert enjoys a conceptual 
unity of egalitarian justice; it also seems that the conception of desert bears a 
normative force that guarantees prima facie duties owed to the deserved. To 
ascertain this, it is time to explore the morally relevant mechanism through which 
we discern our own duties to people who have desert claims. To put it another way, 
we should now argue how we acknowledge our prima facie moral duties owed to 
the claimants for advantages in the desert-sensitive institutional scheme.
My proposal is that the normative force of desert that, prima facie, obliges us 
to provide people with what they deserve can be captured by the close link 
between individuals’ desert claims and our reactive attitudes. That is to say, 
reactive attitudes can serve as the mechanism through which we realise our prima 
facie moral duties to the deserved. Examples of reactive attitudes are gratitude, 
resentment, indignation, forgiveness, love, sympathy, guilt, and hurt feelings.
241 shall argue this point at full length in the next chapter. There 1 will show that my argument can 
allow for the normative space o f basic needs.
251 do not deny that the normative force o f desert does not always entail duties owed to deserving 
parties. (This is why I put ‘prima facie’.) Not all cases are those in which we can do something for 
them. For the asymmetry between desert claims and duties owed to those who have such claims, see 
Miller (1976: 114-117; 1999: 135-136), Sher (1987: xi-xii), Kristjänsson (2003: 46-47), and 
Olsaretti (2004: 13-14).
26 David Miller has made a similar kind o f suggestion (Miller 1976: 88-91). See also McLeod 
(2003a).
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Emphasising the close tie between desert claims and our reactive emotions is not 
novel, because this is a longstanding view of the grounds of moral duties holding 
among us. As is well known, from Adam Smith to Henry Sidgwick, gratitude and 
resentment are commonly regarded as universalisable sentiments that are of one 
cloth with justice of a desert-sensitive sort, according to which we are under 
obligations relating to their object.27 In the contemporary age, Peter Strawson and 
his followers remind us of this traditional view, by pointing to the fact that our 
moral practice is represented by the expression of our reactive attitudes towards an 
object based on our judgments which are deserved by the object. In other words, 
the reactive emotions associate with our ordinary interpersonal relationships 
involving judgments of whether the emotions in question are fitting for the 
object. Notice that such reactive attitudes could be more or less vicarious. As 
Strawson says, reactive emotions could be expressed on behalf of others, where the 
reactor’s own interest is not involved.29 Nor is it always the case that the object of 
our reactive attitudes is a particular individual. Institutional arrangements such as 
the authorities under which favouritism and nepotism are rampant could also be a 
target of our indignation, on grounds that they do not offer a putatively proper 
mode of treatment to people.30 It thus can be said that a scope of the target of 
reactive attitudes is very broad.
It can be easily observed that the conception of desert discussed above is 
germane to our reactive attitudes. The relevant class of reactive attitudes here are 
resentment, indignation, and sympathy. No doubt the inherent connection between
27 Smith (1976: Il.ii.l, 78-82) and Sidgwick (1981: III. v. sec. 5,278-283).
28 Strawson (1962). For recent discussions of the link between desert and reactive attitudes, see 
Wolf (1981: 102-116), Ekstrom (2000: 149-153), and Kelly (2002: 186-187).
29 Strawson (1962: 56).
30 See Scheffler (2003a: 74).
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desert and responsibility is underlined by the web of our reactive emotions, 
especially when it comes to resentment and indignation. For instance, we feel 
resentment towards an employer when he exploits a large portion of the benefits 
that his employees are responsible for and thus deserve. Sympathy also enters into 
individuals’ desert claims in a way that motivates us to do something for people 
who deserve a certain advantage. Consider the examples raised originally against 
the desert-responsibility thesis: we may well feel strong sympathy for the ailing 
person who is not responsible for the suffering; an agent who is impoverished, 
such that her self-esteem is seriously damaged, deserves our compassion; and if 
people who tread on her self-respect could be identified, our sympathy for her 
would be prompted much more strongly, by the extent to which this would evoke 
our indignation towards those people; and so on.
It seems that the normative force of desert can be tracked in this way by the 
phenomenology of our reactive attitudes. However, we should confront one serious 
concern: how can the link between individuals’ desert claims and our 
corresponding reactive attitudes be appropriate? This propriety concern arises 
because there seems no guarantee that our reactive attitudes will not include those 
which are shaped in light of wrongful information or false beliefs (of a rationalised 
kind), nor those which enshrine old prejudices and biased judgments such as 
racism and favouritism. Admittedly, this concern is raised for any account that 
assigns a significant role to reactive attitudes; so, my reactive attitudes-based 
account is not exceptional in this respect. This is a concern that must be taken 
seriously, in advocating the plausibility of my account of reactive attitudes that can 
serve as the mechanism through which we discern our prima facie moral duties, 
direct or indirect, to deserving parties. To defuse this worry, let me suggest three
31 See McLeod (2003a), for this concern.
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constraints that the relevant class of reactive attitudes should meet, in order to be 
qualified as appropriate.
The first constraint is that reactive attitudes counted as appropriate are to be 
formed in light of well-informed judgments about their target. The role of 
judgments accompanying cognitive states is crucial in forming reactive attitudes. It 
seems that reactive emotions are parasitic on our certain judgments about their 
object. For example: I have anger towards my friend based on my judgment about 
his stealing my car; I feel deep gratitude to my mother based on my judgment 
about her devotion to me; and so on. As such, emotions are sensitive to cognitive 
judgments. The point here is that such emotions can be corrected in light of truthful 
judgments—more specifically, in accordance with the relevant beliefs formed 
under the impact of pertinent information. As Robert Solomon says, emotions can 
be defused by being aware of truth, because the object might be misidentified or 
mistakenly regarded as a responsible target.32 To illustrate: my resentment directed 
at my friend would be alleviated were it known to me that he had stolen my car 
under duress; presented with the information that my father devoted himself to me 
much more intensively than my mother did, I might change my emotive stance 
towards my mother; and so on. Examples of this sort can be raised almost 
endlessly.
This judgment-sensitivity of our reactive emotions is of great significance 
when it comes to their normative association with desert claims, for it seems that
'2 Solomon (1976: 185-191; 1980: 256-262). Note that the notions of judgments and beliefs which 
are essential components in cognising the truth should be interpreted in a broader sense that involves 
truth-aptness than those which are responsive only to evidential knowledge. The subtle differences 
aside, there seems a consensus about the character of emotion-related beliefs, even though some are 
critical of Solomon’s overintellectualisation of emotions. See, e.g., Gordon (1987), Greenspan 
(1988), Deigh (1994), Adler (1997; 2002), de Sousa (2002; 2004), Zagzebski (2004), and Salmela 
(2006).
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the propriety of our reactive attitudes towards their object partially depends on 
whether our corresponding judgments are made with relevantly informed beliefs. 
Consider the employer’s case again. Our resentment against the employer based on 
our judgments about his exploiting the employees is appropriate only if he does not 
pay the extent to which his employees are responsible. In this case, the pertinent 
facts about the responsibility in question are an indispensable factor of making our 
reactive emotions appropriate. So if it turned out that the employees receive 
enough salaries for which they are responsible, we would conclude that we have 
reacted wrongly to their claim and so our emotive attitudes should immediately be 
modified. This is also true in the case of an ailing person who is deemed to deserve 
some reparation or sympathy at least. Suppose now that we find out that she has 
contracted the disease mainly on account of her disregard for her own health. Less 
compassion then could be given for her dire straits than would be given in the case 
where she is not responsible, not to mention less indignation about her current 
situation.
The cognitive element of our emotions thus has an essential role in tracking 
what the combined desert bases prescribe, in such a way as to help us avoid an 
unfair attribution of reactive attitudes to their recipients. However, this constraint 
seems insufficient to alleviate the propriety concern, for the cognition of relevant 
facts about a target of our reactive attitudes might not have enough power to 
change our bias, as is shown by racism that survives even these days. It thus can be 
imagined that some reactive attitudes— even in the presence of pertinent 
information—are triggered by biased interests and partial concerns on the basis of 
racism, favouritism, and personal love. Some racists, for instance, might feel no 
indignation at the employer over his exploitation, were it based on the racial 
discrimination. The fact that a stranger suffers acutely from her illness for which
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she is not responsible might not evoke sympathy of people who are concerned only 
about their family members, relatives, and close friends.
The second constraint which is thus needed is that our reactive attitudes 
should be of an impartial kind. Impartiality is a familiar constraint which is 
imposed upon many theories of justice, to a greater or lesser extent. Impartiality 
enjoins us to abstract away from personal attachments to, and exclusive interests in, 
particular objects (including ourselves), which are a hotbed of privileged treatment 
of some kind. This requirement, I believe, can be employed as a constraint on the 
ascription of reactive attitudes to their recipients. In doing so, it is important to note 
that because impartiality captures an attitude we commonly take on many 
occasions (for instance, in teaching children and examining a job candidate), the 
impartial attitude is not from outside or nowhere but from inside, as ordinary 
thinking that is situated within us. As Thomas Nagel describes, impartiality
represents our common way of thought in picking away at who we are.
Each of us begins with a set of concerns, desires, and interests of his own, 
and each of us can recognize that the same is true of others. We can then 
remove ourselves in thought from our particular position in the world and 
think simply of all other people, without singling out as /  the one we happen 
to be.33
This connection between impartiality and our common attitude cannot be 
overemphasised, since impartiality has been often confused with impersonality, 
which requires us to completely leave our own self behind,34 and also with a mere 
logic of identity which seeks to reduce all differences to single unity.3 s Unlike the 
impersonal or universal point of view, adopting the impartial point of view does
,3 Nagel (1991: 10; emphasis original).
,4This confusion is seen in Cottingham (1986), Friedman (1989), and Walker (1991). This is 
partly due to the fact that ‘impersonal’ and ‘impartial’ are interchangeably used by impartialists, of 
whom Thomas Nagel is representative (Nagel 1991).
35 See Young (1990: Ch.4).
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not mean any disengagement with our ordinary moral practice—more specifically, 
the appraising practice involving reactive emotions.36
To see how clearly, let me contrast the impartial making of reactive attitudes 
to the method of Ideal Observer theory—the typical and traditional way of meeting 
the requirement of impersonality. The latter urges us to radically change a set of 
beliefs and motives constitutive of our actual selves, in order to achieve the 
God-like perspective which would be taken as “omniscient, omnipercipient, 
disinterested, and dispassionate.” There are mainly two problems with this 
requirement of revising our belief-desire sets. One problem is that we have 
epistemic difficulties in grasping what such a perspective is like; and should we 
know it, it could hardly be attainable. Another problem is that the God-like point of 
view “lacks susceptibility to essentially particular interests, and the capacity for 
emotions with essentially particular objects.” The former is called an epistemic 
problem with the method of Ideal Observer theory; while the latter boils down to 
psychological difficulties in taking on the perspective of an Ideal Observer. I 
contend that these problems do not apply to the constraint of impartiality imposed
16 For similar— but not the same— lines o f argument for impartiality (or an impartial sort o f  
perspective), see, e.g., Piper (1987: 104-107; 1991), Mendus (2002: Ch.3), and Zagzebski (2004: 
349-372).
,7 Brandt (1955: 407; 1979: 225). Note that Richard Brandt presents this characterisation o f Ideal 
Observer in criticising Roderick Firth’s Ideal Observer theory (Firth 1952: 333-341).
38 Walker (1991: 766).
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upon the ascription of reactive attitudes.39
Let me first explain why the impartial engagement with reactive attitudes is 
not threatened by the epistemic problem. The reason is that unlike the attempt to 
grasp what an Ideal Observer ensures, there is no need to have information of a 
perfect kind under which, for instance, probabilities of any event are zero or one, 
with the view to impartiality. This is because for our reactive emotions to be 
impartial, all that are needed are judgments based on relevantly warranted 
information about their object. Although the information seeking process is 
essential to impartiality, lest we attribute our reactive emotions wrongly or 
mistakenly to the object, this is not an intolerably heavy task in the epistemic terms. 
For one thing, as has been already shown, we need not investigate every person’s 
life history, when assessing his or her responsibility for substantive inequalities, for, 
following John Roemer’s proposal, we can appeal to a rough way of portioning the 
whole population into types in the way that reflects the differential degree of 
rational capacities for which no one is responsible. Our reactive attitudes could 
reasonably be shaped or adjusted on such a feasibly informed basis, not on 
omniscient knowledge, even when collecting some further information is required 
for having them impartial.40
'9 It might be objected that Ideal Observer theory—such as espoused by Firth—purports to identify 
the morally good with what the God-like observer would approve of; it does not advocate that we 
must ourselves attempt to cultivate the traits of such an observer. If so, however, there seems no 
point of seeking the moral good, because it is epistemically inaccessible to us. And actually, this 
epistemic inaccessibility is a concern to Firth, who admits that in order to determine the 
characteristics of the Ideal Observer, we may have to examine our current procedures forjudging or 
deciding morally relevant questions (Firth 1952: 332-333).
40 So the weight of fact-finding on an object of reactive attitudes is lessened in the norm of 
impartiality. This seems to make the reactive attitudes specified as impartial much less hypothetical. 
This, I think, reduces the power of scepticism about the reconciliation between reactive attitudes and 
their demanding sensitivity to factual considerations. For a discussion of this scepticism, see Watson
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Let me turn to how psychologically our reactive attitudes can be impartially 
engaged with. To see how, again let me compare the impartial engagement with 
reactive attitudes to the role-taking of the God-like observer. As we have seen 
above, an Ideal Observer of this kind would be deprived of any particular interests 
and concerns and so make unbiased and consistent judgments about any case. The 
concern is that this practice may generate a lack of interest in, or simply 
indifference to, actual subjects (including us). What is worse, this practice might 
involve no participatory communication with these subjects—just acts of 
observation with no passion.41 By comparison, the practice of reactive attitudes that 
meets the requirement of impartiality are not disengaged in this way, since 
impartial reactive attitudes are, after all, nothing but a certain class of reactive 
attitudes. True, the class is narrowed down by the constraint of impartiality. From 
this, however, it does not follow that the impartial engagement with reactive 
attitudes exhibits a kind of simple disinterestedness, indifference, or something like 
the divinity of instantaneous omniscience, which does not address any interaction 
with actual contexts. The truth is opposite: our reactive attitudes formed with the 
filter of impartiality would urge us to express emotions of some kind if there were 
lack of actual concern with, or indifference to, the substantive treatment of us. We 
should note that this does not itself run afoul of the fact that reactive attitudes are 
ineliminably prompted by particulars.
I turn now to the third constraint on our reactive attitudes. This is that the 
relevant conception of reactive attitudes is one according to which they can be 
construed dispositionally. According to the dispositional construal, reactive 
attitudes are states that have some functional basis. We then should see the reactive
(1987: 144-146).
41 See Friedman (1989: 651) and Walker (1991: 768).
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attitudes as being a set of dispositions, in such a way that we are disposed to 
display reactive emotions towards an object in conditions Ci, C2 . . . Cn. This 
dispositional conception of reactive attitudes can encapsulate what I have 
suggested as the conditions in which to make appropriate the normative tie 
between desert claims and our reactive attitudes. As a general condition, the 
circumstances of justice fit well with this model. As has been argued, desert is 
more or less conditional on such circumstances because, in conditions of limited 
resources, the desert-sensitive issues of distributive justice robustly arise. This can 
be built into the dispositional construal because of its essentially conditional trait: 
we would be disposed to display resentment at those who expropriate our own 
resources, in circumstances where the resources are moderately scarce. More 
specific types of conditions are also appreciated by this dispositional model, which 
are actually the two constraints I argued above—that is, the conditions under which 
we are well informed and impartial. On the informed judgments constraint, we can 
describe our reactive attitudes in the following form: if relevant facts of an object 
obtained, we would reveal emotive reactions to the object. On the impartiality 
constraint, it can be held that the disposition to appropriately express certain 
reactive attitudes to the target is manifested when our judgments thereof are made 
impartially.
Note that in talking about dispositions in this way, I have in mind a realist 
notion of dispositions, not a behaviourist account that does not treat dispositions as 
causal factors. According to the realist account of dispositions, there are particular 
states which dispose an object to undergo a change, irrespective of whether the 
states in question are known to us. For instance, the fragility of glass is a real factor 
which is identified in terms of its manifestation under suitable conditions (for 
instance, shattering when hitting the floor), regardless of whether we are ignorant
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of the real nature of the factor.421 want to take the dispositions of reactive attitudes 
to be of this realist kind. But if the dispositions at stake are of the realist sort, how 
do we possess such emotive states that dispose us to express emotions of a reactive 
kind in the above-mentioned three conditions? My tentative answer is that they are 
partially innate and mostly acquired at later stages by educative efforts of parents, 
friends, teachers, and siblings.43 This acquisition process may be of a natural 
psychological kind in a way that involves various kinds of learning process such as 
conditioning and deconditioning through education and mimicry, facial or 
otherwise. Its details aside, it seems less controversial to think that there is some 
psychological mechanism that may prove the causal states of reactive emotions in 
some rigidified way.44
The dispositional conception of reactive attitudes enables us to ward off one 
typical worry about the reliance upon the account of reactive attitudes—that is, the 
worry that our reactive emotions cannot keep track of the normative force of desert 
because they may not always be evinced in actual circumstances. It is often the 
case that, for instance, we do not feel anger at politicians despite the prevalence of 
political corruption for which they are responsible. It seems that this sort of 
concern can be cleared up by the dispositional conception of reactive attitudes. To 
see this, consider a variety of commonplace reasons that no reactive emotions are 
felt or revealed towards the politicians: we do not know details of the political 
corruption; we take it as natural because of having got used to it; or, we
42 For a classical presentation o f this realist account o f dispositions, see Armstrong (1968: 85-88).
43 See, e.g., Nagel (1979: 37), Watson (1987), and Fisher and Ravizza(1998: 211-213).
44 For helpful discussions o f this point, see Brandt (1979), Gibbard (1990), and Darwall (2002). In 
particular, Stephen Darwall presents an insightful argument about the connection between 
psychological mechanism as such and the moral status o f reactive emotions. His argument mainly 
refers to recent psychological surveys on empathy and sympathy (Darwall 2002: 54-58).
138 Desert-Sensitive Egalitarianism
(unconsciously) suppress our feelings such as resentment and indignation about it 
because we will be clapped into prison should we criticise the corrupt politicians. 
In any of these cases, if physiological reactions of an emotive sort were the 
determining factor of our having reactive attitudes, the politicians might not be 
regarded as their target, for we do not find ourselves reacting with certain feelings 
in respect to them. But if we see reactive attitudes as dispositionally construed, we 
may plausibly say that the politicians in question are indeed the target of our 
reactive attitudes, even in cases in which our reactive emotions are neither actually 
felt nor revealed. The dispositional construal has to accompany neither with 
physiological nor with phenomenological content such as the having of actual 
feelings or the display of such emotions.
There is no reason that the politicians in question can escape from the 
attribution of deserved blameworthiness, since the reason we do not actually 
express resentment about the political corruption seems to be one of the following: 
we lack pertinent information thereof, or our emotions are tamed through 
becoming accustomed to it or under the oppressive circumstances in which we 
cannot express our indignation at them. Even in the actual circumstances that these 
cases exemplify, the dispositional reading of reactive attitudes may well obtain. 
This is because, were we informed and impartial and so directed to attend to what 
the politicians have performed, we would very likely feel indignant at them for 
their misdeed, on grounds that idiosyncrasies of any sort—such as tame 
dispositions and the fear of persecution—are thereby washed out.
4. The Content of Reactive Attitudes
It becomes increasingly clear that the conception of desert that embraces the two 
combined bases has a normative force which can be captured in terms of our
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reactive attitudes. In other words, our reactive attitudes can serve as the mechanism 
through which we acknowledge our prima facie moral duties to deserving parties. 
This is, I maintain, plausible as long as the reactive attitudes are dispositionally 
construed as meeting the two conditions—the conditions under which we are 
well-informed and impartial in the circumstances of justice. But to see clearly how 
the proposed construal of reactive attitudes can track what the synthesised desert 
bases prescribe, it is important to attend to the content of our reactive emotions. In 
this section I explore this. (I assume that the class of our reactive attitudes 
construed dispositionally is of an informed and impartial kind.)
An account of the content of reactive attitudes that I find palatable is based 
on their connection with our shared expectations. According to this account, the 
reactive emotions can be understood (especially when it comes to resentment and 
indignation) such that we display reactive emotions towards people or institutions 
in the face of their breach of our shared expectations. Put another way, we do hold 
people to our shared expectations in a way that exposes those people to our 
resentment or indignation when they violate the expectations in question. For 
example, we feel furious, or embarrassed at least, that one fails to observe a rule of 
etiquette, breaks a promise, or hurts an innocent person (in normal situation), all of 
which have something to do with breaches of our shared expectations. This 
emphasis on the expectation-sensitivity of our reactive attitudes fits well with the 
dispositional construal of reactive attitudes, since the stance of holding people to 
our shared expectations is characterised in terms of their susceptibility to a range of 
reactive emotions, not based on symptomatic feelings of a reactive sort.45
45 R. Jay Wallace articulates this expectation-sensitive account of reactive attitudes, in narrowing 
the relevant class of them to resentment, indignation, and guilt (Wallace 1996: Ch.2; see also 
Scheffler 2003a). As Wallace notes, Jonathan Bennett originally considers this way of explaining the 
content of reactive emotions (although he ultimately rejects it) (Bennett 1980: 41-42).
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Of course, not all expectations are associated with our reactive attitudes. In 
order to characterise the connection between them, our shared expectations should 
be capable of being justified relative to the reactive attitudes on a certain ground.46 
Especially in explicating the normative aspect of desert that grounds prima facie 
duties, it is important to realise that this stance of holding people to our shared 
expectations needs a warrant from some moral ground. But this does not require us 
to embark upon some further task, because, as I have already demonstrated, the 
two synthesised desert bases can provide such a ground, as far as egalitarian justice 
goes: one desert base has to do with the desert-responsibility thesis; the other desert 
base is substantiated by the Principle of Baseline Equality. As I have shown, both 
are regulated by the political idea of human equality, and hence, they can be taken 
together to provide a morally acceptable standard for rating each person’s claim. I 
now want to suggest that they become also putative grounds of our shared 
expectations concerning people or the institutional arrangements. In other words, 
the relevant expectations are of a normatively justifiable kind just in case they are 
grounded on the two desert bases.
We can now see that the stance of holding people to our shared normative 
expectations has an explanatory role in why we incur prima facie moral duties to 
deserving parties. We can see, for instance, that any employer incurs a duty not to 
pay less than the amount of salary that his employees are responsible for and so 
deserve. The employer’s incurrence of a moral duty is guaranteed by his 
susceptibility to our reactive emotions in the following conditional sense: if the 
employer failed in a duty which is justifiable based on our shared normative 
expectations then he would prompt our indignation. How is it that all people are 
equally respectable and thus deserving a decent level of advantages? In response, it
46 See Wallace (1996: 22).
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should be again noted that our shared normative expectations in the first place 
correspond to the Principle of Baseline Equality that all people should be equally 
well off as a base point. We then may confront the following two paradigmatic 
possibilities of breaches of our shared normative expectations: our expectations are 
violated if we find out that the worse off are not responsible for being worse off, on 
the one hand; in the face of people who are responsibly worse off, on the other 
hand, a breach of our shared normative expectations still may be perceived. No 
doubt the latter possibility is more controversial, so let me focus on it. On my 
argument, this could be the case for two reasons. First, as I mentioned, no one can 
be fully responsible for being worse off in actual circumstances. This residual part 
of the outcome for which people cannot be responsible may well be reflected in the 
formation of our shared normative expectations about what the worse off of any 
kind ought to receive. Second, our shared normative expectations may be 
responsive to our normative thoughts directed through overall deliberation about 
the status of simple equalisation in some cases. As I argued before, for example, 
our sympathetic concern about the worse off for their self-respect or youthful 
indiscretion may ultimately outweigh the consideration of their responsibility 
under the regulative political ideal of human equality.47 These thoughts, I think, 
generate duties to help all of the worse off in the actual circumstances, no matter 
how strong each of the duties is. Unless the duties in question are discharged in 
accordance with our shared normative expectations, our sympathetic motivation 
disposes us to reveal indignation towards people or the current institutional 
settings.48
This expectation-sensitive element of reactive attitudes seems to match our
47 See Chapter 2, Section 2, and Chapter 3, Section 8. 
481 shall discuss this point more in Chapter 6.
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considered judgments, in that this can reflect the differential strength of our 
reactive emotions. Let me explain this point. Our indignation felt in observing the 
responsibly worse off could not be as strong as in encountering the worse off who 
are not responsible. This is obviously because in the latter case, unlike the former, 
the worse off did not cause their situation by their own deliberative fault. In other 
words, our shared normative expectations are breached more intolerably in the 
latter case than in the former. Our compassion then may well be aroused much 
more strongly in the latter case than in the former, just as our indignation towards 
people or the institutional arrangements that leave the worse off unaided will be 
correspondingly strong. So the duty to help those not responsible for being worse 
off is much more stringent and so prioritised over those responsible for being 
worse off if this can be done feasibly.44 Of course, not all of such shared normative 
expectations impose duties on us in this way. There are many cases in which no 
one can do anything for the deserved without huge sacrifice of a certain sort. We 
have already seen such an example: the treatment of an ailing person who is not 
responsible for the disease in cases in which any medical care is not currently 
available.50
It might be questioned: how can we explain cases in which our shared 
normative expectations are simply met? My argument can plausibly explain cases 
of this sort by appealing to the dispositional construal of reactive attitudes. On my 
argument, we feel approval for people’s current positions on grounds that our 
shared normative expectations are satisfied. This kind of approval may involve 
neither physiological nor phenomenal content of reactive emotions of any robust 
sort. Still, the approval can be dispositionally connected to our reactive attitudes in
49 See Chapter 6, Section 3.
50 See note 25 above.
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such a way as to hold people or the institutional settings to our reactive emotions. 
As I discussed above, whether we actually feel or reveal emotions is not the 
determining factor of whether an object is a target of our reactive attitudes.31
5. Scheffler on Desert
In this section, I show that the proposed conception of reactive attitudes is not 
vulnerable to Samuel Scheffler’s objection that reactive attitudes cannot play an 
indispensable role in our judgments about any redistributive assignment of 
advantages. Scheffler admits that the conception of desert can be implicated in our 
practice involving the display of reactive attitudes. He also thinks that the 
propositional content of reactive attitudes can be fleshed out in terms of their 
expectation-sensitivity. He writes:
[T]he reactive attitudes always present themselves as merited or deserved 
responses to the individuals who are their targets. Since part of what is 
involved in treating people as responsible agents is being disposed to view 
them as appropriate targets of reactive attitudes when they violate the 
normative expectations to what we hold them, it follows that our practice of 
treating one another as responsible agents commits us to the idea that an 
agent’s breaches of expectations deserve to be met with a reactive 
response.32
Scheffler argues, however, that this account fails to prove that “responsible agents 
are committed to including within their reactive repertoires resentment that is based 
on judgments of economic desert in particular.” There are, he believes, two main
51 See also Wallace (1996: 71): “We suppose only that the agent held responsible has done 
something that meets or exceeds the moral obligations we accept, and that at the time o f action she 
was the sort o f person we hold to such obligations, in the way that is dispositionally connected with 
the negative reactive emotions.”
52 Scheffler (2003a: 71).
53 Scheffler (2003a: 75).
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reasons.54
First, our judgments that are made about socioeconomic affairs in the name 
of distributive justice are not typically those which involve reactive emotions, even 
though we often experience such feelings in the face of some maltreatment of 
people. According to Scheffler, there is an obvious presence of reactive emotions 
in our thoughts of retributive justice, since they are intimately connected to the 
institutional practice of punishment that criminals apparently deserve. On the 
contrary, reactive emotions as such are not typically directed at people or a given 
institution in a way that is responsive to socioeconomic affairs of an unfair kind. 
For one thing, our resentment may not be expressed in public, even when we 
observe that some individual receives a much higher salary than we could 
normatively expect him to earn. Moreover, unlike the legal institution in which 
criminals are publicly subject to our reactive emotions (through decisions on the 
extent to which we punish them), there is no similar kind of institutional settings in 
which our reactive attitudes about an allocation of advantages are displayed. 
Scheffler thus asserts: “what he is said to deserve—a lower salary—does not itself 
constitute an institutional vehicle whose function is to give public expression to 
feelings of resentment and indignation like those conveyed the original judgments 
of desert.” 55
Second, and more important, a target of reactive attitudes may differ from its 
propositional object in many if not all cases of distributive justice. While the target
54 Scheffler used to appeal to the holism of distributive justice as a main reason against 
responsibility-sensitive desert within the most plausible theory of egalitarian justice (Scheffler 2001: 
Ch.10). But he now admits that this cannot be provide a strong reason for rejecting the role assigned 
to desert in distributive justice, since there could be a holistic idea of distribution in accordance with 
desert (Scheffler 2003a: 81 -88). See also Hurka (2003: 67-68).
55 Scheffler (2003a: 75).
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of our reactive attitudes is a person or an existing institution, the propositional 
object is that which we have reactive emotions about. This difference seems 
salient; for instance, whereas we may not feel indignant at a person who receives 
higher salary than the amount which we could reasonably expect her to earn, we 
may feel resentment at recipients of certain benefits that spill over from someone 
else’s—or some institutional—breach of our shared normative expectation. In 
cases of this commonplace kind, the target of a reactive attitude is not identical to 
its propositional object. Since those cases are not exceptional in our society, it is 
argued, the conception of desert reflected in our reactive attitudes cannot provide a 
secure standard based on which we can make appropriate judgments about the 
treatment of people. For these two reasons, Sehe filer concludes that desert cannot 
play an essential role in our practice of egalitarian justice.56
In responding to his argument, I take to be beyond question Scheffler’s 
understanding of retributive justice in which the institutional mechanism—the 
mechanism of giving punishment for a crime—represents a public expression of 
our reactive attitudes, no matter how controversial this is. Now let me focus on 
the first argument that reactive feelings are not of a typical kind that constitutes our 
practice of distributive justice. On this argument, first and foremost, I must say that 
Scheffler is just plainly wrong on the facts about the presence of people’s reactive 
emotions in the issues of egalitarian justice. There is actually a large body of 
literature on the experimental data, to the effect that people’s perceptions of the 
desert-sensitive fairness of an economic practice or distribution guides their own
56 Scheffler (2003a: 73-77).
57 As is well known, this presumption has been challenged by the consequentialist-based theories 
of retributive justice— most classically, the utilitarian theories o f  punishment. For the recent 
criticisms o f this presumption upon which Scheffler heavily relies, see Husak (2000), Moriarty 
(2003), and Mills (2004).
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choices and their reactions to others’ choices. Among this is data on the 
experimental results of the ‘ultimatum game’: given a certain sum of money and 
two players, the proposer can offer any portion of money to the responder, while 
the responder has a choice of whether she accepts it or not, and if she does not then 
neither party gets any money. One might anticipate that the proposer will offer the 
lowest non-zero amount, on the expectation that the responder will reason, “Well, 
this is at least better than nothing.” However, in fact the proposer normally comes 
up with a more equal division of money than the case in which she only takes care 
of her self-interest.58 Other literature is on public opinion surveys in the United 
States. It shows that most Americans think that the government should aid the 
needy but that this should extend only to the incapacitated such as the disabled, not 
to the deserved poor.59 These empirical studies confirm that people are sensitive to 
other people’s reactive emotions which are evoked when receiving their 
undeserved maltreatment and so brings to the light Schefifler’s simple factual 
mistake.
Second, more fundamentally, the principal problem with Schefifler’s first 
argument is that he fails to capture the point of the expectation-based interpretation 
of reactive attitudes. As I argued above, whether people actually feel resentment or 
indignation towards people or institutional arrangements is not crucial. The 
important point is rather whether our shared normative expectations are breached 
or not. The dispositional construal of reactive attitudes allows that they need not
58 The results show that the proposer offers about 40 percent of the total to the responder, and that, 
as is expected by the reasonable proposer, divisions of less than that percent are more likely rejected 
by the responder. See, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986: 288-292), Camerer and Thaler 
(1995), and Ullmann-Margalit and Sunstein (2002: 345-349).
39 For useful references to such surveys in the debates over the US citizens’ attitudes towards 
welfare reform, see, e.g., Gilens (1999: 1-10) and Wax (2000:271-274).
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always be accompanied by some physiological sign or occurrence of emotions. 
Their upheavals depend on the extent to which our beliefs are informed and 
impartially shaped in the circumstances of justice. To see this clearly, take the 
example that we may not actually feel indignant at an employer or a system that 
lets an employee receive her higher salary than our shared normative expectation. 
On my argument, this can be explained such that our reactive emotions would be 
revealed only if they were based on our informed belief-based judgments and also 
confined to the cluster of impartial ones. The very fact that emotive responses are 
atypical in actual circumstances does not itself deny the dispositions to react to 
breaches of our shared normative expectations about the treatment of people. Nor 
does it refute that the redistributive arrangements reflect our reactive attitudes, 
since there is no need to have the institutional expression grounded directly upon 
any actual feeling aroused by some maltreatment of economic agents. This, I think, 
undermines the first reason Schefifler puts against the role of reactive attitudes in 
the issues of egalitarian justice.
Turn to the second reason raised by Schefifler against the role of desert in the 
domain of distributive justice: a target of reactive emotions may differ from its 
propositional object. In actual circumstances, there may be many cases that involve 
the difference in question; the target of such feelings and its propositional object 
might be coincident— sometimes simply inconsistent. However, this is not a 
problem with my dispositional construal of reactive attitudes, for reactive attitudes, 
so understood, are essentially judgment-sensitive, in that they count as appropriate 
only if they are formed impartially under the impact of relevant information. This 
judgment-sensitivity has an important implication in coping with Schefifler’s 
criticism. The reason is that were our beliefs sufficiently informed and impartially 
formed about the propositional object, then our judgments in the light of which
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emotions of a reactive sort could be displayed in the circumstances of justice 
would tie their target to its propositional object. Reconsider the example of our 
feeling resentment at those who are the beneficiaries of a breach committed by 
someone else. I think this to be a case in which we are not informed enough of the 
facts about how the beneficiaries receive such benefits (knowingly or unknowingly, 
directly or indirectly), and of the facts about the relationship between the 
beneficiary and the person who breaches our shared normative expectation (close 
or not). Under the impact of warranted information about these details, however, 
our judgments would be made differently: our indignation would be directed aptly 
at the person who commits the breach (and the beneficiaries as well). Were we 
carefully attentive to the dispositions constitutive of our reactive attitudes of an 
informed and impartial kind, it would seem that the target of our reactive attitudes 
is identical to their propositional object.
6. Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the conceptual unity of egalitarian justice by an 
appeal to the conception of desert. As I have shown, the difficulties with respect to 
the desert-responsibility thesis in particular can be defused if the two synthesised 
principles of egalitarian justice are incorporated into the desert bases. I also argued 
that the normativity of egalitarian justice that grounds prima facie moral duties to 
deserving parties can be tracked by the appropriate conception of reactive attitudes: 
our reactive attitudes can serve as the mechanism through which we come to a 
realisation of prima facie duties to the deserved, given that our reactive attitudes 
are construed dispositionally such that they are formed impartially with pertinent 
information in the circumstances of justice. We have seen that the content of 
reactive attitudes can be explicated in terms of our shared normative expectations
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that are held to people in actual circumstances: were the shared normative 
expectations unmet then the people would prompt our reactive emotions of an 
informed and impartial kind. I then showed that this construal of reactive attitudes 
as residing in the two combined desert bases can deal with Schefifler’s criticisms 
against the role of desert in the practice of distributive justice. The further strength 
of my argument is a point to which I turn in the next chapter, by putting my 
argument to the test of how plausibly moral duties to people in great need can be 
grounded in the desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice.
C h ap ter 6
B asic N eed s Trum p D esert?
1. Introduction
In the last chapter, I argued that a conception of desert underpinned by the two 
egalitarian principles grounds prima facie moral duties owed to deserving parties, 
whether direct or indirect. As explained, the normative force of desert can be 
captured by our reactive attitudes, if dispositionally construed such that they are 
formed impartially with pertinent information. To the preceding chapter I have 
demonstrated that moral duties as such echo the regulative political ideal of human 
equality that all people are of equal worth, in two respects: first, a pluralism of the 
two egalitarian principles (incorporated into the conception of desert as the two 
desert bases) allows for the normativity of simple equality, so that simple 
equalisation may be favoured even in cases in which an agent’s responsibility is 
obvious. Second, more crucially, the restricted understanding of people’s 
responsibility for substantive inequalities on the basis of the Responsibility-Based 
Principle of Inequality alleviates sufferings of substantive inequalities in actual 
circumstances. So if this is schematised as desert-sensitive egalitarianism, not only 
can we avoid the inhumane treatment of people who face their unequal positions, 
but any improper way of arranging a pattern of redistribution can be excluded.
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With these results in mind, this chapter aims to examine how plausible my 
desert-sensitive egalitarianism is. The most relevant way of accomplishing this task, 
I think, is to scrutinise whether the needy can be treated appropriately in the 
desert-sensitive egalitarian scheme. It goes without saying that a duty to the needy 
is that which no one can convincingly turn down. In other words, how plausibly 
the duty in question can be espoused is a fundamental test to which any egalitarian 
argument should be put. In this chapter, I thus attempt to show how plausible my 
argument is by going over whether and how reasonably my desert-sensitive 
egalitarian theory of justice can guarantee the duty owed to those in dire need. For 
these purposes, in Section 2 I elucidate the concept of basic needs that delineates 
when people are in great need. In the next three sections, I wish to show that no 
arguments for the robust normativity of basic needs can defeat my desert-sensitive 
egalitarianism. In Sections 3, 4, and 5, I take up three arguments: the compassion 
argument, the vulnerability argument, and the urgency argument. I then 
demonstrate that none of them can offer a more plausible account of what we 
ought to do for the needy. In defence of my perspective against these arguments, I 
show that the desert-sensitive egalitarian view can allow for the normative space of 
basic needs in a suitable manner: my argument passes the test with a better score.
2. The Concept of Basic Needs
In order to explicate the concept of basic needs, let me start by observing a few 
characteristics of needs by contrasting needs with desires. Because needs are often 
confused with desires, this contrast helps clarify what makes (basic) needs 
conceptually salient. Consider the statement “I need a car.” In ordinary discourse, 
this might often be taken as identical to the statement “I desire to have a car.” By 
examining these two statements carefully, however, we can see two main
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differences between needs and desires. First, the needs statement may not be tied to 
a subject’s perceptual experience, while the desires statement must be: when I 
stand in need of a car in the countryside, it could be that such a need is neither 
intended nor felt by me. This shows that needs are not always evident to all agents, 
whereas desires are those which they can perceive more or less as mental states. 1 
Second, needs are explained by a certain end for which something is needed 
(whether an agent is aware of the needs or not). More precisely, what is needed is a 
means for a goal that is evaluated from a (quasi-)objective point o f view.2 For 
instance, the statement “I need a car” must be followed by an end of some 
objectively evaluative kind which gives rise to my need; ‘for a comfortable life in 
the countryside’ is of this kind. Note that this objective evaluation of the end, as 
theorists of needs often maintain, may itself go beyond contingencies of any kind 
on reality and feasibility in the countryside of our contemporary age, even though 
the substantive content of this need is in part relative to the social context at a given 
time.3 On the other hand, if someone says, “I desire to have a car,” we can interpret 
it as designating her desire to own a vehicle in an elliptical way, regardless of 
whether its evaluation is subjective or (quasi-)objective.4
1 See Wiggins (1987: 6): “What I need depends not on thought or the workings of my mind (or not 
only on these) but on the way the world is.” Note that needs, so defined, should not be confused with 
drives. Needs for an object do not always drive a person to get it physiologically. For instance, to say 
that everyone needs education, regardless of his or her perception, does not mean that an organism 
causally drives his or her to receive education (Thomson 1987: 13-15).
2 See, e.g., Frankfurt (1984: 3), Griffin (1986: 41-42), and Barry (1965: 48).
3 See, e.g., Sen (1984: 332-338; 1992: 108), Wiggins (1987: 11-23), Miller (1999: 212-213), 
Alkire (2002: Ch.5), and Reader (2006: 340).
41 do not deny that a goal, objectively specified, is not normally questioned in the needs statement. 
We do not always have to clarify a goal for which we need something essential, such as the 
avoidance of harm or death, since it is too obvious to put it in that way. For discussions of this point, 
see Thomson (1987: 18-22) and Miller (1999: 317).
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These characterisations of needs bring us into the distinction between 
instrumental needs and basic needs: some needs are just instrumental such that a 
goal for which something is needed is that which we can reasonably choose or 
even dispense with, whereas others are not derivative from any particular goal but 
instead are intrinsically linked to our being human beings—human nature, say. 
Only the latter can be called ‘basic needs’. In other words, our basic needs, unlike 
instrumental ones whose purpose is reasonably choosable or dispensable, are 
defined such that their end is inescapable and ineliminable as far as we live as 
human.5 Of course, as in cases of needs simpliciter, how the basic needs are 
satisfied may well differ at various levels, such as the levels of individuals, 
societies, and times. The point is that meeting the basic needs involves a global 
goal for which we are destined to aim as long as our life can be seen as human.
This definition seems equivocal. It requires more clarification of what makes 
the claims of needs depend upon the intrinsic nature of human beings. My way of 
clarifying what makes needs basic follows the traditional way of understanding 
basic needs. What is ultimately essential for the human nature in claims of needs 
can be stipulated in a negative way: people are inhumanely harmed unless their 
basic needs are met.6 In other words, unmet basic needs violate a minimal decency 
of humankind, to the extent that no individuals can remain unharmed in their life. 
But what constitutes the harm in question, as distinct from all sorts of other harms 
we human beings can suffer that are unconnected to basic needs? There are, I think, 
two sources of the harm by which a person’s minimal decent quality of life might 
be undermined.
5 See, e.g., Griffin (1986: 42), Thomson (1987: 17-18), and Reader (2006: 344-345).
6 As a matter o f fact, this way o f defining basic needs has gained many supporters. Among them 
are Feinberg (1973: 111-112), Miller (1976: Ch.4; 1999: Ch.10), Thomson (1987), Wiggins (1987: 
Ch.l), Doyal and Gough (1991), and Alkire (2002: 158-160).
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First, it is widely recognised that some basic needs are uncontrovertibly 
delineated such that the avoidance of serious harm is linked to “the fact that we 
must ail and eventually die without food, water, and air.” 7 In other words, the 
fundamental inescapability of basic needs points foremost to a biological minimum, 
which constitutes goals all humans must pursue if they are to avoid serious harm. 
Although the possession of biological needs does not automatically render its 
subjects distinctly human beings, they are vital for any human being, for they must 
be met for any normal exercise of rational capacities, including higher-level 
capacities to engage in healthy practical reasoning and social affiliations (which, as 
I will argue below, are germane to the second source of the serious harm). No one 
seems to deny that the fulfilment of biological essentials is a minimum requirement 
for carrying out the capacities to make rational judgments and choices.8
It might seem that satisfying these basic needs is not a real problem for 
humankind. This is wrong for two reasons, however. First, there are still millions 
of the desperate who are under the influence of malnutrition and have no access to 
fresh water in many of the developing (and part of the developed) countries. We 
should note that the importance of our emphasis on people’s biological 
functionings does not disappear even in cases in which the desperate do not 
actually feel deprived or are not aware of deprivations. As I argued above, needs
7 Thomson (1987: 27).
8 There might be exceptional cases in which a person can enjoy their higher skills or talents while 
being in dire needs; for instance, some novelists could write fabulous novels only in a squalid 
situation. In egalitarian debates, however, we do not have to deal with those cases for two reasons. 
First, whether people succeed in achieving their own overall good does not matter much. Pace 
perfectionists, egalitarians can appeal to a modest standard of well-being, whatever the metric is. 
Second, and more important, the significance of biological needs resides in our capabilities to lead a 
human life, not in whether the satisfaction of the needs is demanded for a certain kind of life or not. 
We thus can say that meeting biological functionings is normally required for the achievement of 
higher capabilities. Cf. Griffin (1986: 47-55).
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are not subject to whether people perceive a needy state. This has a further 
implication: even in circumstances in which individuals’ biological needs are 
currently met, as in many developed countries, the biological needs should count 
as fundamental in society. The importance of meeting them is not absent insofar as 
there are potential threats of serious harm, no matter how impending the threats are. 
Recall that many victims of Hurricane Katrina suffered— some are still 
suffering—the devastating effects in southeast Louisiana and Mississippi of the 
United States, in a way that their biological needs were left unfulfilled. Second, the 
biological minimum has a relevant appeal to health care needs without any detour 
through social norms. For the biomedical model of health defined as the absence of 
disease, which means deviations from normal functionings to be met for exercising 
rational capacities, provides an empirical basis of qualifying any physiological 
disturbance in the natural functionings of the human organism as detrimental to us. 
Although what this empirically confirmed model implies should not be 
exaggerated, establishing the health care system can be seen as a natural extension 
of the appeal to biological needs that people could reasonably accept in 
contemporary society.9
Obviously enough, the biological minimum, thus defined, does not exhaust 
all basic needs. The biomedical model is not sufficient for the full account of basic 
needs whose goals can be neither evaded nor eliminated by human beings, for 
there is no difficulty in finding those needs in other species. We should thus clarify 
the second source of the peculiar kind of harm that comes from having basic needs
9 See Daniels (1985: 28-32; 1996: 185-187), for this argument. Note that what the biomedical 
model says is weaker than the WHO definition o f health: ‘a state o f complete physical, mental and 
social well-being, not merely the absence o f disease and infirmity’ (see http//www.who.int/about/en). 
This shows that the model in question identifies the most fundamental class o f basic needs that are 
indispensable for survival and thus essential for any human being.
156 Desert-Sensitive Egalitarianism
unmet. Here I insist that the second source has strongly to do with an essential 
class of capabilities that must be satisfied in order for an agent to act autonomously 
in any form of social life. This is easily confirmed by observing that a person’s 
quality of life would suffer were her autonomous conditions impaired, even in 
cases in which she is provided with all manner of material comforts (for example, 
many women’s lives in a patriarchal society). This proposal, I believe, gains 
consensual support from many theorists who find the moral significance of basic 
needs: Len Doyal and Ian Gough, for instance, say that a fundamental human need 
in addition to the biological one is to be autonomous in a minimum sense—“to 
have the ability to make informed choices about what should be done and how to 
go about doing it” ; 10 David Copp says that the ground of basic needs must be one 
that everyone must be a “rational and autonomous agent” who “at a minimum, has 
the ability to choose how he shall live his life on the basis of his values he has 
formed, values that he has the capacities to evaluate and to pursue” ; * 11 and Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaunf s conception of (basic) capabilities in significant part 
echoes what is required for an individual to be an autonomous citizen, which 
relates strongly with her capacities to achieve objectives she has reasons to value. 12
These views can be epitomised in my own terms: the minimum requirements 
for an autonomous agent are those by virtue of which the agent can exercise 
minimal capacities for rational decisions and act upon them in the expectational
10 Doyal and Gough (1991: 53).
11 Copp (1993: 123).
12 Sen (1992; 1993) and Nussbaum (1992; 1993; 1999). As is well known, there is a difference in 
their approaches to basic human capabilities: Nussbaum makes a list of basic capabilities, most of 
which are required for autonomous action, such as a capacity to engage in practical reasoning and a 
power to form affiliations (Nussbaum 1992: 216-223; 1993: 263-265; 1999: 41-42). Sen, on the 
contrary, is sceptical of the further specification of basic capabilities, since it demands completeness 
of such a list that is theoretically and practically difficult to satisfy (Sen 1992:45-49; 1993: 46-48).
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terms. Although there may be subtle differences that the specific versions of basic 
needs have, all of them, I think, can reasonably espouse my synoptic view. What 
my view delineates, I take it, is based upon an overlapping consensus about the 
minimum conditions of an autonomous agent. 13 In sum: our basic needs are 
identified with the biological functionings, plus other central human capabilities 
defined such that any failure to meet the needs deprives people of their human 
decency as autonomous members of society. 14
To this point it has been argued that the nonfulfilment of basic needs is a 
seriously harmful state in which no individuals can enjoy a minimally decent 
quality of life. The concept of basic needs, so understood, includes not only the 
biological minimum but also the basic capabilities required for the autonomous 
exercise of capacities to make rational decisions and implement them. With this in 
hand, we might easily see the normative force of basic needs. There seems little 
difficulty in showing how cruel it is when the severely deprived are left unhelped. 
As a matter of fact, many contemporary egalitarians take the normativity of basic 
needs for granted. Among such egalitarians are sufficientarians who claim that all 
people should have enough, and prioritarians who claim that all people’s lives 
should be leximined. 15 For these egalitarians, various as their positions are, the
13 For the notion o f an overlapping consensus among different arguments over a concept, see 
Rawls (1993) and Nussbaum (1999:40).
14 Some might question my proposal o f including basic human capabilities as the component of 
basic needs as such, on grounds that capabilities have richer connotations— more than commodities 
and passive states o f standing in need (Sen 1984: 513-515; see also Alkire 2002: 170-174). My 
argument here does not deny the salient features o f capabilities (if any), although I think that they 
should not be exaggerated. For a thorough discussion of this point, see Reader (2006).
15 On sufficientarianism (in a broad sense), see, e.g., Frankfurt (1987), Wolff (1998), Anderson 
(1999), and Crisp (2003). On prioritarianism, see, e.g., Temkin (1993: Ch.9; 2000), McKerlie (1995), 
and Parfit (2000). (See also Chapter 1.) Needless to say, there is a variety o f these positions. For one 
thing, there could be a combined position which holds that people whose life is below the threshold
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basic tenet may be simply that “the first priority of justice is to bring it about that 
every person gets a decent level of capability for each of the functionings that are 
needed for a genuinely good quality of life.”16 But not all of them have offered an 
ostensive argument of why meeting basic needs is the first priority of justice. It 
seems, however, that the relevant argument should be proposed for the priority in 
question.
As I see it, there are three arguments for the strong normativity of basic 
needs: the compassion argument, the vulnerability argument, and the urgency 
argument. But to examine only whether each argument shows the evaluative force 
of basic needs is not the main focus here, for the main aim of this chapter is to 
show how plausible my desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice is. More 
precisely, this chapter purports to show that my argument can provide a reasonable 
account for a moral duty to the needy. I thus examine these arguments in terms of 
whether each of them achieves better than my desert-sensitive egalitarianism, with 
respect to the helping of the direly needy. In doing so, I focus on whether we can 
forgo the consideration of an agent’s responsibility for being needy in the light of 
each argument, since the difference between these arguments and my proposal 
consists in whether responsibility should count or not. This attempt would have an 
impact on egalitarian debates, because the above-mentioned egalitarians—who 
presume, implicitly or explicitly, the normative force of basic needs—are inclined 
to go for the ‘trumping claim’: basic needs trump responsibility, or desert in 
general. In the following, I show that none of the three arguments can support the 
thesis that basic needs trump desert. I thereby demonstrate that my desert-sensitive
of human decency be prioritised over the worse off who are above the threshold unless benefits 
given to them are trivial or demand a huge amount of sacrifice (e.g., Anderson 1999; Crisp 2003; see 
also the next section). Although I do not deny such a variety, this does not affect my argument here.
16 Ameson (2000b: 47).
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egalitarianism can appreciate the normative space of basic needs in a much better 
way than if any of the three arguments were employed.
3. The Compassion Argument
The first argument for the trumping claim is that we feel sympathy for people 
whose basic needs are unmet, whether they are responsible or not. This argument 
counters any appeal to responsibility in determining a pattern of egalitarian 
redistribution. So the compassion argument collides with my desert-sensitive 
egalitarian theory of justice.
To see this clearly, let me take up two examples. First, imagine a person who 
uses up his salary on gambling and then is starving. Given that he has rational 
capacities to a sufficient extent, it is argued, my desert-sensitive egalitarianism 
holds him blameworthy for his current situation, other things being equal. But it 
seems seriously inhumane to leave him to die simply because he is responsible for 
the situation. Another instance is a heavy smoker who has rational capacities for 
control over her craving to smoke. Suppose that she suffers from lung cancer 
through her smoking habit. In the desert-sensitive egalitarian view, it is argued, she 
is to be held responsible for the illness inasmuch as the cancer is caused by her 
habitual tobacco use, all else constant. Yet it seems cruel to give her no operation 
for cancer simply because she could and should have avoided contracting the 
cancer, even in cases in which the operation can be performed at reasonable cost. 
As these cases illustrate, it seems counterintuitive that the agents are denied any 
assistance that is necessary to lead a minimally decent life simply on grounds that 
they are responsible for their dire situation. Once we put ourselves into the shoes of 
those in grim situations, our compassion may well encourage us to help them out 
of the situations, since “compassion is based on an awareness of suffering, an
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intrinsic condition of a person.” 17 To give people their due on the basis of their 
responsibility-sensitive desert, irrespective of their dire plights, would give rise to 
such counterintuitive outcomes, contrary to the concern of our compassion.
The compassion argument, by contrast, directly appeals to the threshold at 
which the minimal decency of an autonomous life defined above is guaranteed 
over the course of that life. As Elizabeth Anderson argues, this has two directions 
at the policy level: negative and positive directions. Negatively, for the badly off 
suffering serious harm due to their dire situation, this argument helps to purge the 
differential effects of internal and external endowments. Positively, this argument 
promotes a secure way of treating people as equals, since people across the board 
are entitled to sufficient goods of society that make their life minimally decent. 18 
With the compassion argument at work, people are thus regarded as equal citizens 
who have supposedly moral powers and so enough capacities to participate in 
democratic and egalitarian self-government. 19 It is important to note that in such a 
polity, all citizens are reasonably expected to exercise responsibility for their own
fate above the decency threshold. Anderson writes:
Democratic equality does not indemnify individuals against all losses due to 
their imprudent conduct. It only guarantees a set of capabilities necessary to 
functioning as a free and equal citizen and avoiding oppression. Individuals 
must bear many other losses on their own.
As such, this argument holds people responsible for any loss following from their
17 Anderson (1999: 306). Note that Elizabeth Anderson distinguishes compassion from pity: unlike 
the former, the latter is “aroused by a comparison of the observer’s condition with the condition of 
the object of pity.” In other words, pity stands in the observer’s superiority to a sufferer, which 
should be sharply distinguished from judgments based on compassion that is a more aptly egalitarian 
emotion towards the object (Anderson 1999: 306-7).
18 Anderson (1999: 312-313).
19 This argument obviously reflects Rawls’s notion of moral agents who can shape and fulfil a 
conception of their own good (Rawls 1999: Ch. 10).
20 Anderson (1999: 327).
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improvident acts, unless this loss puts them below the threshold at which their 
basic needs are met. Hence, the compassion argument is not as lenient as 
egalitarianism of a simplistic-sufficientarian kind.
It might seem that the compassion argument is more attractive than the 
desert-sensitive egalitarian view, since it is not only far from egalitarianism of any 
lax sort but also directs policies of a more humanitarian sort than those based on 
any responsibility-catering argument, including mine. In the following I show that 
this is not the case.
Let me first emphasise that my desert-sensitive egalitarian conception of 
justice does not consist only of a single desert base which is of one cloth with the 
consideration of responsibility. On my argument, there is also an equality-relative 
desert base that derives its normative force from the value of simple equality in 
itself. In other words, the two desert bases are pluralistically placed in egalitarian 
justice, which may favour simple equalisation that would lead us to rescue the 
needy, even in the circumstances of justice.22 We should also note that this is 
promoted under the regulative political ideal of human equality, since the situation 
in which those who fall into dire straits may well contradict the idea that all people 
are of equal moral worth. The further—and most important—point is that as the 
compassion argument does, my argument also allows reactive emotions such as 
sympathy to enter into our responses to those in dire need. Recall what I argued for 
the relevant construal of reactive attitudes in Chapter 5: the conception of desert is 
closely linked to our reactive emotions such that our imaginative occupying of 
another’s viewpoint drives us to feel sympathy towards them and so feel obliged us 
to do something for them (if we can). This stance can be fleshed out in such a way
21 A similar view is supported in Crisp (2003). Cf. Ameson (1999a; 2000a; 2000b).
22 See Chapter 2, Section 3, and Chapter 5, Section 2.
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that our sympathetic feeling is aroused if our shared normative expectation about 
the treatment of the needy is breached. The desert-sensitive egalitarian scheme 
thus does not deny the significance of sympathetic emotions that can serve as the 
relevant mechanism through which we discern our duty to the seriously needy, 
however indirectly.
But what is distinctive about my desert-sensitive egalitarianism is that it 
signifies the role of an agent’s responsibility that purports to justify substantive 
inequalities of many kinds. For this reason, my argument seems problematic in that 
the destitute poor may not always be rescued, unlike the compassion argument 
under which the rescue is always promised. So some might think that as long as an 
agent’s responsibility matters, the desert-egalitarian scheme often runs contrary to 
the phenomenology of sympathy. However, the reality is opposite: my argument 
could underwrite the appropriate role of compassion—even reactive emotions in 
general—more promisingly than if we appealed to the compassion argument.
Consider a gambler who depletes his income on gambling. Suppose he is 
fully capable of making autonomous decisions and act upon them. Suppose also 
that he receives a truly good job offer. He, nonetheless, continues to gamble. Now 
imagine that we employ the scheme under which the basic needs of anyone will be 
met whenever they turn out to be unsatisfied. Under this scheme, we must promise 
to satisfy the basic needs of the gambler in question. Naturally, he comes to know 
through consecutive gambling that the government rescues him whenever his basic 
needs are actually unmet. It then could be that he gambles forever. We now should 
ask ourselves: can we feel compassion for him when he is deprived of basic needs? 
I doubt it. To say the least, this case shows that social policies of this kind that meet 
basic needs without counting an agent’s responsibility for being worse off do not
23 See Chapter 5, Section 4.
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necessarily resonate with our reactive emotions. Rather, our reactive emotions may 
indicate that the ‘convinced’ gambler should not be acquitted, lest his indulgence in 
such a debauched life be encouraged. It thus seems that the compassion argument 
cannot fully cover these emotional states of a relevant kind.
What the case of the ‘convinced’ gambler illustrates is that we may not feel 
strong compassion for this gambler, on grounds of his responsibility for lapsing 
into the needy state. My desert-sensitive egalitarianism that resides in the 
desert-responsibility thesis can appreciate this point. Let me get back to the 
Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility, which embodies a plausible 
understanding of responsibility. Under this principle, the ‘convinced’ gambler is 
inescapably responsible for being needy for three obvious reasons. First, his 
capacities are rational enough to resist a series of choices of gambling, in such a 
way that his craving for gambling is sensitive to beliefs of a rational and informed 
kind. Second, his being worse off is the consequence he could have reasonably 
expected to obtain were he to gamble. Third, he could have chosen the reasonable 
option—the good job offer—that would certainly guarantee a decent life other than 
gambling.24 It is not deniable that his responsibility deadens our sympathetic 
feeling towards him. On my argument, this can certainly be reflected in the 
desert-sensitive egalitarian scheme which allows that compassion be not strongly 
evoked in cases of this sort, since our relevantly formed reactive attitudes can track 
what his responsibility specified in the above-mentioned way bears as the relevant 
desert base.
Moreover, the strength of our sympathetic emotions that motivates actions 
for the avoidance of cruelty can be captured by the expectation-sensitive
24 See Chapter 3, for the full account o f the conditions o f responsibility o f this kind.
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interpretation of reactive attitudes.2^  Our reactive emotions would vary depending 
on our judgments about what the destitute did. Indignation felt in observing the 
responsibly worse off could not be evinced as strongly as in encountering the 
unfortunately destitute, owing to the difference of our shared normative 
expectations about them. My desert-sensitive egalitarianism correlates this 
difference closely with the conception of responsibility, given that our reactive 
attitudes are shaped impartially with relevant information about how much an 
agent is responsible for being worse off.26 We can point to the undeniable fact that 
while the ‘convinced’ gambler is pretty much responsible for the worse off 
outcome of gambling, he is extremely badly off. This means that we may well feel 
some compassion for him because of his hardship, but the compassion may not be 
as strong as that invoked when we face a gambler who has an unfortunate 
background: our shared normative expectation would be seriously violated if the 
unfortunate gambler is left unaided, whereas it would not be violated much in the 
former case. This, I think, suits our considered judgments about the treatment of 
the ‘convinced’ gambler.
Some still might complain that there is no guarantee that the 
responsibility-catering form of desert-sensitive egalitarianism cares always for the 
needy. It thus might seem that my argument would advocate cruelty because it 
may promote a different treatment of the needy on account of their responsibility. 
In response, recall that the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility allows for 
the inequality-appeasing role of proportionality that bears mainly on an agent’s 
capacities in actual circumstances: because no one can be fully informed and
25 See Chapter 5, Section 4.
26 Note that, on my argument, our reactive attitudes are narrowed down to the informed and 
impartial class, which can be dispositionally construed. For the detailed account see Chapter 5, 
Section 3.
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rational, no one can be fully responsible for any outcome of choice. This is 
empirically confirmed by the psychological experiments of how (relatively 
well-educated) people make a decision under risk: it reveals the imperfection of 
our rational capacities for framing choice alternatives and outcomes, which is far 
from what an ideal agent would do on the basis of her perfectly rational 
preferences.27 This is particularly relevant to the consideration of the extent to 
which people are less than fully rational and so affects our corresponding emotions 
towards those people, no matter how rational their capacities are. Given that our 
reactive attitudes were formed impartially with the relevant information, we would 
feel compassion of the apt kind for the badly off, even in cases in which they seem 
to posses rational capacities of an effective kind. This directs us to discharge a duty 
to the badly off in question, even when they might not be prioritised over the 
unfortunately worse off in some marginal cases. My argument thus does not deny 
the role of our compassion for any needy person in actual circumstances, on the 
one hand. My argument, on the other hand, can plausibly account for the 
prioritisation of rescuing people who are not responsible for their dire straits over 
the faulty desperate, in such a way as to fit with the strength of our sympathetic 
emotions for each needy individual.
Some still might object to my argument, to the effect that even under the 
strictly narrowed understanding of responsibility, there could be almost perfectly 
rational agents who are nearly fully responsible for falling into dire plight if they 
choose. Suppose that the ‘convinced’ gambler is one such person. The objector 
might say, then, that under the desert-sensitive egalitarian scheme, he could be left
27 By referring to Kahneman and Tversky (1986; 2000), I have argued that this provides a good 
reason to help the badly off o f any kind in the actual circumstances. See my response to the third 
question in Section 8 o f Chapter 3.
28 See also the next section, for this point.
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to die because of his responsibility. It might seem very cruel not to aid in his 
subsistence simply because his capacities are almost perfectly rational and 
exercised in the presence of full and pertinent information. What would my 
desert-sensitive egalitarianism say about this? The immediate response is that the 
regulative political ideal of human equality may well push us to rethink the plight 
of such nearly fully rational but destitute persons, notwithstanding their 
responsibility, on grounds that all people are of equal moral worth. Here again, my 
desert-sensitive egalitarian conception of justice constitutes the two pluralistically 
synthesised desert bases underpinned by the two principles of egalitarian justice, 
one of which disfavours substantive inequalities per se—the Principle of Baseline 
Equality. This is a moral ground of our compassionate feelings that are prompted 
in the face of an individual’s sufferings from the badly off state. As I argued above, 
my argument can fully embrace this.
Some might not be persuaded by this response: it is logically possible that 
my argument holds perfectly rational agents fully responsible for substantive 
inequalities and so may leave them unhelped should they be truly needy in the 
name of egalitarian justice.29 Even if this could be rarely obtained in actual 
circumstances, it is argued, there might be an undeniable possibility that these 
agents are fully responsible if they possess perfectly rational capacities and the 
option of lending a decent life is presented with full and relevant information. To 
be sure, we can realise that the world in which people are fully rational is possible; 
in such a world, we might have to hold those people fully responsible even in cases 
in which their basic needs are unmet. This, however, brings me to ask a question in
29The situation I am describing here might seem logically impossible, because no one would 
intentionally act irrationally if fully rational and perfectly informed; the very fact he does it proves 
that he is not fully rational indeed. But it then simply means that the proposed objection to my 
argument fails, since it is now admitted that there is no such a possibility.
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return: if people are really fully informed and perfectly rational, do we really think 
it unduly harsh to hold them fully responsible for being worse off? I think not. To 
see why, consider a perfectly informed gambler, Jensen. He is a fully informed and 
intelligent gambler. He can know exactly what will happen if he devotes himself to 
gambling. Also he can choose otherwise: he can make decisions and act upon them 
in the light of his rational beliefs and informed desires. However, he squanders 
money on gambling and is then starving. Would we really think it merciless not to 
rescue him? I doubt it, because he has absolutely no trouble in avoiding the choice 
in question. His distress may not elicit our sympathetic reaction, since it is suffered 
through his inexcusably deliberate fault. 30 From this, of course, we 
cannot—obviously should not—-jump to a conclusion that no one can be morally 
faulted for refraining from helping Jensen. What this case shows is rather that there 
is a far-reaching gap between the ideal circumstances in which Jensen-like people 
exist and the actual circumstances in which we are standing—the gap that my 
perspective signifies. The point is simply that we cannot forgo the consideration of 
responsibility at root.
Notice also that my desert-sensitive egalitarianism does not deny that there is 
room for a principle of humanity which is connected to our charitable motivation 
to help any badly off person. In other words, even in cases in which Jensen-like 
agents are fully responsible for being needy, there remains an irremovable fact that 
the moral requirement of simple equality cannot be met. This may well drive us to 
do something supererogatory for them. Although my argument does not deny the 
praiseworthiness of supererogatory acts, it emphases that this motivation should be
30 Note that this resonates with even what Nussbaum says when she reminds us o f the significant 
role played by compassion in ancient Greek analyses: she regards “the belief that the person who is 
suffering did not cause the suffering by deliberate fau lt' as one o f three cognitive requirements for 
causing compassion (Nussbaum 1992: 237; emphasis added).
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separated from moral duties that egalitarian justice holds.31
4. The Vulnerability Argument
The second argument that allows basic needs to enjoy some normative precedence 
over responsibility is that those who are in dire need are vulnerable, whether they 
are responsible or not. Robert Goodin pioneers this argument. By vulnerability, he 
roughly means susceptibility to potential threats of harm, manmade or natural, 
which includes not merely physical damages, but rather infringements of vital 
interests. To see how this argument grounds moral duties owed to the needy, it is 
important to address two points about the definition of vulnerability. First, 
vulnerability is a relational concept in that the vulnerable are dependent upon 
someone (to whom people are vulnerable) for something specific (with respect to 
what the people are vulnerable). For instance: a train passenger is dependent upon 
an engineer for her safety en route to her destination; tenants are susceptible to the 
decisions by their landlord; and so on. Second, vulnerability, so defined, implies 
that, in most cases, people being depended upon are in the best position to protect 
the vulnerable, since those people normally if not always have a better or even 
exclusive capacity to protect the vulnerable from some threatened harm. To 
illustrate: surgeons at a hospital near the car accident are best able to treat those 
seriously injured by that accident; both parents and teachers have great impact on 
children for their healthy growth; and so forth. The principle of protecting the
31 For presentations of a similar view, see, e.g., Rawls (1971: 191-192) and Campbell (1974; 1988: 
Ch. 1). See also the last paragraph in Section 4 of Chapter 2.
,2This might seem circular, since the vulnerable are defined as those who ought to be relieved of 
threats to harm if this can be done without special difficulties. But Goodin rejects this circular 
objection (Goodin 1985b: 124-125). He argues that the vulnerability argument stands at the 
second-order task of weighing moral considerations that currently concern us. The social fact that the
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vulnerable thus enjoins more than abstaining from acting in such a way as to 
assault them, for, under this principle, people being depended upon should incur 
moral duties flowing from the fact that the dependent are the vulnerable, whether 
the depended intend to harm the dependent or not.
The vulnerability argument, so understood, can be considered as a robust 
argument for the normative force of basic needs for three reasons. The first has to 
do with the conceptualisation of basic needs that has been done above. Recall that 
basic needs are defined negatively such that people are inhumanely harmed unless 
their basic needs are met. Obviously enough, this way to delineate the concept of 
basic needs resonates with what vulnerability means, because, as we have seen 
above, the vulnerable are those who face serious harm of an impending kind. The 
vulnerability argument thus can fully apply to cases of the needy. Second, what 
makes basic needs distinctive is captured well by the vulnerability argument, in 
that the vulnerable are not simply regarded as those whose basic needs are not 
actually satisfied, but also as those who face potential violations of their basic 
needs, regardless of their perception of such threats. The emphasis upon the 
potential threats of unmet basic needs has an implication that the impending harm 
ought to be prevented in advance. Third, and most important, the vulnerability 
argument clarifies that the desperately needy are subject to actions or choices of
vulnerable exist is not the same state o f affairs that the vulnerable people should be helped through 
some institutional scheme; only the latter follows from the vulnerability argument while the former 
does not (rather, the former is the state o f affairs to which the argument in question should apply).
3j Goodin (1985b: 32-35, 110-114; 1985c). Goodin thus argues that whether duties in question are 
positive— a duty to do something to help someone— or negative— a duty not to harm anyone— does 
not crucially matter to the vulnerability argument. More precisely, to bring the consideration of 
vulnerability to the fore would undercut the sharp distinction at stake, because this compels us to 
upgrade the moral status o f positive duties that are indistinguishable at root from special duties of 
any kind (Goodin 1985b: Ch.2).
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others, to the extent that they cannot behave autonomously. Here again, on the 
vulnerability argument, whether the others intend to inflict harm on the vulnerable 
or not does not crucially matter in holding them to have duties to the vulnerable. 
The vulnerability argument justifies the imposition of moral duties upon 
whosoever is in a position to help the vulnerable out of their dire straits. It is plain 
that such a position is taken directly by the social planners, and indirectly by 
us—through paying taxes, for instance— in contemporary society. Put another way, 
in most cases in which individuals’ basic needs are potentially unmet, the 
vulnerability argument enjoins the welfare state to discharge an ultimate duty to 
meet them.
The implication of the vulnerability argument is that the government has a 
duty to the needy, regardless of their responsibility for being in grim states, 
especially in cases in which they can be protected without any substantive 
difficulties.34 For this argument, Goodin distinguishes task responsibility from 
individual (or causal) responsibility. Task responsibility, as Goodin defines 
elsewhere, is the responsibility that is assigned to people in accordance with their 
duties, jobs, or (generically) tasks, from the minimally consequential ist point of 
view—namely in terms of whether the allocation as such creates socially desirable 
outcomes. This is essentially forward-looking, unlike individual (or causal) 
responsibility that is concerned with what has been done, since the point is who is
'4 To be precise, the state’s responsibility in question is activated only insofar as individuals are 
unable to satisfy their basic needs. Goodin’s argument thus rests upon the fact that people 
individually should bear primary responsibility for attending to their own basic needs; so people 
should discharge primary responsibility for averting the harm that befalls them if failing to meet their 
own basic needs (Goodin 1985b: 145-154; 1985c: 784-785).
’5 Goodin has in mind a variety of consequentialist considerations (Goodin 1985b 114-117; 1995: 
109-110). Although they are admittedly disputable, for present purposes, they should be left open.
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best able to perform a task, in distributing duties to people.36 The vulnerability of
the needy has a direct appeal to the former, not to the latter. Goodin writes:
My argument is that task responsibility and causal responsibility are 
separable, logically, and should often be separated in practice. On my 
analysis, how A got into his present state is irrelevant. All that matters now is 
who is best able to get him out.
Consider, for example, a reckless driver who is wounded heavily. Although he is 
suffering through his headstrong driving, the vulnerability argument claims that 
medical practitioners who have no difficulties of any special kind in saving his life 
should treat him, since his salvation is within their hands in that they are the only 
agents who can operate on him. Should they not operate on him without any 
special reasons, th ey  would not perform their duty to protect him from the 
preventable harm—his subsequent death. In the light of the vulnerability model 
which has recourse to task responsibility rather than individual (or causal) 
responsibility, we can thus engage in the consequentialist-wise distribution of 
moral duties to people (or the government), without any detour through detecting 
causal webs of each action with the view to the assignment of individual
T O
responsibility.
I Q
As Goodin admits, two desert-related questions immediately arise. First, 
should we not ignore whether the needy fall into their current situation through
’6 More precisely, those duties incurred by people are defined in terms o f the reasonable 
expectations people could hold in normal circumstances. Otherwise, it might be the case that we 
ought to protect other people from trivial harm or those who are in a far distant place (Goodin 
1985b: 122-123).
37 Goodin (1985c: 780).
38 Goodin (1995: Ch.2, 81-113). But note that as I have argued mainly in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
ascription o f responsibility to each agent is not unfeasible at all, if we have recourse to a relevant tax 
scheme. This, I think, undermines one o f the strong reasons against individual (or causal) 
responsibility-based arguments o f any kind, including mine.
39 Goodin (1985b: 132-134; 1985c: 780-781).
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their own improvident behaviours? It is intuitively plausible to say that the needy 
deserve the worse off consequence, as in the ‘convinced’ gambler’s case, insofar as 
the result is produced by their negligent actions. Second, why is a special duty to 
save the needy imposed upon us (through the governmental body), even in cases in 
which we have done nothing wrong towards them? The vulnerability argument 
urges us to bear an indirect burden with the protection of the needy simply because 
they are the vulnerable. Goodin responds to two concerns revealed in the form of 
the two questions, to the effect that “[b]oth claims ... extend the notion of ‘desert’ 
beyond its proper bounds.’'40 Goodin appeals to two analogical cases: as for the 
first concern, how the needy fell into their present state is out of place, just as 
physicians are expected to treat the heavily injured equally, irrespective o f  their 
differential liabilities. To the second concern, Goodin replies that whether a duty is 
imposed on us is not relevant to what the vulnerable deserve, just as we bear the 
burdens ofgetting a dro\\>ning child out o f  a shallow pond. By these two analogical 
examples, Goodin attempts to show that desert is out of place in accounting for the 
moral duty to the needy.
I want to scrutinise Goodin’s responses to the two desert-related concerns, 
especially in regard to his appeals to two analogical cases against the 
responsibility-sensitive part of desert. This is mainly because the careful 
examination of his replies enables us to see whether the vulnerability argument has 
more plausibility than my desert-sensitive egalitarianism has. In what follows I 
demonstrate that Goodin’s responses by analogy are too weak to justify the 
trumping claim, since he fails to compare the vulnerability argument with the 
argument that puts desert within its proper bounds. I show below that my argument 
can provide a more plausible account of what we ought to do in the two cases (and
40 Goodin (1985b: 133; 1985c: 781).
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other related ones).
Let me take the physicians case first. We must note that for the precise 
comparison of the two arguments in the physicians case, it is essential to bring out 
a contextual factor that makes this case special.41 Obviously enough, such a factor 
is emergency in a strong sense: the driver would quickly die were the operation not 
immediately done. As I will argue later, this is not representative of most cases 
debated in egalitarianism, because the case in which some immediate decision 
must be made cannot always be standardised in matters of redistribution.42 
Although this fact may well pose a question concerning the relevance of the 
counterexample used for the trumping claim, I here accept this contextual factor 
for the comparison in question. Even then, we do not find any superiority of the 
vulnerability argument over the desert-sensitive egalitarian view. This is because, 
as in the vulnerability argument, my desert-sensitive egalitarianism requires 
physicians to perform the operations on those who are badly wounded even in 
cases in which their liability is undeniable. Here again, the Autonomy-Based 
Principle of Responsibility in its rough proportional construal allows that no one be 
fully responsible on grounds that no one is fully informed and rational. That is to 
say, the fact that no one could ever be fully rational and informed in actual 
circumstances assures emergency treatment of all people; so, if they did not receive 
emergency care, then they would be treated undeservedly.
It might seem that this guarantee is not firm enough. My response to this 
objection is threefold. First, as I argued above, this is empirically confirmed since 
there is the fact that the imperfection of our rational capacities is unavoidable,
41 For discussions o f the role o f contextual factors, see Kagan (1988) and Kamm (1996). See also 
Chapter 2, Section 3.
42 In the next section, I will argue that the emergency case is not typical as a case demanding the 
satisfaction o f basic needs; nor are all basic needs relatively urgent.
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especially when it comes to decisions under uncertainty. This is also affirmed in a 
different way: should the guilty driver really be fully rational and perfectly 
informed, as in the case of Jensen, our hunch then would be that he should be 
punished. This is because his reckless choice must have been made in ideal 
circumstances in which he certainly could have avoided the accident in question. 
This implies that in the less-than-ideal circumstances—our actual world—my 
desert-sensitive egalitarianism need not bite the ‘basic needs not being met’ bullet. 
Second, even if someone is very nearly fully informed and rational, the desperately 
needy may be rescued for some telic egalitarian reason, as in the case of needy 
strangers. 43 Here again, my desert-sensitive egalitarian conception of justice 
contains the telic egalitarian principle as the relevant desert base, which holds that 
all people deserve equal standings. This has pro tanto moral weight such that it 
may well favour immediate surgery based on the claim that all people should be 
equally well off, even in cases in which the patient’s responsibility is irrefutable. 
Note that this is neither ad hoc nor consistent, because our deliberation over the 
moral status of such an immediate operation should be conducted under the 
regulative political ideal of human equality.44 Third, as was also already pointed 
out, my argument does not deny the benevolent principle of humanity that may 
dispose the surgeons to do a supererogatory act for the badly injured whose 
responsibility is indisputable even under the Autonomy-Based Principle of 
Responsibility. But we can see that this is unlikely, because my argument allows 
for the fact that no one should bear ultimate responsibility for being worse off even 
through the exercise of his or her rational capacities in the actual circumstances. To 
sum up: in the physicians case, a duty to save the undeservedly needy is morally
43 See Chapter 2, Section 2.
44 See Chapter 2, Section 4.
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equivalent to a duty to help the badly off. Hence, this case cannot show moral 
differences of any salient kind between my desert-sensitive egalitarian argument 
and the vulnerability argument.
To show that my desert-sensitive egalitarianism can deal with the physicians 
case just in the same way as the vulnerability argument does, however, is not to 
show that the former is more plausible than the latter. So to see the superiority of 
my argument, let me consider a slightly different case in which another 
different—and much less standard— contextual factor is added: excessive scarcity. 
Suppose that two drivers are in a car accident at a tiny village. Both of them are 
badly wounded. An eyewitness can prove that one is liable for this accident 
because of his reckless driving, not the other at all. Unfortunately, surgery can be 
performed only for one seriously injured person, since there is one hospital which 
has only a few surgeons at this moment in the village. Those surgeons are informed 
of who is an absolutely negligent driver. Now the point to consider this extreme 
case that exemplifies emergency and excessive scarcity is that it provides a test by 
which we can clearly examine which argument is more generally plausible. The 
test result is this: while the vulnerability argument is indifferent to operating on 
either, my desert-sensitive egalitarianism claims that the less culpable patient be 
prioritised.45 In this case, the property of a duty to save the undeservedly needy 
shows its own difference from that of a duty to help the needy in the vulnerability 
argument. As far as this extreme case is concerned, I think, this prioritisation of 
helping the faultless wins broader support; pace Goodin, an agent’s exercise of 
responsibility matters in this extreme case46
45 As a matter o f fact, Goodin asserts that in cases o f this sort, what we should do is flip a coin 
rather than examining the patients’ records in treating either person (Goodin 1985a: 586-588).
46 Goodin might say that we should not use extreme cases o f this kind in political philosophy. This 
is because such cases “cannot directly inform policy choices. Either they are too thin or else they are
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To avoid a misunderstanding, let me emphasise that the modified physicians 
case is far from a standard case of emergency treatment. We must note that this is 
an extreme case in combined conditions of desperate scarcity and emergency; so, 
this should be taken as a test case. Normally in accordance with existing codes 
from medical ethics from Hippocrates onwards, the drivers in question should 
receive medical treatment in the same way according to their injuries and needs, as 
long as the resources necessary for operations are available. Here again, the 
helping of the severely wounded is assured by the desert-sensitive egalitarian 
scheme, since my argument confirms theoretically and empirically that no one can 
be fully responsible in actual circumstances.
I turn now to the drowning child case that purports to show why we incur a 
duty to the needy, regardless of their personal responsibility. To distinguish this 
case from the physicians case where emergency is a distinct contextual factor, let 
me assume that there is enough time to rescue the child. It is absurd to deny that 
the moral duty ought be imposed upon those who can easily save the drowning 
child in this tragic situation. My argument does not gainsay the duty in question at 
all. According to the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility, the duty in 
question is generated for the high likelihood that children lack capacities to make 
rational judgments about their own behaviour involving certain risks. The fact that 
children’s own capacities are not rational enough in a non-culpable sense owing to 
their immaturity ultimately constitutes a compelling reason to help any child out of
overly rich in unrealistic detail.” (Goodin 1982: 11). Fair enough. To recant the use o f extreme cases 
does not change the main discussion here, however, for my argument can reasonably offer a certain 
aid to those whose life is in grim straits without acquittal o f each person’s responsibility in most 
actual cases: my argument places importance upon the gap between the ideal world in which full 
rationality obtains with perfect information and the actual world in which no one is fully informed 
and rational. See also the next paragraph.
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the water.
My desert-sensitive egalitarianism indeed provides a better account of a duty 
owed to the drowning child, for the responsibility-sensitive conception of justice 
can appreciate our considered judgments that the relevant sense of responsibility 
ought to be acquired and developed for the growth of children. On my argument, 
the fact that the drowning child is devoid of capacities which are rational enough to 
have reasonable beliefs about the risky outcome does not fully exempt her 
responsibility proportionately assigned on the basis of the Autonomy-Based 
Principle of Responsibility. Unlike the vulnerability argument that is not essentially 
concerned with individual responsibility, my desert-sensitive egalitarianism can 
give endorsement to this line of thought, in the form of appealing to the degree to 
which this child should take the responsibility: the responsibility is roughly 
proportional to the degree to which the child should acquire rational capacities for 
not making the same kind of error in her growing process. One essential role of 
proportionality—the responsibility-reflecting role of proportionality— in the 
Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility clearly supports this.47
It might be wondered if this desert-based account for saving the drowning 
child is true of cases in which an adult is drowning through his fault and can be 
rescued by someone nearby without any substantive difficulties. My response is 
yes, for the drowning adult should be saved from the pond on grounds that no one 
could be fully responsible, even if this adult has rational capacities of a sufficient 
kind. Here again, this is ultimately secured by the desert-sensitive egalitarian 
scheme. On the other hand, we might want to blame this person to the extent that 
her capacities are rational enough to avoid falling into such an improvident 
situation. Our considered judgments, for example, may be that the drowning
47 See my reply to the second question in Section 8 o f Chapter 3.
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person should bear its full cost—compensate a rescuer for wet clothes— after the 
rescue. My desert-sensitive egalitarianism justifies this claim, while the 
vulnerability argument cannot in its own terms. Unlike the vulnerability argument 
that is theoretically cost-insensitive, my argument is cost-sensitive in such a way as 
to track an agent’s responsibility in a rough proportional sense.
Let me summarise my contention here. The desert-sensitive egalitarian 
theory of justice appropriately mitigates miserable consequences of any sort, as in 
the vulnerability argument, by virtue of my proposed conception of desert that can 
be put within its proper place in egalitarian justice. In the desert-sensitive 
egalitarian scheme, the fact that no one could be perfectly rational and informed 
warrants moral duties owed to the needy who are therefore not fully responsible for 
their dire straits in actual circumstance: any physician should do an operation on 
anyone who is ferried to her hospital by ambulance; and any child should be saved 
from drowning by someone who is nearby and has no trouble with the rescue. Still, 
the duties borne by the surgeons and the rescuer do not exculpate those who are 
saved; for instance, the rescued might have to bear certain (proportionately 
ascribed) costs of the saving activities. Moreover, in conditions of excessive 
scarcity and emergency, we cannot ignore the magnitude of their deservingness in 
a rough sense: the less responsible a person is, the less deserving she is of the 
worse off consequence. In saving only one injured person at an automobile 
accident, surgeons in a tiny hospital are compelled to give priority to the operation 
on a less responsible patient, given that they are informed of who is less liable for 
the accident in some way or other beforehand. In this extreme case, my argument 
can supply a more convincing account of a duty owed to the patients than the 
vulnerability argument, because their responsibility would matter.
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5. The Urgency Argument
The third argument for the trumping claim is that it is urgent to rescue those who 
stand in dire need, whether they are responsible or not. According to this argument, 
the moral significance of basic needs is grounded in terms of the urgency of claims 
on basic needs relative to claims on mere interests or desires. Thomas Scanlon 
employs the criterion of urgency as an objective basis of measuring the relative 
weight of a person’s preference concerning her truly significant interest in a given 
circumstance.48 In this view, moral significance may well be assigned to a person’s 
claims on basic needs, because it can be said that her preference for the claims on 
basic needs is formed in terms of her vital interest for survival. In the light of 
urgency, we can thus rank people’s claims in such a way that claims on basic needs 
have some priority over claims of other kinds. What is special about this argument 
is its appeal to why we should assign particular importance to urgency as such. The 
concept of urgency in this argument involves a distinct sense of emergency in a 
way that is incorporated into basic needs themselves: meeting people’s basic needs 
is of special importance right now, not later.
The urgency argument seems consistent with our considered judgments, in 
that there seems a fair amount of agreement with respect to the urgency of some 
fundamental class of basic needs.49 The class of the biological minimum such as 
needs for food and water constitutes the urgency claims. It then might be argued 
that this leads us to prioritise the relevant principle which can justify the ubiquity 
of moral duties owed to people in urgent need, over any other moral principles 
(including my desert-sensitive egalitarian principles of justice). Scanlon calls this 
principle ‘the rescue principle’ which holds that “if you are presented with a
48 Scanlon (2003: Ch.4). See also Nagel (1991: 68).
49 See Sen (1993:40).
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situation in which you can prevent something very bad from happening, or 
alleviate someone’s dire plight, by making only a slight (or even moderate) 
sacrifice, then I would be wrong not to do so.” 50 What is distinctive about the 
rescue principle under the urgency argument is that it can allow for a relatively 
higher level of sacrifice and cost to aid in the subsistence of the needy, for the 
moral consideration of urgency that squares unmet basic needs with an emergency 
state commands immediate rescue in a way that would trump the considerations of 
culpability and cost even in cases of conflict between claims.51 The urgency 
argument thus seems more capable of instructing us to give immediate aid to those 
who are on the verge of starvation than any other arguments that are conditional on 
‘costlessness’ or ‘minimum costliness’ for aid. This argument says, for instance, 
that one ought to save the drowning child if one can do so, regardless of whether 
the child’s drowning is her own fault or not. One should also do so even in cases in 
which the rescue ruins one’s fancy clothes. One might have to do so even if some 
(but not extremely high) risk should be involved in saving the child. Even this level 
of duty is anchored by the rescue principle because, otherwise, her vital interest for 
survival would be neglected.
There is no denying that the urgency argument can provide a plausible 
account of why some claims on basic needs have a strong normative force by an 
appeal to the rescue principle. As a matter of fact, there are obvious cases in which 
we can find eligible the urgency argument for the rescue principle, such as urgent 
necessity for international aid to reduce global poverty. My contention is that this 
does not itself refute the desert-sensitive egalitarian view I put forward. To see why, 
we should reconsider the essential component of urgency: the robust sense of
50 Scanlon (1998: 224). See also Rawls (1971: 114-117).
51 Scanlon (1998: 225).
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emergency. There are two points worth mentioning about this component. First, 
the strong sense of emergency on which the rescue principle relies is not always 
connected to central issues in egalitarian debates. Many cases discussed in the 
name of egalitarian justice are not typically those which require that we have a split 
second to decide whether to rescue an individual. For one thing, whether or how 
much the ‘convinced’ gambler should be compensated need not be treated as an 
emergency case, since in this case, unlike in the physicians case, no immediate 
decision on the treatment of his claim is demanded. The urgency argument, 
however, treats both any case involving some lack of basic needs and the drowning 
child case as exactly the same, because emergency in this argument is an essential 
property in claims on basic needs. Second, relatedly, not all basic needs are to be 
met urgently. As has been seen above, most biological needs may be defined such 
that the deprivation of those needs is of the emergency kind such as starvation 
resulting from global poverty. Nevertheless, not all basic needs are urgent in a 
literal sense. For instance: among the biological needs, treatment of chronic disease 
is not urgently required; nor may the need for some autonomous exercise of 
capacities for rational choice—practical reasoning—be described as urgent. 
Furthermore, some desires may be as urgent as some biological needs, such as “my 
desire to hear Pavaroti’s farewell performance next week.” If emergency itself 
carries moral significance as the urgency argument contends, then this desire 
should be signified in the same way. This seems absurd.
This does not deny that there are basic needs of an urgent kind, the 
dissatisfaction of which leads to immediate death. So it might seem that relevant 
claims on these urgent needs trump what the desert-sensitive egalitarian conception 
of justice prescribes. We can see that this is not so if we correctly understand what
52 Goodin (1988: 36).
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the conception in question entails, however. Here again, my desert-sensitive 
egalitarianism tells us that we cannot hold anyone fully responsible for falling into 
the emergency situation, even in cases in which his or her culpable negligence is 
the main cause. Under the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality, a moral 
duty to help out the needy is nearly certainly guaranteed as the least that we should 
do. On the other hand, it is counterintuitive to allow the rescued to duck their 
responsibility, especially when they had an accessible alternative in which they 
would not get into the urgent situation. This can be reflected in the scheme under 
the Autonomy-Based Principle of Responsibility, by virtue of its proportional 
construal that ascribes a relevant degree of responsibility to the saved. This is, I 
think, a striking fact that my argument accommodates, whereas the urgency 
argument cannot in its own terms. In addition, my argument contains the telic 
egalitarian principle—the Principle of Baseline Equality— as the relevant desert 
base which stems directly from the value of simple equality in itself. Recall that the 
value of simple equality may well outweigh the desert-responsibility thesis in some 
situations. An appeal to the urgent needs can definitely be qualified as such cases; 
they must be satisfied immediately, whether the desperately needy are responsible 
or not. My whole theory of justice thus can appreciate any case in which the 
urgently needy must be helped, regardless of their responsibility.
Before closing, let me take one possible objection to the last point. It might 
be objected that in a situation in which all other people enjoy a slightly better level 
of well-being than the desperately needy, simple equalisation cannot have any 
implication of helping them and so fails to counter the trumping claim on some 
urgent needs. My response is that the situation in question is far from our actual 
world, because it includes a contextual factor of a non-standard kind: excessive 
scarcity of resources. Under this condition, achieving simple equality may not have
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desirable influence in any respect. From this, however, it does not follow that 
simple equality does not have a desirable effect on the needy in cases of a standard 
kind. Of course, this case could be taken to be a test case for my argument, as in 
the modified physicians case. But taken as such, this will not challenge my 
desert-sensitive egalitarianism, for, as I argued above, my argument can deal with 
cases of this non-standard kind such as the modified physicians case: an agent’s 
responsibility may have much heavier weight than that in a standard situation, to 
such an extent that it nullifies the desirability of simple equality. This is what my 
argument can support, while the urgency argument cannot.53
6. Summary
This chapter has scrutinised whether my argument assures the normative space of 
basic needs defined properly, in terms of whether it can provide a more desirable 
account for the treatment of the desperately needy than other arguments for basic 
needs trumping desert. I took up the three plausible arguments for this trumping 
claim—the compassion argument, the vulnerability argument, and the urgency 
argument— and examined them closely. It turned out that they all fail to justify the 
trumping claim. By comparison, my desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice 
performed perfectly especially in some hard cases that the three arguments could 
not handle. I thus conclud that my argument not only guarantees a duty owed to the 
needy, but also treats them more morally acceptably than if any of the three 
arguments for the strong normativity of basic needs were employed.
53 On this kind o f context-dependency of a value or factor, see Chapter 2, Section 3.
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C onclusion
In this thesis, I have presented a desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice which 
contains three important proposals. First, egalitarian justice is a pluralist concept 
such that the two forms of egalitarianism—telic egalitarianism and deontic 
egalitarianism—each enjoy an important place in egalitarian justice. More 
precisely, these two forms can be formulated as the relevant principles of justice: 
the Principle of Baseline Equality and the Responsibility-Based Principle of 
Inequality. Further, I have demonstrated that these principles can be combined 
within a pluralist synthesis: all people should be equally well off unless they are 
responsible for substantive inequalities, given the circumstances of justice. As has 
been noted, the political idea of human equality—which can be accepted by all 
reasonable people as an uncontroversial second-order ideal—is not only 
appreciated by the pluralist synthesis of these principles, but also orients practical 
judgments of a consistent and harmonious kind, as far as is possible, should the 
two principles conflict. So in some situations, the telic consideration of simple 
equality may justly outweigh whatever considerations arise from personal 
responsibility.
Second, the particular specification of responsibility in the
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Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality helps us avoid any unacceptable 
implication with which the responsibility-sensitive construal of deontic 
egalitarianism has been charged. But in my view, no one can be held fully 
responsible for substantive inequalities. The principle I proposed insists that people 
should be attributed full responsibility only if they are fully informed and rational. 
Put another way, it is very likely that people are partially—not 
ultimately—responsible for being worse off in actual circumstances. Adopting this 
conception allows us to preserve the luck-egalitarian ethic while still appreciating 
the normative space of basic needs. Taken together with the telic egalitarian 
consideration, I have argued that the Responsibility-Based Principle of Inequality 
would guarantee a minimally decent life for everyone.
Third, as typically is the case for any theory of justice, my argument has 
revealed that the two principles of egalitarian justice can ground moral duties, 
direct or indirect, in contemporary society. I have argued that the conception of 
desert can embrace the two principles at stake in such a way as to defuse 
longstanding suspicions of the role of desert in our practice of distributive justice. 
The point of this appeal to the conception of desert, I have emphasised, is that our 
prima facie moral duties to deserving parties can be fully captured by the close link 
between each individual’s desert claim and our reactive attitudes. This obtains only 
if those reactive attitudes are relevantly informed and impartially formed. I have 
shown that this construal not only echoes the circumstances of justice but 
explicates the content of reactive attitudes in terms of their expectation-sensitivity.
One of the virtues of the desert-sensitive egalitarianism I have proposed is 
that it preserves the luck-egalitarian ethic, which grants an essential role to 
responsibility judgments in egalitarian justice. I have demonstrated that there are 
three reasons that we can reasonably retain the luck-egalitarian ethic. First, my
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argument is committed to a form of pluralist justice that has an egalitarian ground 
for equality; this commitment deals with the worry that responsibility itself does 
not provide any ground for an egalitarian pattern of distribution. Second, the 
deontic form of egalitarianism which is concerned with an agent’s responsibility, 
on my argument, is carefully restricted in that responsibility is not fully held by 
anyone in actual circumstances. Third, our duties to do something for the deserved 
are assured by my argument because we discern our direct or indirect prima facie 
moral duties through our reactive emotions; these emotions can track what the 
principles prescribe only if they are shaped impartially with pertinent information. 
As such, my argument avoids the implausibilities that the desert-sensitive form of 
egalitarianism has been thought to engender. The luck-egalitarian ethic is upheld in 
such a way as to fit with our considered judgments about responsibility.
The practical upshot of this argument should be obvious. To take the notions 
of desert and responsibility in the way I propose would not commit us to any 
endorsement of existing inequalities in the actual market society. On the contrary, 
the desert-sensitive egalitarianism for which I have argued would very likely call 
for corrections of extant substantive inequalities. In particular, my argument 
enjoins that people who are not strictly responsible for being worse off be given 
redistributive advantages that would make their well-being closer to the baseline of 
equality. This shows that the role of desert and responsibility runs contrary to that 
which the right purport to delineate, for, on my argument, these notions lead us to 
appreciate claims of the worse off in actual circumstances. Furthermore, as I have 
argued, this can be actualised in a way that is schematised in institutional 
settings— such as the relevant tax scheme—under which we can feasibly impose 
endowment tax based on the partition of the population in terms of the 
circumstantial factors. This move radically undermines the feasibility concern that
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the right often use as a response to egalitarian arguments, including mine. It now 
should be evident that we can rob them of this weapon.
What I have discussed throughout this thesis, of course, only provides a 
plausible conception of egalitarian justice that deploys the three major 
notions—equality, responsibility, and desert— in the right places. No fuller defence 
of this theoretical conception of egalitarian justice has been offered as competing 
with and finally defeating different kinds of theories of justice, including 
anti-egalitarian ones. Although it is my hope that the approach to egalitarian justice 
developed in this thesis could gain extensive support, there is a need to defend the 
desert-sensitive egalitarian theory of justice against the other kinds of conceptions 
of justice. That is a task for another time.
Bibliography
Adler, Jonathan E. 1997. “Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes.” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 891-905.
— 2002. Beliefs Own Ethics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Alchian, Armen A., and Susan Woodward. 1988. “The Firm Is Dead; Long Live 
the Firm: A Review of Oliver E. Williamson’s The Economic Institutions o f  
Capitalism!'’ Journal o f  Economic Literature 26, 65-79.
Alkire, Sabina. 2002. Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty 
Reduction. New York: Oxford University Press.
Anderson, Elizabeth. 1999. “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, 287-337. 
Armstrong, D. M. 1968. A Materialist Theory o f the Mind. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
Ameson, Richard J. 1981. “What’s Wrong with Exploitation?” Ethics 91,202-227.
— 1989. “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.” Philosophical Studies 56,
77-93.
—  1990. “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for
Welfare.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19, 158-194.
— 1991. “Lockean Self-Ownership: Towards a Demolition.” Political Studies 39,
36-54.
— 1999a. “Egalitarianism and Responsibility.” Journal o f  Ethics 3, 225-247.
— 1999b. “What, If Anything, Renders All Humans Morally Equal?” In Dale
Jamieson (ed.) Singer and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 103-128.
—  2000a. “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism.” Ethics 110, 339-349.
—  2000b. “Perfectionism and Politics.” Ethics 111, 37-63.
Arnold, N. Scott. 1987. “Why Profits Are Deserved.” Ethics 97, 387-402.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1973. “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of 
Justice.” Journal o f  Philosophy 70, 245-263.
Baiasu, Sorin. 2006. “The Normative Pluralism of Desert.” Journal o f  Political 
Philosophy 14, 226-237.
Barry, Brian. 1965. Political Argument. New York: Humanities Press.
—  1995. Justice as Impartiality. New York: Clarendon Press.
188
Bibliography 189
Beim, S. L, and R. S. Peters. 1959. Social Principles and the Democratic State. 
London: Allen and Unwin.
Bennett, Jonathan. 1980. “Accountability.” In Zak van Straaten (ed.) Philosophical 
Subjects: Essays Presented to P. F. Strawson. New York: Clarendon Press, 
14-47.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1978. “Equality.” In Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays.
(ed.) Henry Hardy. London: Hogarth Press, 81-102.
Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions: A Theory o f Practical Reasoning. New 
York: Clarendon Press.
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. 2002. “The Inheritance of Inequality.” 
Journal o f  Economic Perspectives 16, 3-30.
Brandt, Richard B. 1955. “The Definition of an ‘Ideal Observer’ Theory in Ethics.” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15, 407-413.
—  1979. A Theory o f the Good and the Right. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Broome, John. 1991. Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
—  2004. “Reasons.” In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and
Michael Smith (eds.) Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy 
o f Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press, 28-55.
Brown, Campbell. 2003. “Giving Up Levelling Down.” Economics and 
Philosophy 19, 111-134.
Buchanan, James. 1962. “Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins.” Economica 
29, 17-28.
Camerer, Colin, and Richard H. Thaler. 1995. “Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators 
and Manners.” Journal o f Economic Perspectives 9, 209-219.
Campbell, T. D. 1974. “Humanity before Justice.” British Journal o f  Political 
Science 4, 1-16.
—  1988. Justice. Basingstoke: Macmillan Education.
Christman, John. 1988. “Entrepreneurs, Profits, and Deserving Market Shares.” 
Social Philosophy and Policy 6, 1-16.
—  1991. “Self-Ownership, Equality, and the Structure of Property Rights.”
Political Theory 19, 28-46.
Clayton, Matthew, and Andrew Williams (eds.) 2000. The Ideal o f  Equality. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press.
Cohen, G. A. 1989. “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” Ethics 99, 906-944.
—  1995. Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Copp, David. 1993. “Reason and Needs.” In R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris 
(eds.) Value, Welfare, and Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
112-137.
190 Bibliography
—  1997. “Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem.”
Ethics 108, 33-54.
Cottingham, John. 1986. “Partiality, Favouritism and Morality.” Philosophical 
Quarterly 36, 357-373.
Crisp, Roger. 2003. “Equality, Priority, and Compassion.” Ethics 113, 745-763. 
Cupit, Geoffrey. 1996. Justice as Fittingness. New York: Clarendon Press.
Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Daniels, Norman. 1985. Just Health Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
—  1990. “Equality of What: Welfare, Resources, or Capabilities?” Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research. Supplement 50, 273-296.
— 1996. Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Darwall, Stephen. 2002. Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Deigh, John. 1994. “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions.” Ethics 104, 824-854. 
de Sousa, Ronald. 2002. “Emotional Truth.” Proceedings o f the Aristotelian 
Society. Supplement 76,247-263.
— 2004. “Emotions -  What I Know, What I’d Like to Think I Know, and What
I’d Like to Think.” In Robert C. Solomon (ed.) Thinking about Feeling: 
Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 61-75.
Doyal, Len, and Ian Gough. 1991. A Theory o f Human Need. Houndmills: 
Macmillan.
Dreier, James. 1996. “Rational Preference: Decision Theory as a Theory of 
Practical Rationality.” Theory and Decision 40, 249-276.
—  2000. “Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation.”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, 619-638.
Dubs, Homer H. 1944. “The Defense of Human Equality.” Philosophical Review 
53, 399-400.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
—  1983. “Comment on Narveson: In Defense of Equality.” Social Philosophy and
Policy 1, 24-40.
— 1985. A Matter o f  Principle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
— 1986. Law ’s Empire. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press.
—  2000. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice o f Equality. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Bibliography 191
Ekstrom, Laura Waddell. 2000. Free Will: A Philosophical Study. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press.
Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion o f Rationality. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Elniversity Press.
Feinberg, Joel. 1970. Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory o f Responsibility. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
—  1973. Social Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Feldman, Fred. 1996. “Responsibility as a Condition for Desert.” Mind 105, 
165-168.
—  1997. Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
—  2003. “Return to Twin Peaks: On the Intrinsic Moral Significance of Equality.”
In Olsaretti 2003, 145-168.
Firth, Roderick. 1952. “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer.” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 12, 317-345.
Fischer, John Martin. 1999. “Recent Work on Moral Responsibility.” Ethics 110, 
93-139.
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza (eds.) 1993. Perspectives on Moral 
Responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornel University Press.
—  1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theoiy o f  Moral Responsibility. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Fleurbaey, Marc. 1995. “Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?” 
Economics and Philosophy 11, 25-55.
—  2001. “Egalitarian Opportunities.” Law and Philosophy 20, 499-530.
Frankfurt, Harry G. 1984. “Necessity and Desire.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 45, 1-13.
— 1987. “Equality as a Moral Ideal.” Ethics 98, 21-43.
—  1988. The Importance o f What We Care about: Philosophical Essays. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Freeman, Samuel. 1994. “Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right.” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 23, 313-349.
Fried, Barbara H. 2003. “Ex Ante/Ex Post.” Journal o f Contemporary Legal Issues 
13, 123-160.
Friedman, Marilyn. 1989. “The Impracticability of Impartiality.” Journal o f  
Philosophy 86, 645-656.
Gauthier, David. 1986. Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory o f Normative 
Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
—  1991. “Constructing Justice.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, 264-279. 
Gilens, Martin. 1999. Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics
192 Bibliography
o f Antipoverty Policy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Goodin, Robert E. 1982. Political Theory and Public Policy. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press.
—  1985a. “Negating Positive Desert Claims.” Political Theory 13, 575-598.
—  1985b. Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis o f Our Social Responsibilities.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
—  1985c. “Vulnerabilities and Responsibilities: An Ethical Defense of the
Welfare State.” American Political Science Review 79, 775-787.
—  1988. Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory o f the Welfare State.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
—  1995. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Gordon, Robert M. 1987. The Structure o f Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive 
Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Greenspan, Patricia S. 1988. Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional 
Justification. New York: Routledge.
Griffin, James. 1986. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral 
Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gutmann, Amy. 1980. Liberal Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Haji, Ishtiyaque. 1998. Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Hare, R. M. 1975. “Rawls’ Theory of Justice.” In Norman Daniels (ed.) Reading 
Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory o f Justice’. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 169-205.
Harper, David A. 1996. Entrepreneurship and the Market Process: An Enquiry 
into the Growth o f Knowledge. London: Routledge.
Harsanyi, John C. 1976. Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific 
Explanation. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Hart, W. A. 1998. “Nussbaum, Kant and Conflicts Between Duties.” Philosophy 
73,609-618.
Hayek, F. A. 1960. The Constitution o f Liberty. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
—  1979. Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol. 3: The Political Order o f  a Free
People. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Herman, Barbara. 1993. The Practice o f Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Hinton, Timothy. 2001. “Must Egalitarians Choose Between Fairness and 
Respect?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, 72-87.
Hsieh, Nien-he. 2000. “Moral Desert, Fairness and Legitimate Expectations in the 
Market.” Journal o f  Political Philosophy 8, 91-114.
Bibliography 193
Hume, David. 1975. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and 
Concerning the Principles o f  Morals, (ed.) L. A. Selby-Bigge. 3rd edition, 
(rev.) P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
—  1978. A Treatise o f Human Nature, (ed.) L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd edition, (rev.)
P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hurka Thomas. 2003. “Desert: Individualistic and Holistic.” In Olsaretti 2003, 
45-68.
Hurley, S. L. 2003. Justice, Luck, and Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Husak, Douglas. 2000. “Holistic Retribution.” California Law Review 88, 27-36. 
Jackson, Frank. 1986. “A Probabilistic Approach to Moral Responsibility.” In Ruth 
Barcan Marcus, Georg J. W. Dom, and Paul Weingartner (eds.) Logic, 
Methodology and Philosophy o f  Science VII. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 351-365.
—  2001. “How Decision Theory Illuminates Assignments of Moral
Responsibility.” In Ngaire Nafifine, Rosemary Owens, and John Williams 
(eds.) Intention in Law and Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate, 19-36.
Johnson, Robert Neal. 1997. “Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational.” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 619-625.
Kagan, Shelly. 1988. “The Additive Fallacy.” Ethics 99, 5-31.
—  1989. The Limits o f  Morality. New York: Clarendon Press.
—  1999. “Equality and Desert.” In Louis P. Pojman and Own McLeod (eds.)
What Do We Deserve?: A Reader on Justice and Desert. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 298-314.
—  2003. “Comparative Desert.” In Olsaretti 2003, 93-122.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1986. “The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice.” In Jon Elster (ed.) Rational Choice. New York: New 
York University Press, 123-141.
—  2000. “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.” In Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky (eds.) Choices, Values, and Frames. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 209-223.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1986. “Fairness and 
the Assumptions of Economics.” Journal o f Business 59, 285-300.
Kamm, F. A. 1996. Morality, Mortality Volume II: Rights, Duties, and Status. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Kane, John. 1996. “Justice, Impartiality, and Equality: Why the Concept of Justice 
Does Not Presume Equality.” Political Theory 24, 375-393.
Kane, Robert. 1996. The Significance o f Free Will. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Critique o f Pure Reason, (trans. and eds.) Paul Guyer and 
Allen W. Wood. New York: Cambridge University Press.
194 Bibliography
Kelly, Erin. 2002. “Doing without Desert.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83, 
180-205.
Kirzner, Israel M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press.
— 1981. “Entrepreneurship, Entitlement, and Economic Justice.” Jeffrey Paul
(ed.) Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy State, and Utopia. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 383-411.
— 1992. The Meaning o f Market Process: Essays in the Development o f  Modern
Austrian Economics. London: Routledge.
Kolm, Serge-Christope. 1996. Modern Theories o f  Justice. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996a. Creating the Kingdom o f Ends. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
—  1996b. The Sources o f  Normativity. (ed.) Onora O’Neill. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kristjänsson, Kristjän. 2003. “Justice, Desert, and Virtue Revisited.” Social Theory 
and Practice 29, 39-63.
Kymlicka, Will. 1988. “Rawls on Teleology and Deontology.” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 17, 173-190.
—  1990. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Lamont, Julian. 1994. “The Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice.” 
Philosophical Quarterly 44, 45-64.
—  1995. “Problems for Effort-Based Distribution Principles.” Journal o f  Applied
Philosophy 12, 215-229.
Levine, Andrew. 1999. “Rewarding Effort.” Journal o f  Political Philosophy 7, 
404-418.
Lewis, David. 1983. Philosophical Papers Voll. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. 1999a. “Ameson on Equality of Opportunity for 
Welfare.” Journal o f  Political Philosophy 7, 478-487.
—  1999b. “Equality and Responsibility.” Danish Yearbook o f Philosophy 34,
65-90.
—  2001. “Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility.” Ethics 111, 548-579.
—  2004. “Smilansky’s Baseline Objection to Choice-Egalitarianism.” SATS:
Nordisk Tidsskriftfor Filosofi 5, 147-150.
Little, Margaret Olivia. 2000. “Moral Generalities Revisited.” In Brad Hooker and 
Margaret Olivia Little (eds.) Moral Particularism. New York: Clarendon 
Press, 276-304.
Locke, John. 1960. Two Treatises o f  Government, (ed.) Peter Laslett. Cambridge:
Bibliography 195
Cambridge University Press.
Marcus, Ruth Barcan. 1980. “Moral Dilemmas and Consistency.” Journal o f  
Philosophy 77, 121-136.
Marshall, Gordon, Adam Swift, and Stephen Roberts. 1997. Against the Odds?: 
Social Class and Social Justice in Industrial Societies. New York: Clarendon 
Press.
Mason, Andrew. 2001. “Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection.” 
Analysis 61, 246-254.
—  2004. “Equality of Opportunity and Differences in Social Circumstances.”
Philosophical Quarterly 54, 368-388.
McDowell, John. 1998. Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
McKeever, Sean, and Michael Ridge. 2006. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a 
Regulative Ideal. New York: Clarendon Press.
McKerlie, Dennis. 1995. “Critical Notice of Larry S. Temkin, Equality.” Canadian 
Journal o f  Philosophy 25, 623-636.
—  1996. “Equality.” Ethics 106, 274-296.
McLeod, Owen. 2003a. “Desert.” In Stanford Encyclopaedia o f Philosophy. 
(http://plato.stanford.edU/entries/desert/J
—  2003b. “On the Comparative Element of Justice.” In Olsaretti 2003, 123-144. 
Mele, Alfred R. 1995. Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Mendus, Susan. 2002. Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Miller, David. 1976. Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
—  1989. Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations o f  Market
Socialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
— 1999. Principles o f  Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
—  2003. “Comparative and Noncomparative Desert.” In Olsaretti 2003, 25-44. 
Mills, Eugene. 2004. “Scheffler on Rawls, Justice, and Desert.” Law and
Philosophy 23, 261-272.
Moriarty, Jeffrey. 2003. “Against the Asymmetry of Desert.” Noüs 37, 518-536.
—  2005. “The Epistemological Argument against Desert.” Utilitas 17, 205-221. 
Munoz-Darde, Veronique. 2005. “Equality and Division: Values in Principle.”
Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society. Supplement 79, 255-284.
Murphy, Liam, and Thomas Nagel. 2002. The Myth o f Ownership: Taxes and 
Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 1979. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—  1991. Equality and Partiality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nell, Edward. 1987. “On Deserving Profits.” Ethics 97, 403-410.
196 Bibliography
Norman, Richard. 1987. Free and Equal: A Philosophical Examination o f Political 
Values. New York: Oxford University Press.
— 1998. “The Social Basis of Equality.” In Andrew Mason (ed.) Ideals o f
Equality. Oxford: Blackwell, 37-51.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Nussbaum, Martha C. 1992. “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense 
of Aristotelian Essentialism.” Political Theory 20, 202-246.
—  1993. “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach.” In Nussbaum and
Sen 1993, 242-269.
—  1999. Sex and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha C., and Amartya Sen (eds.) 1993. The Quality o f  Life. New
York: Clarendon Press.
Olsaretti, Serena (ed.) 2003. Desert and Justice. New York: Clarendon Press.
—  2004. Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
O’Neill, Onora. 1996. Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  
Practical Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— 2000. Bounds o f Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Otsuka, Michael. 2003. Libertarianism without Inequality. New York: Clarendon 
Press.
— 2004. “Equality, Ambition and Insurance.” Proceedings o f the Aristotelian
Society. Supplement 78, 151-166.
Parfit, Derek. 2000. “Equality or Priority?” In Clayton and Williams 2000, 81-125. 
Pettit, Philip. 1991. “Decision Theory and Folk Psychology.” In Michael 
Bacharach and Susan Hurley (eds.) Foundations o f  Decision Theory: Issues 
and Advances. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 147-175.
Phillips, Anne. 1999. Which Equalities Matter? Cambridge: Polity Press.
—  2004. “Defending Equality of Outcome.” Journal o f  Political Philosophy 12,
1-19.
Piper, Adrian M. S. 1987. “Moral Theory and Moral Alienation.” Journal o f  
Philosophy 84, 102-118.
—  1991. “Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal Imagination.” Ethics 101,
726-757.
Pogge, Thomas W. 2002. World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan 
Responsibilities and Reforms. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
Pojman, Louis P. 1997. “On Human Equal Worth: A Critique of Contemporary 
Egalitarianism.” In Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (eds.) 
Equality: Selected Readings. New York: Oxford University Press, 282-299. 
Popper, Karl R. 1966. The Open Society and its Enemies Vol.2: The High Tide o f  
Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. 5th edition. London: Routledge
Bibliography 197
and Kegan Paul.
Price, Terry L. 1999. “Egalitarian Justice, Luck, and the Costs of Chosen Ends.” 
American Philosophical Quarterly 36, 267-278.
Rachels. James. 1978. “What People Deserve.” In John Arthur and William H. 
Shaw (eds.) Justice and Economic Distribution. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 150-163.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory o f Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press.
—  1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
—  1999. Collected Papers, (ed.) Samuel Freeman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Reader, Soran. 2006. “Does a Basic Needs Approach Need Capabilities?” Journal 
o f Political Philosophy 14, 337-350.
Rescher, Nicholas. 1966. Distributive Justice: A Constructive Critique o f the 
Utilitarian Theory o f Distribution. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
Roemer, John E. 1994. Egalitarian Perspectives: Essays in Philosophical 
Economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
— 1996. Theories o f  Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
— 1998. Equality o f  Opportunity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
—  2003. “Defending Equality of Opportunity.” Monist 86, 261-282.
Sadurski, Wojciech. 1985. Giving Desert its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Salmela, Mikko. 2006. “True Emotions.” Philosophical Quarterly 56, 382-405. 
Sandbu, Martin E. 2004. “On Dworkin’s Brute-Luck— Option-Luck Distinction 
and the Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism.” Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics 3, 283-312.
Scanlon, T. M. 1988. “The Significance of Choice.” In Sterling McMurrin (ed.) 
The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Vol. 8. Salt Lake City, UT: 
University of Utah Press. Reprinted in Stephen Darwall (ed.) Equal 
Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 39-104. Page references to reprinting.
— 1998. What We Ch\>e to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
—  2003. The Difficulty o f  Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Scheffler, Samuel. 1992. Human Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.
—  2001. Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems o f  Justice and Responsibility in
Liberal Thought. New York: Oxford University Press.
— 2003a. “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert.” In Olsaretti 2003, 69-92.
198 Bibliography
— 2003b. “What is Egalitarianism?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, 5-39. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1943. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. London:
George Allen and Unwin.
Sen, Amartya. 1984. Resources, Values and Development. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.
— 1987. “The Standard of Living: Lecture I, Concepts and Critiques.” In
Geoffrey Hawthorn (ed.) The Standard o f Living. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1-19.
—  1992. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
—  1993. “Capability and Well-Being.” In Nussbaum and Sen 1993, 30-53.
Sher, George. 1987. Desert. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sidgwick, Henry. 1981. The Methods o f Ethics. 7th edition. Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett.
Simmons, A. John. 1992. The Lockean Theory o f Rights. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Singer, Peter. 1976. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment o f  
Animals. London: J. Cape.
Smilansky, Saul. 1994. “Fortunate Misfortune.” Ratio 7, 153-163.
—  1996. “Responsibility and Desert: Defending The Connection.” Mind 105,
157-163.
— 2000. Free Will and Illusion. New York: Clarendon Press.
—  2003a. “Choice-Egalitarianism and the Paradox of the Baseline.” Analysis 63,
146-151.
— 2003b. “Is Justice Binary?: A Free-Will-Related Exploration.” Metaphilosophy
34, 476-487.
Smith, Adam. 1976. The Theory o f Moral Sentiments, (eds.) D. D. Raphael and A.
L. Macfie. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Smith, Michael. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.
— 1995. “Internal Reasons.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55,
109-131.
—  1997. “A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility.” In Garret Cullity and Berys
Gaut (eds.) Ethics and Practical Reason. New York: Clarendon Press, 
293-319.
—  2003. “Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness,
and Compulsion.” In Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet (eds.) Weakness o f 
Will and Practical Irrationality. New York: Clarendon Press, 17-38.
Solomon, Robert C. 1976. The Passions. Garden City, NY: Anchor 
Press/Doubleday.
—  1980. “Emotions and Choice.” In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) Explaining
Emotions. Berkeley and Los Angels, CA: University of California Press,
Bibliography 199
251-281.
Steiner, Hillel. 1977. “The Natural Right to the Means of Production.” 
Philosophical Quarterly 27, 41-49.
—  1994. An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell.
Strawson, Galen. 1994. “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.” 
Philosophical Studies 75, 5-24.
Strawson, Peter. 1962. “Freedom and Resentment.” Proceedings o f  the British 
Academy 48, 1-25. Reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza 1993, 45-66. Page 
references to reprinting.
Temkin, Larry S. 1993. Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.
—  2000. “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection.” In Clayton and
Williams 2000, 126-161.
Thomson, Garrett. 1987. Needs. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1990. The Realm o f  Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Tungodden, Bertil. 2003. “The Value of Equality.” Economics and Philosophy 19, 
1-44.
Ullmann-Margalit, Edna, and Cass R. Sunstein. 2002. “Inequality and 
Indignation.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, 337-362.
Vallentyne, Peter. 1998. “Critical Notice of G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, 
Freedom, and Equality.” Canadian Journal o f Philosophy 28, 609-626.
—  2002. “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities.” Ethics
112, 529-557.
—  2003. “Brute Luck Equality and Desert.” In Olsaretti 2003, 187-204. 
Vallentyne, Peter, and Hillel Steiner (eds.) 2000. Left-Libertarianism and Its
Critics: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Palgrave.
Vallentyne, Peter, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka. 2005. “Why 
Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply 
to Fried.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, 201-215.
Van Parijs, Philippe. 1995. Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) can Justify 
Capitalism? New York: Clarendon Press.
Varian, Hal R. 1987. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company.
Waldron, Jeremy. 1979. “Enough and as Good Left for Others.” Philosophical 
Quarterly 29, 319-328.
—  1988. The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
—  2002. God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations o f  John Locke’s
Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Walker, Margaret Urban. 1991. “Partial Consideration.” Ethics 101, 758-774. 
Wallace, R. Jay. 1996. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA:
200 Bibliography
Harvard University Press.
— 1999. “Three Conceptions of Rational Agency.” Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice 2, 217-242.
Watson, Gary. 1987. “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a 
Strawsonian Theme.” In Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.) Responsibility, 
Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 256-286. Reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza 
1993, 119-148. Page references to reprinting.
—  2001. “Reasons and Responsibility.” Ethics 111, 374-394.
Wax, Amy L. 2000. “Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive 
Attitudes, and the Political Economy of Welfare Reform.” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 63, 257-297.
Wenar, Leif. 1998. “Original Acquisition of Private Property.” Mind 107, 799-819. 
White, Stuart. 2003. The Civic Minimum: On the Rights and Obligations o f  
Economic Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wiggins, David. 1987. Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy o f Value. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wiland, Eric. 2000. “Good Advice and Rational Action.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 60, 561-569.
Williams Barnard. 1981. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Wolf, Susan. 1981. “The Moral Importance of Free Will.” Mind 90, 386-405. 
Reprinted in Fischer and Ravizza 1993, 101-118. Page references to 
reprinting.
Wolff, Jonathan. 1991. Robert Nozick: Property Justice and the Minimal State. 
Oxford: Polity Press.
— 1998. “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos.” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 27, 97-122.
Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics o f Difference. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
—  2001. “Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice.”
Journal o f  Political Philosophy 9, 1-18.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. 2004. Divine Motivation Theory. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
